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La communauté des Etats qui était demeurée jusqu'alors anarchique, est devenue 
une véritable société internationale organisée. Cette transformation est un fait ; il 
n'est pas nécessaire qu'un accord international le consacre. Cette société est 
composée non seulement d'États, parfois groupés, voire même associés, mais 
aussi d'autres entités internationales ; elle a une existence, une personnalité 
distinctes de celles des membres qui la composent ; elle a des fins qui lui sont 
propres. D'autre part, les rapports internationaux présentent divers aspects : 
politique, économique, psychologique, etc., ainsi qu'un grand dynamisme, une 
complexité et une variabilité qu'ils n'avaient pas autrefois.1 
The foregoing words, from 1950, were issued in a separate opinion by Judge 
Alejandro Álvarez from an early bench of the International Court of Justice.  They 
enjoyed no binding force and were not part of the majority opinion in the case, the 
                                                                
1 International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 11 July 1950, [1950] I.C.J. Reports 128, at 
177 (Judge Álvarez, Dissenting Opinion) (“The commmunity of States, which had hitherto remained 
anarchical, has become in fact an organized international society. This transformation is a fact which does 
not require the consecration of an international agreement. This society consists not only of States, 
groups and even associations of States, but also of other international entities. It has an existence and a 
personality distinct from those of its members. It has its own purposes. On the other hand, 
international relations present various aspects: political, economic, psychological, etc., and today 
possess a dynamic character, complexity and variety which they did not show formerly.”) (emphasis in 
original).consecration of an international agreement. This society consists not only of States, groups 
and even associations of States, but also of other international entities. It has an existence and a 
personality distinct from those of its members. It has its own purposes. On the other hand, 
international relations present various aspects: political, economic, psychological, etc., and today 
possess a dynamic character, complexity and variety which they did not show formerly.”) (emphasis in 
original). 
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International Status of South-West Africa Advisory Opinion.  Coming from the bench of 
the ICJ, however, they represented the modern ascendance of a distinct 
cosmopolitan conception of international law.  That cosmopolitan conception may 
be observed throughout 20th century scholarship into the present, as well as in the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ, among other areas of practice.  Cosmopolitan ideas in 
international law, however, have generally been treated without sufficient regard to 
differentiation among distinct schools of cosmopolitan thought.  Moreover, the 
particular cosmopolitan conception at issue has never been expressly developed as a 
doctrine in its own right, and thus lacks the consolidated vocabulary and critical 
engagement enjoyed by clear doctrinal movements, cosmopolitan and otherwise.  I 
propose to recognize the school of thought reflected in Judge Álvarez’s words as a 
discrete theoretical construct, and refer to it as innate cosmopolitanism.  Innate 
cosmopolitanism stands for the proposition that the world as a whole represents a 
phenomenon with interests and even a will of its own – des fins qui lui sont propres, to 
borrow Álvarez’s phrase – and is capable of establishing a foundation for universal 
norms under international law. 
The failure adequately to differentiate in the treatment and appreciation of different 
cosmopolitan schools of thought has impeded both the clarity and adequacy of 
arguments for cosmopolitanism, as well as criticism of cosmopolitanism in 
international law.  In this book, I will distinguish between three broad schools of 
cosmopolitan thought, namely liberal cosmopolitanism, constitutional 
cosmopolitanism and innate cosmopolitanism, and trace the bounds of the domain 
of each, including the method, substance and ends attributable to them.  Liberal 
cosmopolitanism is the dominant school of cosmopolitan thought in political 
theory, largely to the exclusion of other cosmopolitan theory.  Constitutional 
cosmopolitanism represents a prevalent means of conceiving of universal norms in 
international law today.  Innate cosmopolitanism, however, represents still another 
means of conceiving of universal norms, which may helpfully be contrasted with the 
method and substance of liberal and constitutional cosmopolitanism.  Moreover, 
despite the relative neglect of innate cosmopolitan ideas as part of a distinct 
theoretical construct, the innate cosmopolitan conception, in a variety of terms and 
contexts, has been central to the narrative and development of modern international 
law.  Thus, in recognizing innate cosmopolitanism as a distinct theoretical construct, 
I propose as well in this work to look more closely and critically at the role of innate 
cosmopolitan ideas in the discourse and development of international law. 
  
3 
 
Cosmopolitanism 
While international law and international lawyers have regularly been described as 
cosmopolitan,2  the term in this context has remained elusive, or has been taken as 
self-evident, and is rarely explained with any thoroughness.  In the meantime, 
international law is increasingly occupied with still more terms that may also be 
described as cosmopolitan, including the “interest of all mankind” 3 and “the 
province of all mankind”,4 or the “common bonds” and “delicate mosaic” described 
by the Rome Statute,5 or certain universal values attributed to international 
economic law or recognized by regional regimes in their extra-regional relations,6 or 
the normative authority attributed to world public opinion as a matter of law.7  With 
the failure of an adequate definition comes an insufficient comprehension of the 
normative scope and purpose of these developments and other discrete 
cosmopolitan terms in legal arguments and resolutions arising out of international 
controversies.  While cosmopolitan terms continue to multiply in the documents 
and discourse of international law, their effect continues to be underappreciated. 
What does cosmopolitanism generally mean in international law?  It does not 
properly refer to any narrowly orthodox theory or practice of international law, 
which presumes a consensual system of relations among equal and independent 
sovereign states.  Rather, at its most broad, the cosmopolitan obtains to the 
cosmopolis: a harmonious and universal order.  The cosmopolitan system calls for 
universal order, whereas the consensual system allows for a cooperative (or 
uncooperative) anarchy of normative relations.  When international lawyers are 
described as cosmopolitan, the association invokes aspirations to a system of law 
capable of purposefully sustaining order in the world on unified terms.  Their 
                                                                
2 See, e.g., Frederick Pollock, Cosmopolitan Custom and International Law, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 565 
(1916); Martti Koskenniemi, Legal Cosmopolitanism: Tom Franck’s Messianic World, 35 N.Y.U. J. 
Int’l. L. & Pol. 471 (2003). 
3 Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71, preamble; Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies (1967), preamble. 
4 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1979), Art. 
4(1). 
5 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), preamble. 
6 See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Theories of Justice, Human Rights, and the Constitution of 
International Markets, 37 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 408 (2003); Erik Erikson, The EU – a cosmopolitan 
polity?, 13 J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y 252 (2006). 
7 See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, [1996] I.C.J. 
Reports 226 (Judge Weeramatry, Dissenting Opinion).; and Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, [1996] I.C.J. Reports 226 (Judge Shahabuddeen, Dissenting Opinion). 
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cosmopolitan order is an objective one, pretending to a normative authority that is 
superior to its subjects in principle and defined independently of them.  In contrast 
with the subjective system of international law as it is classically described, 
cosmopolitanism represents a normative condition that is neither definable nor 
revocable by state subjects individually, nor by any other subjective actors in their 
individual capacities.  Cosmopolitanism replaces the political authority of sovereign 
states (and their analogs) with the authority of universal norms. 
Cosmopolitan aspirations at law to world order, independent of the political will 
of states and other subjective interests, have lately received critical attention.8  
Scholarship has shed critical light on progressive aspirations to the would-be 
greater good of a unified cosmopolis of world relations, not mediated by 
subjective attachments.  This critical scholarship makes clear that cosmopolitan 
doctrine, despite its apparent antinomy with orthodox ideas of a consensual 
system of law among states, is neither wholly oppositional nor exactly subversive 
in its relationship to international law and international legal discourse.  Rather, 
the cosmopolitan ethos runs like a leitmotif throughout the work of diverse 
scholars and practitioners in modern international law.  Appreciating the 
cosmopolitan undercurrent of international law can be crucial to appreciating the 
historical project of international law,9 a project that is bound up with the 
tension between aspirations to objective international norms, and a subjective 
international system.  The critical attention to cosmopolitanism generally, 
however, has not adequately distinguished among distinct cosmopolitan 
doctrines, methods and norms. 
 
Innate cosmopolitanism 
As a sentiment or sympathy, innate cosmopolitanism is largely taken for granted, 
but in its scope and particulars, it is not properly recognized, and as a result, its role 
and effect in international law have gone underappreciated and unchallenged.  
Notably, though innate cosmopolitanism has not been recognized as a discrete 
school of thought even by its adherents, scholars and practitioners referring to 
innate cosmopolitan ideas tend regularly to invoke a long history of innate 
                                                                
8 See, e.g., David Kennedy, One, Two, Three, Many Legal Orders: Legal Pluralism and The 
Cosmopolitan Dream, 31 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 641 (2007). 
9 See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), passim. 
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cosmopolitan ideas, in each case largely as though for the first time.  The vocabulary 
has never been sufficiently conformed or consolidated, such that the same historical 
lessons are repeated in various contexts, and scholars and practitioners regularly 
refer for a variety of purposes and in a variety of ways to a common history.  That 
history is a history of ideas in support of a normative potential vested in the world 
as a whole, capable of serving as a source of law under international law.  Because 
the innate cosmopolitan premise of a world social or political collective capable of 
establishing norms and normative authority is so difficult to establish empirically, 
the history of innate cosmopolitan ideas plays an unusually significant role in the 
argument for innate cosmopolitan normativity.  The history of the idea, captured 
and recaptured in repetitious exercises, serves as a pedigree and bona fides where 
other support is lacking.  Furthermore, the regular recourse to an intellectual history 
of cosmopolitanism has bound application of the innate cosmopolitan model to the 
historical narrative of cosmopolitanism in international law more closely than other, 
better recognized forms of cosmopolitanism. 
Several characteristics that define the consistent substance of the innate 
cosmopolitan idea are reflected in the words of Judge Álvarez, cited at the outset.  
For one, innate cosmopolitanism founds a bedrock normativity in international law 
on the will and interests of the world as a collective whole.  To found normativity 
on the will and interests of the world as a whole means to assume as a central 
premise that the world of people and peoples represents a social or political whole 
capable of exhibiting a unified will or unified interests.  Moreover, by conceiving of 
the world in terms of a discrete collective capable of exhibiting and sustaining an 
exercise of normative authority in its own interests or according to its own will, the 
world is made an autonomous phenomenon.  It is conceived to be independent of 
the smaller collectives and entities, including states, which it comprises.  As 
Álvarez’s words indicate, the autonomous world phenomenon is attributed 
something like personality, elle a une existence, une personnalité distinctes de celles des 
membres qui la composent – it is ‘subjectivized’, to use a term to which I return in 
Chapter 2.  The subjective and independent world phenomenon, then, becomes a 
source of normative authority in the international system.  Moreover, it becomes a 
preeminent source: as Chapter 2 makes clear, the world as a whole is taken to 
represent the objective foundation of normativity for international law, capable of 
escaping the contradictions of a system of law established according to consent. 
Another characteristic of innate cosmopolitanism reflected in the quote from Judge 
Álvarez is the appreciation of the world phenomenon as a fact.  The world as a 
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social or political whole is perceived to exist as a function of comprehensive 
interdependence in the world.  Moreover, because the subjective personality of the 
world as a whole is understood as a fact or phenomenon, the world phenomenon 
precedes and is independent of any positive expression – or lack thereof – as a 
matter of international law.  Its recognition is joined to an emphasis on 
observational method, as opposed to formal legal method.  Likewise, as I will 
explore in Chapter 2, its normative potential flows from the fact of its existence, 
rather than any positive law affirmation.  The nature of the subjective personality 
manifested by the world unit will be discernible as a matter of proper observation.  
Accordingly, innate cosmopolitanism has typically relied on assertions of roughly 
sociological observation – if not simple intuition – to describe characteristics of the 
interdependent world as a whole at any given point in time.  Álvarez’s unbounded 
list of attributes associated with the phenomenon of the world as a whole – 
including, but not limited to, political, economic and psychological attributes – 
partially reflects the scope of the observational analysis argued to be necessary to 
comprehend the normative mandate represented by the world as a whole under 
innate cosmopolitanism.  From those observed attributes, the norms adhered to by 
the world as a whole at any given point in time may be discerned, and from those 
norms law and policy may be determined. 
The premise that the world as a whole represents a viable – even fundamental – 
normative potential in international law, independent of any positive law 
affirmation, represents a challenge to the limitations of voluntary positivism, and 
particularly to the limited list of traditionally-recognized sources of international law, 
such as are recognized by Art. 38 of the World Court’s statute.  This is one of the 
crucial and most controversial aspects of innate cosmopolitanism as it is employed 
in international law; I return to the point below and in various contexts in all of the 
remaining chapters.  Additionally, there exists under the innate cosmopolitan model 
a close link between law and policy.  As Chapters 2 and 4 will make clear, the 
normative potential attributed to the autonomous world as a whole becomes, in the 
work of theorists and practitioners, synonymous with policy tailored to the 
perceived attributes particular to the world complex.  The incorporation of a policy 
mandate, especially as it may be observed in the jurisprudence of the ICJ, reflects 
the expansive scope of legal argumentation and legal authority under innate 
cosmopolitanism.  That scope is not constrained by traditional terms of positive law 
and political contestation, to which points I return in the Conclusion of this work. 
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In sum, a normative potential flows from the particular nature of the world as a 
whole, such that proper observation of social and political interrelationships that 
make up the phenomenon of the social or political world as a whole will yield 
universal norms, which norms will guide law and policy alike.  In application, as 
Chapter 4 demonstrates, the innate cosmopolitan model is used by the ICJ to 
extend normative authority over a given matter, on the basis of what is held to be in 
the interest of the world as a whole, where positive law may not produce a 
comparable result.  Furthermore, the extension of authority by the ICJ typically 
takes an ad hoc character across cases, often invoked in a sui generis manner, in 
application to select issues as they arise.  In part, that ad hoc character may be 
attributable to the lack of any developed vocabulary or established framework for a 
doctrine of innate cosmopolitanism, in part it may be attributable to the specific 
appeal of innate cosmopolitanism to a source of normativity that exists independent 
of positive international law. 
 
Liberal, constitutional and innate cosmopolitanism 
The scope and architecture of innate cosmopolitanism, as well as the ends to which 
it is put, can only fully be appreciated in comparison with other forms of 
cosmopolitanism at work in international law.  I consider here liberal and 
constitutional cosmopolitanism: two forms of cosmopolitan doctrine predominantly 
recognized in political theory and the body and discourse of international law.  
Liberal cosmopolitanism is the dominant theory of cosmopolitanism in political 
theory, and it is regularly applied to international law for purposes of critique or 
innovation.10  Constitutional cosmopolitanism is discernible in international legal 
scholarship, and examines the possibility or reality of a world constitution, lately also 
incorporating basic tenets of liberal cosmopolitanism, including normative 
individualism.11  I propose to contrast an innate cosmopolitan model of 
international law with liberal and constitutional cosmopolitanism, for the purpose of 
distinguishing tenets of innate cosmopolitanism, the particular conceptual domain it 
occupies and the role for which it is invoked, and thereby further to explore the 
                                                                
10 See, e.g., Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Kok-Chor 
Tan, Justice Without Borders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Allen Buchanan and 
Robert O. Keohane, The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal, 18 Ethics 
& Int’l. Affairs 1 (2004); Thomas Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 Ethics 48 (1992). 
11 See, e.g., Anne Peters, The Merits of Global Constitutionalism, 16 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 397 
(2009). 
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actual normative influence enjoyed by innate cosmopolitan ideas in international 
legal practice and argumentation. 
Liberal cosmopolitanism is a well-developed ethical doctrine in political theory, 
lately represented by figures such as Simon Caney, Kok-Chor Tan, Allen 
Buchanan and Thomas Pogge, among others, and develops norms out of what 
are taken to be universally-acceptable moral premises, independent of the 
powers of states and other actors in the international system.12  Liberal 
cosmopolitanism is expressive of normative individualism, and bound up with 
the core norms and values of human rights doctrine.  Constitutional 
cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, is closely related to international 
constitutionalism, and accordingly has received increasing attention in 
international legal scholarship as theories of world constitution have enjoyed 
renewed interest.  Constitutional cosmopolitans differ from liberal 
cosmopolitans insofar as the former identify world norms with the formal 
establishment of a global political settlement among actors in the international 
system, creating a new world order independent of its constitutive parts.  
Constitutional cosmopolitanism is particularly bound up with the method of 
international law, as it turns on questions of formal sufficiency derived from 
positive terms of international law.13  One branch of constitutional 
cosmopolitanism takes the UN Charter for a discrete international constitution; 
others are founded on some hierarchical arrangement of generally-applicable 
norms, however rudimentary.  Lately, scholars such as Erica de Wet and Anne 
Peters have posited a nascent world constitution according to hierarchically-
superior, universal norms, incorporating principles of normative individualism, 
drawing the liberal and constitutional models of cosmopolitanism closer 
together. 
Despite differences among liberal, constitutional and innate cosmopolitanism, 
each seeks to establish some autonomous normative power, an objective 
normativity for the world as a whole, as against the system of subjective 
authority identified with the relations of equal and independent states.  In 
aspiring to objective world norms exhibiting autonomous bases of legitimacy, 
                                                                
12 Simon Caney, Cosmopolitan Justice and Institutional Design: An Egalitarian Liberal Conception of 
Global Governance, 32 Social Theory and Practice 725 (2006); Tan, supra note 10; Allen Buchanan, 
Justice Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), p. 85; Thomas Pogge, supra note 10. 
13 J. G. van Mulligen, Global Constitutionalism and the Objective Purport of the International Legal 
Order, 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 277 (2011), p. 278. 
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each of the three aspires to world norms superior to international politics.  
Liberal and innate cosmopolitanism, however, emphasize different aspects of 
cosmopolitan thought: liberal cosmopolitanism emphasizes individuals in the 
world; innate cosmopolitanism emphasizes the individuality of the world.  
Constitutional cosmopolitanism, by contrast, is relatively agnostic as between the 
two: the potential constitutional settlement is open in its terms, and – insofar as 
the constitution is a cosmopolitan one – either cosmopolitan vision, liberal or 
innate, might yield a constitutional arrangement provided it is satisfies a certain 
formal baseline of constitutional legitimacy. 
In terms of discourse, each of the three cosmopolitan streams is differently situated.  
The differences may be conceived as points along a line: at one end, liberal 
cosmpolitanism represents, as noted, an ethical discourse applied to law; at the other 
end, constitutional cosmopolitanism represents a legal discourse largely congruent 
with traditional terms of international law, however radical its use of those terms.  
Between the two, innate cosmopolitanism represents a legal discourse that eschews 
some of the traditional terms of international law.  The differences are discernible 
by reference to the different allowance for ascertaining law and different 
appreciation of sources exhibited by each cosmopolitan school of thought.14 
Liberal cosmopolitanism ascertains law – or the need for legal change – by a 
deductive, or special constructivist method, the source of which is identical with the 
substance of select moral premises.  Constitutional cosmopolitanism, on the other 
hand, adheres by comparison to a typically legal, formal means of law-ascertainment, 
locating constitutional development in traditionally-acknowelged sources of 
international law.  Innate cosmopolitanism, falling between the two, maintains the 
posture of legal discourse, but nonetheless goes outside the limits of modern 
international law.  In maintaining the posture of legal discourse, innate 
cosmopolitanism exhibits a framework for law-ascertainment by which law is 
discerned as a discrete historical product, not according to any fixed substance.  In 
going outside the limits of modern international law, innate cosmopolitanism allows 
for the ascertainment of legal norms independent of convention and custom, 
according to a source not otherwise acknowledged in the positive law of the modern 
international system: namely, the will or interest of the world as a whole, the 
normative expression of which is entirely independent of its affirmation – or 
                                                                
14 In this discussion, here and where it reappears throughout this work, I am guided by the work of 
Jean d’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law: A Theory of the Ascertainment 
of Legal Rules (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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rejection – by any one or several of the subjective constituents (such as states) that it 
comprises. 
Where liberal cosmopolitanism presents a well-articulated ethical theory, and 
constitutional cosmopolitanism observes more closely the traditional constraints 
of international law, innate cosmopolitanism is roughly predicated on an 
intuition that is basically sociological in character: the world as a whole 
represents a discrete social or political collective capable of exhibiting subjective 
characteristics, including discrete interests and a will of its own, like other 
individuals and collectives.  Moreover, where liberal cosmopolitanism functions 
primarily to measure existing institutions against an ethical cosmopolitan 
standard, and where constitutional cosmopolitanism functions primarily to 
articulate or identify formal standards by which a cosmopolitan constitution may 
be recognized, innate cosmopolitanism function primarily like a heuristic device.  
Never expressly developed as a discrete doctrine, innate cosmopolitanism has 
served as an implicit model to guide the development of the international system 
towards certain normative ends associated with the interests or will or the world 
as a whole, discerned in roughly sociological and historical terms.  In its 
expression by tribunals such as the ICJ, the innate cosmopolitan heuristic 
function has taken an ad hoc character, facilitating the extension of jurisdiction 
or norms to particular issues raised in given cases.  That ad hoc character is in 
contrast with the more systematic development of liberal and constitutional 
cosmopolitanism. 
The normative ends of the innate cosmopolitan heuristic model include the 
objective ends of an interdependent world, and an affirmation of its interests 
above and beyond the politics of sovereign states and all other exercises of 
subjective interest.  Moreover, those ends are taken to be not only desirable, but 
necessary to make a coherent doctrine out of modern international law: where 
the cooperative venture that a strictly subjective system represents is perceived as 
not rising in theory to the level of a binding system of law, innate 
cosmopolitanism establishes an objective authority, in the form of the world as a 
whole, capable of grounding the normativity of international law.  Alpheus Snow 
captured the idea at the beginning of the last century: “the term 'international 
law' is self-contradictory....  That which is international cannot be law; or, what is 
the same thing, that which is law cannot be international.  Agreements, 
relationships, commerce may exist between nations and thus be international; 
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but law can never so exist.  Law always and inevitably comes from above.”15  
This is the gist of the central historical narrative of modern international law that 
innate cosmopolitanism represents, running from Vitoria forward.  The narrative 
includes the efforts of international scholars and practitioners to strengthen, in 
the words of J.L. Brierly, the “frail moorings” that bind international law “to any 
sound principle of obligation”.16 
In other words, international law is, in part, constructed around a constantly 
evolving answer to the question of what, if anything, gives effect to rules among 
subjective actors who are nominally sovereign.  Innate cosmopolitanism 
responds to the question with a perhaps deceptively straightforward argument: 
the world itself also represents a subjective actor in the sum of its interdependent 
social conditions.  As the sole all-inclusive subjective actor, the world represents 
an objective actor vis-à-vis every other subjective actor – every other political 
collective – within its parameters.  This does not necessarily elevate the world 
normatively above other, smaller political collectives: local and regional 
attachments may in fact be stronger in terms of immediacy.  The global 
collective, however, does enjoy an exclusive claim to objectivity as against all of 
those other collectives and particular attachments.  Accordingly, the world 
society represents the primary level of social or political order, though not the 
most immediate. 
Jens Bartelson, writing about world community as a matter of international 
relations theory, captures the point as part of a proposal to reinvigorate a 
Kantian tradition allowing for a diversity of collectives within a harmonious 
totality of world relations.17  Following Bartelson, “Kant’s concept of a world 
community includes all human communities ... and regards them as 
indispensable parts of the same overarching community”, with the consequence 
that “the different levels at which political rights could manifest themselves are 
actually inseparable”.18  Bartelson’s Kantian theory tracks the innate 
cosmopolitanism of Judge Alejandro Álvarez from years prior: local and regional 
collectives enjoy normative status as part of the public order arising out of a 
                                                                
15 Alpheus Snow, The Law of Nations, 6 Am. J. Int’l. L. 890 (1912), p. 892. 
16 J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace, C. Waldock, 
ed., 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 40. 
17 Jens Bartelson, Visions of World Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 
165-170. 
18 Ibid., pp. 155, 162 (emphasis in the original). 
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world social phenomenon, and they are all co-constitutive of one another.  For 
Bartelson and for Álvarez, as for thinkers before them going back to Vitoria and 
beyond, the capacity for social interaction is the essential condition from which 
world norms will arise in a situation of global interdependence.  Because the 
essential condition is uniform, certain bedrock norms ordering the proper 
expression of the common social capacity will inhere across the whole of the 
interdependent sphere.  But while the bedrock norms will be common across the 
interdependent sphere, social interaction will also give rise to diverse norms 
across time and space.  Norms will vary with historical, material and cultural 
conditions in the world, while the basic phenomenon of a unified world unit 
with normative consequences will not.  Accordingly, affirming the proper 
expression of normative authority enjoyed by the world as a whole becomes a 
matter of proper observation or discernment. 
Bartelson suggests that his reading of Kant’s cosmopolitanism, founded on the 
appeal to capacity, reverses a Kantian tradition that has made the unified global 
phenomenon more difficult of realization, rather than less.  By this tradition, after 
Kant, “the basic ontological commitments underpinning the concept of world 
community became increasingly hard to sustain, and it became equally difficult to 
make coherent sense of that concept in a world of sovereign and secular nation-
states.”19  In part, this is because Kant himself suggests a cartographic explanation 
of political history that couples a sense of the globe as a physical space to a 
competition among divided political communities.20  Likewise, Kant’s preeminent 
contributions to normative individualism conflict with the holistic ontology of 
innate cosmopolitanism – meaningfully underscoring the distinction between innate 
and liberal cosmopolitanism.  The effect of focusing on these aspects of the Kantian 
tradition is an irreconcilable tension between particular and universal political 
aspirations, such that any concept of world community becomes a “dream incapable 
of realization” at best, and an “ideology of empire” at worst.21 
Where liberal cosmopolitanism, in the liberal Kantian tradition of normative 
individualism, affirms the individual and particular, innate cosmopolitanism 
attempts to redeem the whole.  The world itself is the essential unit for 
normative purposes, an independent and sui generis sociological phenomenon.  
                                                                
19 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
20 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in Reiss, ed., Political Writings, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991 [1970]), pp. 109-11. 
21 Bartelson, supra note 17, pp. 2-3. 
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Accordingly, the method is largely inductive: the world represents a complex but 
unified social phenomenon exhibiting certain historically-contingent but 
generally-applicable norms, which are discoverable with sufficient observation 
and reflection.  The generally-applicable norms associated with the world 
collective may alike be seen to underlie or arise out of the diversity of particular 
norms in sub-global collectives.  In either case, the norms that flow from the 
innate cosmopolitan model must be discerned by reference to the sum total of 
normative behavior bearing on interdependence in the world collective. 
Predicated on the observation and expression of global interests and global will, 
innate cosmopolitanism vindicates the subjectivity of the world itself.  Consider 
Judge Weeramatry’s reading of the UN Charter, in his dissent from the Court’s 
advisory opinion in The Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case: 
The Charter's very first words are "We, the peoples of the United Nations" 
- thereby showing that all that ensues is the will of the peoples of the world. 
Their collective will and desire is the very source of the United Nations 
Charter and that truth should never be permitted to recede from view. In 
the matter before the Court, the peoples of the world have a vital interest, 
and global public opinion has an important influence on the development 
of the principles of public international law.22 
Judge Weeramatry’s statement of the Charter regime captures the basic thrust of 
innate cosmopolitanism: a mandate in the name of world society or community, 
and a vision of the world with a social and political interest of its own on which 
new authority will be based and from which it will draw.  Moreover, Judge 
Weeramatry nowhere in his opinion suggests that the Charter rises to the level of 
a formal constitutional document, though it reflects the related idea of a 
constituted collective – and here the relative closeness of innate 
cosmopolitanism and some constitutional cosmopolitan theory is clear.  In 
positing the constituted world collective capable of normative authority, Judge 
Weeramatry turns to its vital interests, as well as an expression of public opinion 
in its name, to discern the norms available to the Court in its treatment of the 
matter before it.  As such, he employs devices typical of innate cosmopolitanism 
in application.  The attribution of interest and will to a world collective 
represents an extraordinary legal authority where none might otherwise be 
available, such that international law may be established by reference to the vital 
                                                                
22 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Judge Weeramatry, Dissenting Opinion), supra note 7, at 
441-42. 
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interests of the world collective, as well as global public opinion, in addition to 
other sources.  In this manner, his opinion reflects perhaps the central purpose 
for which the innate cosmopolitan model is invoked: as a means around positive 
law limitations in international law. 
 
General principles and innate cosmopolitanism 
In practice, the ICJ has relied on the innate cosmopolitan model to sustain 
jurisdiction or apply a norm on the basis of the authority of the will or interest of 
the world where conventional or customary law have failed to empower the court in 
like measure.  In this manner innate cosmopolitanism represents a challenge to or 
avoidance of limitations bound up with traditionally-recognized sources.  There 
remains, of course, the third primary source of international law identified in Arts. 
38(1)(3) of the Statute of the PCIJ and 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ, namely 
“the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations”.23  In some respects, 
the general principles of law identified as a source of law in the World Court’s 
statutes approximate the innate cosmopolitan idea, especially since the category of 
“civilized nations” has become effectively universal, applying in any event to all 
member-states of the United Nations.24   But general principles as they are identified 
in the World Court’s statutes are not identical with innate cosmopolitanism, and 
have not sufficed to make appeal to innate cosmopolitanism redundant.  Tracing 
briefly the areas of overlap and points of distinction between innate 
cosmopolitanism and the general principles of Art. 38(1)(c) will help take further 
this preliminary sketch of the domain and function of innate cosmopolitanism.25 
The innate cosmopolitan model represents an idea of an interconnected and 
interdependent world that exists as a social or political whole.  By virtue of that 
collective unity, the world as a whole enjoys a will and interests of its own, and 
together with them a discrete normative authority upon which judges of 
international tribunals, among others, may draw in their determination of 
                                                                
23 For what remains perhaps the fullest treatment of general principles under Arts. 38(1)(3) and 
38(1)(c), see Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953). 
24 See, A. Cherif Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to “General Principles of International Law”, 11 
Mich. J. Int’l L. 768 (1989). 
25 Hereafter, I will refer to the general principles of Art. 38(1)(c) simply as “general principles”; any 
other use of the term “general principles” will be expressly indicated. 
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international law.  A tribunal such as the ICJ is thereby empowered in its 
adjudication of questions of international law to give expression to norms reflective 
of the public interest of the world, despite an absence of any corresponding legal 
norm in the body of positive international law.  In similar measure, general 
principles may be argued to represent universal principles of public order, upon 
which, under Art. 38(1)(c), the ICJ is entitled to rely for normative authority, despite 
the absence otherwise of any corresponding legal norm under positive international 
law.  There are two reasons, however, that general principles of law have never 
meaningfully represented a practicable innate cosmopolitan source of law, at least as 
concerns the ICJ.  First, general principles as a source of international law have been 
subjected to wildly different interpretations; though some of those interpretations 
exhibit an innate cosmopolitan character, not all of them do, and indeed the most 
commonly accepted interpretations do not.26  Second, even where general principles 
might be taken to represent a source of law in keeping with the innate cosmopolitan 
model, the ICJ still has declined to rely on them as a court to resolve cases before it, 
perhaps due to the uncertainty and controversy that remains associated with general 
principles as a source of international law.27  Examining for a moment longer each 
of the foregoing distinctions between general principles and innate cosmopolitanism 
helps to demonstrate what innate cosmopolitanism is not.  Thereafter, I will return 
to revealing grounds of commonality that persist after the first two distinctions are 
cleared away, before moving on to introduce other aspects of the innate 
cosmopolitan model. 
The first distinction concerns the myriad interpretations to which general principles 
as a source of international law have been subject.  One primary interpretation 
reinforces a subjective voluntarism that is largely at odds with the innate 
cosmopolitan model.  The authority enjoyed as a matter of general principles 
remains in the final analysis a matter of state consent, such that the innate 
cosmopolitan model of a world authority enjoys no purchase.  By this so-called 
voluntarist interpretation, general principles include those rules or legal mechanisms 
that all or nearly all individual states already and uniformly exhibit in their municipal 
                                                                
26 Jaye Ellis notes that positivist and voluntarist interpretations of general princples as a source of 
international law have largely prevailed, though “an approach tinged with natural law thinking” has also 
been generally employed.  Jaye Ellis, General Principles and Comparative Law, 22 Eur. J. Int’l L. 949 
(2011), p. 954. 
27 Perhaps the most commonly cited treatment of general principles in ICJ jurisprudence may be found 
in Judge McNair’s separate opinion in the International Status of South West Africa Advisory Opinion.  
International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 11 July 1950, [1950] I.C.J. Reports 128, at 
148-49 [Judge McNair]. 
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legal code.28  Each state’s adoption of an identical rule or mechanism is taken 
constructively to represent consent to that rule or mechanism, such that the near-
universal and uniform affirmation by each state municipally represents a tacit 
agreement under Art. 38(1)(c) to allow the municipal rule to stand for international 
purposes where no positive law is available to resolve a given controversy.  By this 
understanding, no authority is acknowledged in or ceded to the world as a whole in 
the allowance for general principles under the Court’s statute; rather, authority is 
retained by states by identification of tacit consent in the terms of 38(1)(c). 
A second interpretation of general principles inclines towards what has been 
described as a naturalist character. 29  By this interpretation, general principles 
represent abstractions drawn from the nature of law itself.  They include that which 
is necessary or intrinsic to law generally as a discrete endeavor: that which is 
fundamental to all and any law in theory represents a general principle available to 
the ICJ as a source of law under Art. 38(1)(c).  But in referring to theoretical 
constructs that derive from the law as a discrete phenomenon, this so-called 
naturalist interpretation of 38(1)(c) is distinguishable from innate cosmopolitanism, 
precisely by virtue of the phenomenon from which normative authority is drawn.  
The naturalist interpretation makes the theoretical enterprise of law itself that which 
underlies the Court’s normative authority for the purposes of 38(1)(c), rather than 
turning for the source of normative authority to the sociological reality of a social or 
political collective representing the world as a whole.  Frances Jalet, rejecting 
comparativist method for determining general principles under article 38(1)(c), 
roughly captures the naturalist interpretation as follows: “It is not because rules or 
legal principles exist in most, or even in every, legal system that they constitute 
general principles, but because they are so basic and fundamental as to compose the 
substratum from which positive rules may be derived.  They comprise an 
unformulated law which should not be confined but left pliant and expandable.”30 
Each of the foregoing interpretations, “voluntarist” and “naturalist”, demonstrates 
something that innate cosmopolitanism is not.  Innate cosmopolitanism is not a 
mere coincidence of norms shared by subjective powers.  Nor is it a theoretical 
abstraction drawn from the nature of law itself.  Rather, innate cosmopolitanism is a 
model of historical normative authority vested in a social or political collective 
                                                                
28 Ellis, supra note 26, p. 953. 
29 Ibid., p. 954. 
30 Frances Jalet, The Quest for the General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations – A 
Study, 10 UCLA L. Rev. 1041 (1962). 
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coterminous with the whole of humanity in the world at any point in time.  The 
method is neither strictly comparative, as per the voluntarist inquiry into the diverse 
legal arrangements entertained by states, nor is it deductive, as per the naturalist 
inquiry into that which is fundamental to the concept or theory of law.  Rather, 
innate cosmopolitan method is roughly sociological, an inquiry into the norms 
exhibited in the sum total of acts, experiences and expectations bearing on 
interdependence in the world. 
There remains, however, an important point of overlap between innate 
cosmopolitanism and general principles, which may be observed in a conflation of 
both of the foregoing interpretations of general principles.  This conflation occurs 
when the comparative technique of the voluntarist interpretation is married to the 
deep structure argument of the “naturalist” interpretation, but does not do so in the 
name of subjective consent, nor in the name of pure legal theory.  By this 
interpretation, conflating each of the prior two, general principles come to resemble 
an innate cosmopolitan idea insofar as the comparative technique reveals a deep 
structure of social or political collective enterprise, rather than anything else.  Thus 
the comparative technique is marshaled to show that which all or nearly all states or 
collectives adopt in the normative exercise associated with forming and sustaining 
the collective body – not for the purposes of establishing tacit consent, but for the 
purpose of revealing some normative characteristic also attributable to the world 
collective.  General principles, by this interpretation, approach the innate 
cosmopolitan model by virtue of being taken to represent evidence of that which is 
historically universal as a matter of collective enterprise. 
The overlap is significant because innate cosmopolitanism, as will be shown, 
assumes a mutually-constitutive relationship between particular collectives and the 
universal or world collective.  As such, that which is essential to the local and 
regional levels may also be essential to the world collective.  Art. 38(1)(c), by this last 
interpretation, allows the possibility of discovering that which is universal to the 
collective enterprise at any given point in time to serve as a source of international 
law, by virtue of what it reveals about the presumptive normativity of the world 
collective.  Brierly hints at this possibility when he refers to general principles, in a 
notably brief treatment, as a rejection of positivism, and “an authoritative 
recognition of a dynamic element in international law, and of the creative function 
of the courts which administer it.”31  Rudolf Schlesinger went farther, as part of a 
                                                                
31 Brierly, supra note 16, p. 63. 
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comparative law project of at Cornell University in the 1950s and ‘60s with the aim 
of determining a common core to legal systems internationally, to which project I 
will return in the next chapter.  Publicizing that project, Schlesinger largely 
encapsulated the innate cosmopolitan idea as it was then popular, noting that 
“appeal to the laws and basic principles of justice which are recognized by all 
civilized nations may carry weight where political arguments fail” insofar as “the 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” might be “translated into 
the pressure of world opinion”.32  According to Schlesinger, sufficient empirical 
research would reveal universally-applicable norms that exist beyond the subjective 
politics of states, reflecting the interest or will of the world, and validated by 
reference to world public opinion. 
Despite, however, the possibility of overlap between innate cosmopolitanism and 
general principles as represented by Brierly and Schlesinger, the ICJ, as noted, has 
not meaningfully adopted general principles in its resolution of cases and 
controversies,33 even as the Court has otherwise turned to innate cosmopolitanism.  
In part, this is reflected by the noted brevity of Brierly’s treatment of general 
principles, as though the topic would be consigned to a footnote at best were it not 
formally included in Art. 38.  Despite its inclusion in Art. 38, however, the general 
principles clause has never enjoyed a sufficiently clear, robust interpretation capable 
of supporting meaningful reliance norms outside of the positive law available to the 
Court.  As Jaye Ellis has noted, general principles remain “highly controversial and 
largely neglected.  One obvious reason for both the controversy and the neglect lies 
in difficulties with the underlying sources of validity of general principles: how can 
judges justify reliance on rules or concepts taken from other systems of law without 
arrogating to themselves law-making power?”34  As will be seen in Chapter 4, the 
ICJ has made regular reference to principles – including general, fundamental and 
cardinal – but the reference rarely rises to the level of invoking the formal authority 
conferred according to Art. 38.  Instead, the Court for the most part has treated 
general principles in more abstract fashion, often as a rhetorical support to other 
innate cosmopolitan arguments, rather than as a formal expression of authority 
enabled by Art. 38. 
                                                                
32 Rudolf Schlesinger, Research on the General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations. 
Outline of a New Project, 51 Am. J. Int’l L. 734 (1957), p. 739. 
33 See, e.g., Jonathan Charney, Universal International Law, 87 Am. J. Int’l L. 529 (1993), p. 536. 
34 Ellis, supra note 26, pp. 949-50. 
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In sum, when it has chosen to assume an innate cosmopolitan authority to make or 
develop international law outside of orthodox consensual and positive law 
constraints, the Court has preferred to do so by direct appeal to the will and 
interests of the world – as captured by the innate cosmopolitan model itself – 
without mediating that appeal by way of Art. 38(1)(c), with its attendant substantive 
and methodological controversies.  Where principles have been incorporated into 
the argument, they have been incorporated in a loose sense and as a support, rather 
than as a formal source of authority in accordance with Art. 38.  As a result, innate 
cosmopolitanism lacks the systematic expression or grounding in international law 
that more clear engagement of Art. 38(1)(c) might have provided.  Indeed, however, 
it may be the lack of systematic expression that makes the innate cosmopolitan 
argument a more appealing one: as Chapter 4 will make clear, innate cosmopolitan 
elements are discernible in the Court’s ruling on cases including (but not limited to) 
Nicaragua (which furthermore eschew square reliance on general principles in favor 
of reference to “fundamental or cardinal principles”), the Lockerbie preliminary 
judgment, and Oil Platforms, but the innate cosmopolitan element is treated with a 
shifting legal vocabulary and without express acknowledgment of the common 
appeal to innate cosmopolitanism.35 
In other words, the innate cosmopolitan argument allows the court to maintain a 
typically legal means of law-ascertainment by reference to a discrete source, but one 
that is not sanctioned by Art. 28, and instead resembles something of a moving 
target in the ad hoc exercise of otherwise novel authority.  Consequently, it appears 
the innate cosmopolitan model has remained consigned, though perhaps 
strategically, to ad hoc expression as a means of capturing a discrete source of 
normative authority in international law.  Notably, this failure to achieve the 
systemic grounding that Art. 38(1)(c) might have offered also underscores a 
significant distinction between innate and constitutional cosmopolitanism: the latter 
offers an integrated, system-wide cosmopolitan solution to questions of 
international law, while innate cosmopolitanism offers international tribunals an ad 
                                                                
35 See Chapter 4, infra.  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States 
of America), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, [1986] I.C.J. Reports 14, at 100; Questions of Interpretation 
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment of 27 February 1998, [1998] I.C.J. Reports 115; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of 
Iran v. United States of America), Judgment of 6 November 2003, [2003] I.C.J. Reports 161. 
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hoc means of realizing select cosmopolitan goals raised in the context of a given 
case or controversy.36 
 
Critiquing innate cosmopolitanism 
Because the reliance on innate cosmopolitanism has been underappreciated, 
together with the effects it has enjoyed in legal argumentation, innate 
cosmopolitanism in international law is not readily confronted, supported or 
adequately considered in express terms.  The failure to appreciate or understand 
innate cosmopolitanism has resulted in an absence of direct, tailored critique. 
A primary grounds of critique that I will explore is, in brief, as follows.  In 
envisioning a world phenomenon with subjective interests and normative 
potential of its own, innate cosmopolitanism exhibits a monolithic potential.  
Moreover, in founding a world legal order on the aggregation of observed 
normative acts and expectations applicable to the world at any given point in 
time, the rule-making process is emptied of responsibility: the rules appear to 
create and recreate themselves; they are merely discovered by constant scientific 
investigation, and announced by the presumptively proper instrument.  In light 
of the vast field contemplated to determine world norms sociologically at any 
point in time, however, the observational method itself reestablishes the 
contested field of politics in other terms.  Any given set of methodological 
choices by which to comprehend world norms potentially represents a particular 
policy and discrete set of interests.  The complexity of the research apparently 
necessary to make good on the innate cosmopolitan intuition suggests that it in 
fact cannot be substantiated or even meaningfully defined.  Thus innate 
cosmopolitanism would suppress subjective international politics by an appeal to 
science, or sociological observation, but the science or method of observation 
becomes a new field of contestation, apparently incapable of resolution. 
The variability of the innate cosmopolitan phenomenon undermines the guiding 
purpose to achieving an objective authority for international legal norms, namely, 
the ability to overcome the paradox and self-contradiction of a subjective system 
                                                                
36 Liberal cosmopolitanism also presents a more systematically-developed normative complex, 
established according to a constructivist method, though, as I will discuss in Chapter 3, the liberal 
cosmopolitan system notably does so from without the international system, rather than within, to 
allow for ethical challenge to the norms and institutions represented by international law. 
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of international law.  With variability comes manipulability, and the association 
of law and policy, touched on in the words of Judge Álvarez, quoted at the 
outset, take on a less sanguine character.  Moreover, the limitations of 
sociological method also expose to critique the underlying premises of an 
interdependent world collective, revealing a consistent limitation of innate 
cosmopolitan doctrine since Vitoria: the vision of a world social or political 
complex remains just that; it is still in the first place a vision or matter of 
intuition, rather than anything more substantial or precise.  In consequence, the 
appeal to a world normative authority under innate cosmopolitanism can appear 
quixotic, or worse, because there is no obvious allowance for political 
contestation in the development of the norm, and no clear assumption of 
responsibility for the norm that is announced or assumed.  The norm is 
observed, rather than deliberated or decided upon, or it is derived from world 
public opinion, rather than the reasoned determination of any legislator or judge.  
In combination with the historical contingency of innate cosmopolitan norms, 
identified with sociological observation, the innate cosmopolitan model begins 
to look like a strategy favoring policies supportive of status quo conditions, 
despite a traditional association of innate cosmopolitan ideas with progressive 
legal scholarship. 
I will take the critique farther in the conclusion of this work.  Here, I note that, 
in response, innate cosmopolitanism purports to offer a compelling account of a 
world phenomenon, which indeed appears to resonate with an internationally-
conscious audience, be it diplomats, scholars, or a world public, loosely defined.  
The innate cosmopolitan account substantiates the international normative 
regime in a coherent way: there is a foundational normative potential that lends 
an authority to international law beyond the subjective authority of its subjects.  
Likewise, innate cosmopolitanism has indeed enjoyed a long history of appeal, 
which continues to represent arguably its greatest strength.  It has been 
suggested, in other places and other words, that the persistent historical intuition 
of innate cosmopolitanism may be its best proof.37  Innate cosmopolitan 
phenomena, such as world public opinion, have historically founded – and 
continue to found – unique arguments for the jurisdiction of international 
tribunals and other institutions.  Currently, appeal to innate cosmopolitan 
phenomena continues to drive calls for normative innovation and changes in the 
rules and very grammar of international law. 
                                                                
37 Salvador de Madariaga, The World's Design (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1938), p. 84. 
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Moreover, the innate cosmopolitan insistence on the historical validity of its 
central intuition represents a particular challenge to its most demanding critics.  
Most of the foregoing criticism is drawn from the field of critical legal studies.  
But, as will be shown in the conclusion, prominent examples of the critical legal 
studies deconstruction of cosmopolitanism generally in international law resolve 
into an intuition or faith capable of redeeming the normativity of international 
law.  With that intuition, even the most trenchant critic appears to adopt the 
fundamental intuition that drives the innate cosmopolitan model in the first 
place, as a heuristic device applied for the purpose of sustaining and perfecting 
the normativity of international law. 
The critical debate, as noted, will be explored in the conclusion.  It will suffice 
here to mention that if, ultimately, the innate cosmopolitan intuition will not be 
denied in international law, it must be better understood.  The terms of its 
articulation and the ends to which they are applied call for more consistency, and 
more consistent recognition.  Doing so will allow for a clearer and more 
comprehensive critical treatment both of innate cosmopolitan argumentation 
generally – the means by which it innate cosmopolitan arguments are made and 
the ends to which they are put – and in its particular instantiations.  This book 
represents a first step in that project, with emphasis on the theory of innate 
cosmopolitanism and its use by the ICJ as an ad hoc device for extending 
jurisdiction and norms to cases where the positive law might not allow the same. 
 
Questions raised 
This study, then, explores the theory and use of innate cosmopolitanism in 
international law, its foundations and effects, with special attention to the 
pretension to an autonomous world society or community exhibiting objective 
normative potential beyond the political.  Two main questions will be addressed: 
first, what is the substance and structure of the innate cosmopolitan model, and 
how does it correspond with other cosmopolitan ideas in international legal 
theory; and second, how is the innate cosmopolitan model articulated, and to 
what effect, in the practice and discourse of international law? 
The first question, concerning the substance and structure of the innate 
cosmopolitan model, and its relationship with other cosmopolitan ideas, will be 
dealt with in Chapters 2 and 3.  In Chapter 2, innate cosmopolitanism will be 
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examined as a matter of legal theory.  As noted, the history of innate 
cosmopolitan ideas remains unusually important to contemporary articulations 
of innate cosmopolitanism.  For that reason, I begin with an examination of 
Vitoria, Suárez and Grotius, who have been central to the development of innate 
cosmopolitan ideas in international law.  Additionally, in keeping with 
Bartelson’s reconstruction of the history of international political theory, 
touched on above, I consider as well the legal theory of Immanuel Kant.  
Though Kant is a central figure to the tradition of liberal cosmopolitanism, 
Bartelson suggests that Kant’s work represents as well the end point of a lost 
tradition of innate cosmopolitan thought, and Kant’s legal theory may be seen to 
correspond with and support aspects of an innate cosmopolitan tradition. 
Following an examination of the early scholarship that remains central to the 
development of innate cosmopolitanism, I will proceed to 20th century legal 
theorists, beginning with James Brown Scott, who was instrumental in 
popularizing the innate cosmopolitan aspects of historical figures such as Vitoria, 
Suárez and Grotius.  Other scholars from the first half of the 20th century 
include Manley Hudson, judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 
Alejandro Álvarez, judge of the International Court of Justice, Robert Lansing, 
US Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson, and Salvador de Madariaga, 
Spanish ambassador to the UN.  Scholars from the latter half of the 20th century 
include prominent thinkers such as Hersch Lauterpacht and Wilfred Jenks, as 
well as Quincy Wright, an academic who worked prominently at the intersection 
of international politics and international law, and Myres McDougal and his 
work in the name of the New Haven School.  I consider as well the work of 
Hans Kelsen, particularly in contrast with Lauterpacht, for Kelsen’s opposition 
to the innate cosmopolitan idea, though Kelsen might feasibly be considered 
cosmopolitan by other measures.  Following the inquiry into select 20th century 
theory, I turn to two examples of contemporary theory, namely transnational 
legal process and interactional legal theory. 
The selection of theorists in Chapter 2 is not intended to be comprehensive, nor 
is it intended to suggest that innate cosmopolitanism represented or represents a 
dominant mode of legal theory and legal reasoning in international law.  Rather, 
it is intended to be sufficiently diverse to be representative of a spectrum of legal 
theory varying between mainstream and progressive contributions to 
international legal theory and discourse.  Because innate cosmopolitanism has 
never achieved the level of a recognized doctrine, it does not offer the benefit of 
24 
 
a discrete set of terms or topics, and does not come with a ready list of theorists 
self-identifying with one another or with innate cosmopolitan theory generally.  
For that reason, the selection of figures and scholarship is intended to capture 
and demonstrate a consistent core of innate cosmopolitan ideas applied in a 
variety of terms in the changing context of international legal discourse.  In so 
doing, Chapter 2 reflects a reasonably full articulation of innate cosmopolitan 
theory as a discrete set of ideas variously adopted by diverse figures to address a 
consistent problematique in international law, namely the perceived need to achieve 
some unified, objective authority under law, capable of maintaining rules of 
conduct over and above the subjective authorities enjoyed by individual political 
collectivities in the world. 
Chapter 3 contrasts innate cosmopolitanism with liberal and constitutional 
theory.  In so doing, Chapter 3 serves two primary functions: first, to map the 
various domains in international legal discourse of the separate schools of 
cosmopolitan thought, and, second, to demonstrate the particular structure of 
innate cosmopolitanism as it may be contrasted with the more systematically and 
comprehensively developed theories of liberal and constitutional 
cosmopolitanism.  Both functions address a matter central to the purpose of this 
project as a whole: the relative lack of sophistication and differentiation in the 
treatment and appreciation of cosmopolitanism generally in international law.  
Liberal cosmopolitanism has been the near-exclusive focus of cosmopolitan 
political philosophy, while global constitutionalism remains the dominant means 
of conceiving universal norms as a matter of international legal doctrine.  As a 
result, liberal cosmopolitanism largely fails to account for the possibility of a 
conflicting vision of cosmopolitanism, as represented by innate 
cosmopolitanism, while constitutional cosmopolitanism tends to conflate – or, at 
least, fail to distinguish – between arguments, on the one hand, about a world 
constitution under law with, on the other hand, arguments about a community 
or collective that might precede the formal constitutional achievement, as 
posited by innate cosmopolitanism.  In both cases, the distinction of innate 
cosmopolitanism makes clearer the scope and substance of all three 
cosmopolitan schools of thought, and thereby serves to differentiate the 
particular roles each plays or may play in international legal argumentation. 
Thus innate, liberal and constitutional cosmopolitanism will be charted and 
analyzed for their varying frameworks and varying effects at law, together with 
their points of distinction and overlap with one another and with innate 
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cosmopolitanism.  To do so, I will not attempt to reproduce the fullness of 
liberal and constitutional cosmopolitan doctrine, which is not the intent of this 
project.  Rather, I will treat core aspects of liberal and constitutional 
cosmopolitanism, and will further raise special attributes of each school that 
serve to distinguish the three from one another.  Relative to the vast body of 
literature that exists for both liberal and constitutional cosmopolitanism, I will 
rely on a narrow selection of authors and literature, chosen as representative of 
main streams of thought within each school, and chosen as well for having 
addressed matters especially pertinent to the distinctions among the three 
cosmopolitan schools.  For liberal cosmopolitanism, this includes the political 
theorists Charles Beitz, Thomas Pogge and Allen Buchanan, among others, as 
well as the international legal theorist Fernando Tesón.  For constitutional 
cosmopolitanism, this includes Bardo Fassbender, among others, as 
representative of a school of thought tending to elevate the UN Charter as a 
constitutional document, and Erica de Wet and Anne Peters, among others, as 
representative of international legal scholars who observe formal constitutional 
development in a hierarchy of norms, largely predicated on substantive values, 
arguably recognized under international law. 
In sum, establishing the different architecture and application of liberal and 
constitutional cosmopolitanism, in contrast with innate cosmopolitanism, will 
establish a clearer map of cosmopolitan argumentation in international law, and 
will likewise establish the discrete contribution to legal and political discourse of 
innate cosmopolitanism.  Thus, Chapter 3 establishes the bounds of innate 
cosmopolitan theory, together with the bounds of liberal and constitutional 
cosmopolitanism in international legal discourse, by contrasting the three schools 
of thought.  Taking Chapters 2 and 3 together, the particular premises, methods, 
conclusions and ends of innate cosmopolitanism will be identified and 
investigated for their distinction as a discrete set of terms.  Ultimately, doing so 
allows, in the Conclusion of this work, for a more thorough and more 
sophisticated critique of cosmopolitan argumentation in international law, and 
especially innate cosmopolitan argumentation, than has heretofore been 
achieved. 
The second question, concerning the articulation of innate cosmopolitanism in 
the practice and discourse of international law, will be addressed in Chapter 4 on 
the basis of an analysis of jurisprudence of the ICJ concerning  jus ad bellum.  I 
look specifically at the ICJ’s treatment of the jus ad bellum as an area of law that 
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would seem at once both the least likely site of cosmopolitan development, and 
the most compelling.  The most compelling because it represents the basic rule 
of public order understood to underlie any meaningful expression of a world 
social or political phenomenon.  The least likely for being the most clearly in 
conflict with the interests of subjective powers that enjoy a foundational role in 
modern international law.  As the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion makes 
clear, the prerogative of states to use force at least in the interest of survival 
remains the seemingly-ineradicable bedrock of subjective right in the 
international system. 
There are other topic areas where innate cosmopolitanism may be found to exist 
in the theory and practice of international law.  Foremost among these other 
areas might be international environmental law and international criminal law.  
International environmental law is well suited to innate cosmopolitanism for the 
former’s central problematique pertaining to the proper treatment of a global 
commons, insofar as a commons presupposes a common interest in a shared 
resource, such as might establish the joined concern of an overarching 
community.38  Likewise, international criminal law is well suited to innate 
cosmopolitanism for presupposing on a world scale the unique authority of 
criminal law, namely the capacity to deprive individuals of life or liberty in the 
name of social, political or moral community.  Both international environmental 
and criminal law, however, represent specific applications of the innate 
cosmopolitan model to issue areas where it might be expected to enjoy special 
traction.  The jus ad bellum, by contrast, represents a more conflicted area of 
application for innate cosmopolitan ideas, and therefore a richer field of analysis, 
less congenial to characterization according to modus vivendi, a common 
exercise of self-interest, or speculative arguments of moral congruence. 
Because the prohibition on the use of force defines both the basic rule of 
international organization, as well as one of its most controversial rules in terms 
of application to subjective authorities jealous to preserve a prerogative to resort 
to force, focusing on the jus ad bellum facilitates examination of the role of innate 
cosmopolitanism at the conflicted heart of modern international law.  Moreover, 
                                                                
38 See, for example, the work Development Without Destruction, by Nico Schrijver, which takes for its 
objective “to demonstrate the role of international organizations, particularly the United Nations, in 
developing universal values about global natural resource management for sustainable development.” 
Nico Schrijver, Development Without Destruction: The UN and Global Resource Management 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), p.2. 
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restricting the inquiry to the prohibition on the use of force in international 
relations facilitates not only the examination of innate cosmopolitanism in 
international law, but also the examination of linked paradoxes that underlie the 
international legal system in the tug between the universal and the particular, and 
the tension between objective and subjective norms. 
 
Political theory and international law 
As a final preliminary note, in examining the work being done in international law 
and discourse by reference to the world as a social or political whole, this project is 
in part an inquiry into concepts of cosmopolitan political theory as they are relied on 
or employed in international law.  In examining cosmopolitan and innate 
cosmopolitan ideas for the work they are doing in international law, the ultimate 
object of this project is juridical in nature.  I am not in the first place looking at 
cosmopolitan political acts and ideas for their effect in the world at large.  I am 
looking for their effect on and in the law and legal reasoning.  The project is not 
without attention to consequences in the world flowing from the legal use of these 
ideas: establishing their effect on and in the law means establishing their effect on 
decision-making and legal resolutions, in addition to legal argumentation, in a 
number of real cases and contexts.  But the project remains primarily concerned 
with how cosmopolitan ideas affect the form and function of international law and 
legal discourse in the first instance.  This project identifies a role for innate 
cosmopolitanism in international legal discourse that reaches as far as the bounds of 
traditionally-recognized sources of international law, but attempts no empirical 
demonstration of law’s effects in the world. 
Likewise, I make no attempt to prove or disprove the political-theoretical concepts 
that I am considering.  Whether or not the moral premises of liberal 
cosmopolitanism are universally valid; whether or not the UN Charter actually 
represents a world constitution, as certain international constitutionalists have 
claimed; or whether or not the world represents a unified phenomenon, the distinct 
premise of innate cosmopolitan, is not my concern here.  That these concepts are 
relied upon in the practice and discourse of international law is enough.  Similarly, 
whether or not they may be construed as good or bad, desirable or dangerous, or 
even feasible or impossible, is a matter for normative critique, which I have taken 
up in limited manner, but not grounds for ignoring or diminishing the role of these 
concepts in the workings of international law.  This project is not about the ultimate 
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validity of innate – or any other – cosmopolitan theory, but about its contingent 
validity, including its contents and discontents, as a facet of modern and 
contemporary international legal discourse.  In sum, I am looking at the way in 
which these concepts have been, and continue to be employed and deployed in 
international legal discourse to help conceive or reconceive the norms and 
structures of the international system, with particular attention hereafter to 
scholarship and select examples from the jurisprudence of the ICJ. 
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Because innate cosmopolitanism represents a body of cosmopolitan principles that 
together make up a coherent doctrine in themselves, but have not been 
comprehended as such, the first task is to demonstrate its manifestation in the 
discourse of international law, and to identify the common core of innate 
cosmopolitan theory in the same.  Lacking the character of a self-referential 
doctrine, innate cosmopolitanism is not amenable to systematic treatment as might 
be applied to scholarship expressly engaged with a common vocabulary, idea set or 
agenda.  But part of the significance of the innate cosmopolitan idea is its appeal 
over time and the common function it serves with respect to an effort to achieve 
objective normative authority in the international legal system.  Thus I will proceed 
by reference to varied examples of the innate cosmopolitan idea articulated or 
embraced in a variety of terms by diverse figures who have all enjoyed an impact on 
international legal discourse, as well as the common doctrinal ends they would 
achieve following the innate cosmopolitan idea in whatever form. 
The first set of references are drawn from canonical works.  The history of the 
innate cosmopolitan idea is unusually critical to its present.  Contemporary legal 
scholars consistently return to historical instantiations of the innate cosmopolitan 
idea to establish a presumptive authority where none other is available as a matter of 
law or legal principle.  The second set of references are drawn from throughout the 
20th century, when innate cosmopolitan principle achieved inroads against the 
30 
 
subjective system of international law, and thereby became foundational for 
contemporary development of the innate cosmopolitan model in international law.  
I conclude, then, with select examples of current scholarship to demonstrate 
ongoing engagement with the innate cosmopolitan model in the discourse of 
international law. 
 
Historical dimension 
Compared with liberal and constitutional cosmopolitanism, innate cosmopolitanism 
is the most speculative of the three schools of cosmopolitan thought, but enjoys the 
longest tradition.  It remains speculative because the basic premise on which it relies 
defies proof.  But the innate cosmopolitan model can be discerned in canonical 
works of international legal doctrine, especially the work of the Spanish School from 
Vitoria through Grotius, reflecting the role of the innate cosmopolitan idea as an 
enduring supposition in support of a coherent system of international law. 
Accordingly, the history of the innate cosmopolitan idea plays a multi-faceted role in 
its current instantiation.  Scholars and practitioners throughout the 20th century 
forward have relied on the history of the idea for descriptive and normative 
purposes.  Descriptively, the history of the innate cosmopolitan idea has been relied 
on to make clear perceived doctrinal complexities and paradoxes underlying the 
otherwise subjective system of modern international legal relations, and to 
adumbrate an alternative model.  Normatively, the history of the idea is relied on for 
its persuasive force to establish a measure of objective cosmopolitan potential 
within the international system.  Additionally, the history of the idea has been 
appealed to as something like an alternative source of legal authority, suggesting an 
intellectual pedigree to challenge the formal pedigree that distinguishes positive law 
scholarship and practice. 
As should be clear, the descriptive and normative uses of the history of the idea are 
conjoined.  Modern and contemporary publicists, from Hersch Lauterpacht to 
Harold Koh, continue to refer back to foundational figures, such as Vitoria, Suárez 
and Grotius, effectively to establish the bona fides of the innate cosmopolitan 
model.  The descriptive analysis of innate cosmopolitanism’s historical role in 
canonical works founds its normative potential.  Likewise, political and legal 
scholars alike return with regularity to Kant to understand or promote a 
contemporary doctrine of cosmopolitan relations.  For the most part, Kant is taken 
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as the father of liberal cosmopolitanism; his depiction of a contractual move away 
from a state of nature also resembles constitutional cosmopolitanism; lately, 
however, his work has been reconstructed by Jens Bartelson to establish an innate 
cosmopolitan argument as well.  I return to that point, below.  For the present, the 
point is to observe that, from Vitoria to Kant, the attention to ancient scholarship is 
more than a genealogy: it often purports at once to establish the historical 
architecture, historical persuasion and historical political and legal authority of the 
innate cosmopolitan idea. 
In part, the normative reliance on the history of the idea follows on the failure of 
definitive proof of the perceived sociological phenomenon.  Bound up with the 
innate cosmopolitan model since its inception, together with the assumption that 
the unitary world collective exists, is the premise that world norms must be 
discovered in historical acts, experiences and expectations occurring in the world as 
a whole.  But the vastness of the empirical field and methodological conflicts among 
scholars and practitioners have compromised the promise of any observational 
science.  In lieu of empirical demonstration, then, the innate cosmopolitan heuristic 
device has been joined to the narrative of its own intellectual and doctrinal history, 
such that the pedigree of the idea provides persuasive force where other evidence is 
lacking.  Though it relies on an empirical premise, innate cosmopolitanism addresses 
the inefficacies of subjective juridical relations firstly with appeals to logic and 
intuition drawn from the narrative of its own history. 
Below, I will first briefly explicate the historical architecture, beginning with Vitoria, 
with attention to those aspects of the canonical scholarship that have been relied on 
and reconstructed by recent scholars.  I will limit my early historical examination to 
only a small selection of canonical works showing the most sustained engagement 
with and development of innate cosmopolitan ideas, namely the Spanish School of 
the 16th and 17th centuries, including the figures of Vitoria, Suárez and Grotius.  
Innate cosmopolitanism can be found throughout canonical works associated with 
international law, but the intent here is not a comprehensive work of historical 
scholarship.  Instead, I rely on a small selection of canonical works in the interests 
of economy, chosen also for representative value: the figures of the Spanish School 
remain among those formative figures still most associated by contemporary writers 
in their various invocations of innate cosmopolitan ideas.39 
                                                                
39 See, e.g., Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 42 Am. J. Int’l L. 20 (1948), pp. 26-34; and Harold 
Koh, Why do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 Yale L.J. 2599 (1996), pp. 2604-07. 
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In addition to the Spanish School, I include, as mentioned, the work of Immanuel 
Kant, who, as noted, has long been canonical to the liberal cosmopolitan tradition, 
and may arguably be foundational to constitutional cosmopolitan as well, but whose 
work has lately also been reconstructed to substantiate and serve as a keystone for 
innate cosmopolitan theory.  In this light, Kant’s work serves a slightly different role 
from the other early works considered here.  Kant is treated less for being 
foundational to the body of recent innate cosmopolitan work, and more as an 
example of the continued possibility of development on that idea, including by 
reference to previously untapped, historical sources of authority. 
Following Kant, I will proceed directly to 20th century scholarship, beginning with 
the work of James Brown Scott, who was instrumental in publicizing and 
reinforcing an appreciation of the Spanish School and innate cosmopolitanism in 
international legal theory.  In later sections I will further consider the persuasion and 
authority that continues to flow from the history of the idea in contemporary 
international legal doctrine and discourse. 
 
Revisiting canonical works 
Francisco de Vitoria, working at the University of Salamanca in the early 16th 
century, developed his ideas in a period of radically disintegrating religious and 
social cohesion among the peoples of Europe, against which lingering normative 
cohesion was devolved from the Roman Empire and ecclesiastical authority.  At the 
same time, the world was expanding as a function of the exploration and 
exploitation of the new world, further stretching the viability of norms and bonds 
that had historically anchored rules of conduct among peoples in the old world.  
Vitoria’s contributions to international law were delivered in the form of lectures at 
the University of Salamanca, and especially a series of lectures dedicated to the 
propriety and legality of the exploitation of native populations in the newly-
discovered Americas.  Vitoria defied the authority of prince and pope in denying 
legal and religious grounds for the forcible subjugation of the native populations, 
but posited an inalienable right among Spanish adventurers and missionaries – 
together with anyone else – to travel, trade and preach anywhere in the world, 
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provided they were not at the same time on other grounds “doing harm” to native 
populations.40 
To substantiate normative cohesion in the face of revolutionary social 
disintegration, coupled with the expansion of the known world, Vitoria posited a 
notmative potential vested in a comprehensive phenomenon of human collectivity, 
not identified with imperialist authorities, and also distinct from – but inclusive of – 
new and independent peoples.  The comprehensive phenomenon that he perceived 
enjoyed the “force of law” sufficient to make its norms “binding upon nations” and 
“capable of conferring rights” and “creating obligations”.41  The phenomenon that 
Vitoria described would represent , by virtue of being comprehensive, an objective 
foundation for international law, capable of sustaining international rules over 
increasingly independent peoples, but without subjecting them to imperial control.  
He supported this objective foundation by positing an interdependent relationship 
among the peoples of the world to counter the rise of political independence, an 
interdependent relationship founded neither in imperial nor ecclesiastical 
community. 
The interdependent foundation that Vitoria established encompassed the world as a 
whole, taking the entirety of the world of people as a discrete collective entity with 
interests of its own, capable of establishing an independent or autonomous 
normative potential.  The vision of the interdependent world derives in the first 
instance from a concept of “natural society and fellowship”, but takes the political 
form, in the law of nations, of a constructive “consensus of the greater part of the 
whole world” capable of binding the entirety.42  The world as a whole represents a 
comprehensive collective with normative power by virtue of a capacity and 
inclination for communication that adheres universally, even if only in potentiality, 
across the whole of humanity.43  In keeping with the Aristotelian premise of a 
natural propensity for communication, Vitoria founds the normative authority 
behind international law in the idea that “[n]ature has established a bond of 
                                                                
40 Franciscus de Vitoria, De Indis Noviter Inventis, in James Brown Scott, The Spanish Origin of 
International Law: Francisco de Vitoria and his Law of Nations (Union: The Lawbook Exchange 
Limited, 2000 [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934]), App. A, pp. xxv-xli. 
41 Ibid., App. A, p. xxxviii. 
42 Ibid., App. A., pp. xxxvi, xxxviii. 
43 See, Franciscus de Vitoria, De Potestate Civili, in James Brown Scott, The Spanish Origin of 
International Law: Francisco de Vitoria and his Law of Nations (Union: The Lawbook Exchange 
Limited, 2000 [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934]), App. C., pp. lxxiv-lxxv. 
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relationship between all men.”44  Thus there is a distinct, all-inclusive social 
phenomenon, not to the exclusion of peoples and states, but different from them, 
more expansive in scope, and not dependent on them.  From the nature of this all-
inclusive phenomenon, Vitoria derives the foundations of world norms: world 
norms represent right rules of conduct in world relations that are derived from 
observation of the social nature of humankind in its broadest or most fundamental 
manifestation. 
The world norms, or universal norms that flow from the world phenomenon, are 
not to the exclusion of local and particular norms: the same capacity and inclination 
for social interaction that underlies some universal norms of conduct also give rise 
to the differentiation of local norms.  Hence Vitoria’s crucial distinction between 
what was permitted and what was not permitted to Spanish adventurers in the new 
world: universal norms affirmed a basic allowance for trade, for missionary 
purposes, and for communication and interaction generally; but beyond the 
inviolability of those basic allowances on the basis of universal norms, particular 
norms were not be overthrown, and subjugation of local populations was 
illegitimate (though ultimately achieved in part on the basis of what was already 
allowed).45 
The product is a normative order that is discrete for flowing from the thing itself, 
namely the human world as a whole, rather than any subjective aspiration to control 
or guide its present or future.  Following Vitoria, international normative 
prescription derives or may derive from the nature and will of the world as a whole, 
rather than from the subjective positions of the actors who constitute it or would 
dominate it; thereby world norms reflect an autonomous and objective foundation, 
rather than any particular, subjective authority: 
that international law has not only the force of a pact and agreement among 
men but also the force of a law; for the world as a whole being in a way one 
single State, has the power to create laws that are just and fitting for all 
persons, as are the rules of international law.  Consequently, it is clear that 
they who violate these international rules, whether in peace or in war, commit 
a mortal sin; moreover, in the gravest matters, such as the inviolability of 
ambassadors, it is not permissible for one country to refuse to be bound by 
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international law, the latter having been established by the authority of the 
whole world.46 
Thus Vitoria envisioned the world vested with its own authority to effect law, 
disassociated from the subjective position of any individual not speaking for the 
inclusive whole of the discrete world phenomenon.  Thereby he affirmed an 
objective normative design intrinsic to the world as a whole, above and beyond the 
subjective normative designs of the separate states: the law of nations takes its 
authority in the first place “in behalf of the common good of all.”47  On this basis, 
“society at large”, encompassing the whole world, can do as a matter of law what “a 
State can do to its own citizens.”48  Once the nature or will of the world as a whole 
is determined, as identified with at least a majority of humankind, it may enjoy the 
force of law “even though the rest of mankind objected thereto”.49 
Vitoria’s juridical foundations for international law were developed by Francisco 
Suárez and Grotius, among others, after him.  Thus Suárez, in the late 16th into the 
early 17th century, also at Salamanca for a time, writes of “true law” that has been 
“introduced by the usage and general conduct, not of one or another people, but of 
the whole world”.50  The law of nations, Suárez repeats after Vitoria, was 
“introduced by the free will and consent of mankind whether we refer to the whole 
human community or to the major portion thereof”.51  Suárez took further the 
radical interdependent underpinning of Vitoria's objective and autonomous law of 
nations as follows: “although a given sovereign state, commonwealth, or kingdom, 
may constitute a perfect community in itself, consisting of its own members, 
nevertheless, each one of these states is also, in a certain sense, and viewed in 
relation to the human race, a member of that universal society”.52  No level of 
internal development and sophistication removes a people or nation from the ambit 
                                                                
46 Vitoria, supra note 43, App C, p. xc. 
47 Vitoria, supra note 40, App. A, p. xxxviii. 
48 Franciscus de Vitoria, De Jure Belli, in James Brown Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law: 
Francisco de Vitoria and his Law of Nations (Union: The Lawbook Exchange Limited, 2000 [Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1934]), App B, lvi. 
49 Vitoria, supra note 40, App. A, p. xxxviii. 
50 Francisco Suárez, A Treatise on Laws and God the Lawgiver, Book VII: Of unwritten law which is 
called custom, in Selections from Three Works, vol. 2, ( Buffalo: William S. Hein & Co., Inc., 1995 
[Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1944]), p. 459. 
51 Francisco Suárez, A Treatise on Laws and God the Lawgiver, Book II: On the Eternal Law, the 
Natural Law, and the Ius Gentium, in Selections from Three Works, vol. 2, ( Buffalo: William S. Hein & 
Co., Inc., 1995 [Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1944]), p. 332. 
52 Ibid., pp. 348-49. 
36 
 
of the single universal society, in Suárez’s terms.  Moreover, the universal society is 
defined by the human race, rather than any other, less comprehensive bonds.  The 
universal phenomenon to which Suárez refers, following Vitoria, is a function of the 
need for “mutual assistance, association, and intercourse”.53  In sum, the local or 
particular collective is acknowledged, and not overthrown, but there exists at the 
same time a collective that is universal in nature, in scope encompassing the whole 
world. 
Suárez justified his assertion of  universal society with a clear statement of  
underlying unity: “the human race, into howsoever many different peoples and 
kingdoms it may be divided, always preserves a certain unity”.54  The unity is social, 
moral and political, and enjoys global normativity as a matter of  necessity.  Suárez’s 
famous passage is worth quoting in its length: 
The human race, into howsoever many different peoples and kingdoms it 
may be divided, always preserves a certain unity, not ony as a species, but 
also a moral and political unity … enjoined by the natural precept of  
mutual love and mercy; a precept which applies to all, even to strangers of  
every nation. 
Therefore, although a given sovereign state, commonwealth, or kingdom 
may constitute a perfect community in itself, consisting of  its own 
members, nevertheless, each one of  these states is also, in a certain sense, 
and viewed in relation to the human race, a member of  that universal 
society; for these states when standing alone are never so self-sufficient that 
they do not require some mutual assistance, association, and intercourse, at 
times for their own greater welfare and advantage, but at other times 
because also of  some moral necessity or need.  This fact is made manifest 
by actual usage.55 
Thus, the universal society is a comprehensive political phenomenon founded in 
human nature.  From that political phenomenon flows the normative authority that 
gives validity and effect to international law.  International law represents those rules 
and principles identified with the nature and interests of humanity, or the world as a 
whole, distinct from the political authority and interests that remain vested in 
particular collectives, including sovereign states. 
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After Suárez, Grotius has been described as the culminating member of the Spanish 
School.56  Like Vitoria and Suárez before him, he subscribed to an idea of a “society 
of mankind” that encompasses the world as a whole.57  Grotius founded his society 
of mankind, derived from the world phenomenon observed by Vitoria and Suárez, 
in both natural and empirical roots.  The society of mankind, according to Grotius, 
arises naturally out of a universal capacity for and inclination to sociability and 
communication among humans; from that capacity and inclination, norms of 
universal human society may be discerned, which in turn establish the terms of 
universal law.  Grotius describes the natural wellspring of universal norms as 
follows: “This Sociability, which we have now described in general, or this Care of 
maintaining Society in a Manner conformable to the Light of human Understanding, 
is the Fountain of Right, properly so called”.58  The empirical grounds for affirming 
the society of mankind are vested in interdependence, according to which no nation 
is able to exist in isolation, and from which interdependence the need for society 
and law arises: 
there is no State so strong or well provided, but what may sometimes stand in 
need of Foreign Assistance, either in the Business of Commerce, or to repel 
the joint Forces of several Foreign Nations Confederate against it…. So true 
is it, that the Moment we recede from Right, we can depend upon nothing.  If 
there is no Community which can be preserved without some Sort of Right 
… certainly the Society of Mankind, or of several Nations, cannot be without 
it.59 
Notably, among the universal rules flowing from the society of mankind is a right of 
intervention vested in the world collective and actionable against any local or 
particular collective.  The world unit possesses certain interests, protected as a 
matter of norm and law, which smaller collectives may not transgress.  Thus Grotius 
holds that, in the case of injustice which “no good Man living can approve of, the 
Right of human Society shall not be therefore excluded”.60  The rights of human 
society, within the sphere of competence of that society, are superior to any right 
vested in smaller social and political collectives.  The society of mankind is 
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‘subjectivized’, enjoying interests and rights of its own, capable of prosecution 
against all other individuated societies, and human sociability is the well-spring of 
that comprehensive and objective society, together with the rights appropriate to it.  
In this way Grotius, concluding the line of Spanish School scholarship, made the 
world phenomenon relatively concrete, like in nature to the increasingly 
sophisticated nation states of the early 17th century, and likewise cognizable as a 
matter of law. 
Following Grotius, subjectivity and individualism associated with nation states were 
ascendant in the international system.  A crossroads of  sorts in the conflicting 
appeals to the world phenomenon, on the one hand, and sovereign states in their 
individual capacities, on the other, is manifest in the work of  Immanuel Kant.  Kant 
is perhaps only truly canonical to the liberal cosmopolitan tradition, and even 
beyond the liberal cosmopolitan tradition has enjoyed more purchase with 
constitutional cosmopolitanism than with innate cosmopolitanism.  But Kant’s 
political theory also supports the idea of  a comprehensive political phenomenon 
that brings it within the ambit of  innate cosmopolitanism.  Recently, Jens Bartelson 
has also revisited Kant’s work for its historical significance and contemporary 
relevance, as both a turning point away from a historically prior commitment to one 
world community in political theory, but also as a source for its potential 
reconstruction.61 
Kant's cosmopolitan theory begins with natural law premises that differ 
meaningfully from the natural law premises that inform the work of  the Spanish 
School.  The natural law associated with the Spanish School derives substantially 
from Roman imperial law, and represents a set of  norms supposed to be 
discoverable by right reason and conducive to harmonious world relations.  Kant's 
natural law, by contrast, represents a conflation of  natural law with the state of  
nature thought experiment, part of  the liberal enlightenment origins myth, 
describing the imagined situations of  individuals in pre-political conditions of  
disorder.  Thus Kant writes that “States, viewed as Nations, in their external 
relations to one another — like lawless savages — are naturally in a non-juridical 
condition”.62  As such, there is an “original Right of  free States to go to War with 
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each other as being still in a state of  Nature”.63  Juridical relations must be 
constructed out of  this condition of  original right, a condition equally appropriate 
to individual humans and the individuated collectives that they form.  
The individualism manifest in Kant’s political thought, however, is moderated by the 
full scope of  his moral philosophy: the condition of  the state of  nature “is wrong in 
itself  in the highest degree, and the Nations which form States contiguous to each 
other are bound mutually to pass out of  it”.64  In the duty to pass out of  the state 
of  nature in international relations, states are like individuals: “The natural state of  
nations as well as of  individual men is a state which it is a duty to pass out of, in 
order to enter into a legal state.”65  Thus states are obliged “to establish some 
condition of  society approaching the juridical.”66  The state is an individual entity, 
but also a moral one, bound mutually with all other states and individuals, but with 
agency and a will of  its own.  Here the emphasis shifts from individualism to 
complex participation in a collective enterprise. 
States, endowed with both original right and moral agency, share common purpose 
with individuals.  Kant draws between individuals and nation-states the following 
distinction only: 
The difference between the right of  individual men or families as related to 
each other in the state of  nature, and the right of  the nations among 
themselves, consists in this, that in the right of  nations we have to consider 
not merely a relation of  one state to another as a whole, but also the 
relation of  the individual persons in one state to the individuals of  another 
state, as well as to that state as a whole.67 
Kant’s cosmopolitan law, drawn from the rights and moral agency of  states and 
persons alongside one another in juridical global relations, posits an inclusive 
“constitution based on cosmopolitan right, in so far as individuals and states, coexisting 
in an external relationship of  mutual influences, may be regarded as citizens of  a 
universal state of  mankind (ius cosmopoliticum)”.68  Perpetual peace in international 
relations must be comprehensive, and “founded upon the right of  individual men 
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and states” alike.69  Mutual interrelationship among individuals and collectives in the 
world establishes a political superstructure for humankind as a whole. 
Moreover, Kant’s objective ius cosmopoliticum, like Vitorian world authority, is not 
reduced to the subjective expression of  any particular will or wills, state or 
individual, irrespective of  others.  Rather, the rights and responsibilities of  states, 
like individuals, must be understood in the context of  Kant's theory of  autonomy.  
To destroy the state's moral existence is to reduce it to a thing.70  In keeping, then, 
with Kant's theory of  autonomy, individual right becomes a function of  the legal 
order as a whole, and autonomy is defined not by the subjective will alone, but by 
reference to the interconnected whole, or the sum of  the relations in the world of  
every will to every other.  It is the framing mechanism of  the interconnected whole, 
and its crucial role in arriving at the categorical imperative, that makes Kant’s work a 
fruitful source of  innate cosmopolitan theory.  Here is also the potential break from 
a constitutional cosmopolitan reading of  Kant: insofar as Kant is understood to 
describe a contractual move among strangers to leave a state of  nature, his work 
remains within the ambit of  constitutional cosmopolitanism, as will be seen in 
Chapter 3; but insofar as Kant is understood to describe a situation of  immanent 
community, whereby future members of  any social contract are already obliged to 
enter that relationship by virtue of  interdependence prior to any juridical act – and 
if  the terms of  the final relationship are dictated in part by this prior 
interdependence – his work falls within the ambit of  innate cosmopolitanism. 
Cosmopolitan right, by this reading of  Kant, supports a comprehensive vision of  
world relations: the cosmopolitan emphasis shifts from the discrete individual, or 
discrete entity in the world, to the world as a discrete entity.  Cosmopolitan society is 
juridical world society, inclusive of  nations and individuals alike, under a normative 
regime properly derived from the unique nature of  world as a whole, rather than 
from any particular, subjective will.  Moreover, even prior to juridical society, the 
world as a whole represents a comprehensive phenomenon, or framing mechanism 
by which to comprehend the norms incumbent on any individual – person or 
collective – within that inclusive whole.  Thus, in keeping with Bartelson’s 
reconstruction of  the Kantian political tradition, Kant’s legal theory may also be 
understood to posit an objective basis for arriving at world norms by means of  an 
innate cosmopolitan model. 
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James Brown Scott and the renewal of innate cosmopolitan ideas 
Despite the innate cosmpolitan potential discernible in Kant’s work, the narrative of 
international law continued to be one of ascendant individualism.  The story began 
to change immediately prior to the 20th century.  The author perhaps most 
responsible for the 20th century revitalization of innate cosmopolitan ideas would be 
James Brown Scott, who did so principally by reference to the Spanish School.  
Scott promoted republication and translation of works of Vitoria, Suárez and 
Grotius, among others, and wrote a number of works celebrating the Spanish 
School elevation of the world as a whole as a discrete and foundational grounds for 
world norms and international law.  Scott’s work concerning the Spanish School, 
however, was more than mere restatement.  His return to those works in particular 
exhibited a clear object and purpose, and his reading was tailored accordingly.  Scott 
helped to usher in a new generation of innate cosmopolitan ideas in the 20th century 
by selectively emphasizing and interpreting innate cosmopolitan ideas discernible in 
the classical scholarship.  Thus Scott writes that “[Vitoria’s] conception of the 
community of nations, coextensive with humanity and existing as a result of the 
mere coexistence of States, without a treaty or convention, is the hope of the 
future.”71 
Scott’s treatment of Vitoria begins from the premise that the world as a whole, 
represented in the law of nations by an international community of states, but 
coterminous in fact with the whole of humanity, constitutes the ultimate grounds of 
normativity for international law.72  In doing so, Scott devotes substantial attention 
to the idea of individuals as constituents and subjects of international law, as well as 
states.  Vitoria’s doctrine, following Scott, represents: 
a law for each and for all – not merely of each individual and of all individuals 
but of each State, which is but a group of people, and of all the States forming 
the international community of States, which is synonymous, and indeed 
identical, with humanity.  ‘Jus gentium’ therefore appears to be used in the 
double sense of law for people and for States:  the law of humanity on the 
one hand and, on the other, the law of each and every fraction of humanity as 
expressed in the term ‘nation’ or ‘nations’.73 
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Though the will of states, following Scott, may delimit international law under 
certain historical conditions, states are not definitive of the underlying normative 
potential vested in the world as a whole.  Rather, that normativity, and the system of 
law to which it gives rise, is coterminous with the whole of humanity at any given 
point in time.  Thus international law is “binding upon individual, upon State, and 
upon the international community [and it is] an international law coterminous with 
the human race”.74  Likewise, as a matter of international law, “[w]e may conceive of 
… an international community, which, being the world, would have jurisdiction 
over the States and their inhabitants.”75  Moreover, in the absence of any clearer 
expression, the norms of international law may be both discerned and cultivated by 
appeal to “the opinions of mankind.”76 
Scott alternates between premises of natural law and the law of nations to identify 
the expression of normativity enjoyed by the world as a whole, varying as well 
between the will of a majority of the world, and the natural conditions of universal 
human society.  Functionally, the law of nations and natural law are merged, such 
that Scott describes “the law of nations as the law natural and as added to by the 
consent of the majority of mankind.  Here we have the law of nations applying to all 
persons: those who had consented to it, as well as the minority who had not 
consented, but who were equally bound.”77  The language of the will of the 
majority, however, is deceptive.  Scott is not interested to affirm a world state.  
Rather, the world phenomenon is not a world state in the mold of traditional states 
– but it is nonetheless capable of grounding normative authority, as is clear from an 
approving reference to Suárez, worth quoting at length: 
Suárez did not favor the idea of a world state.  Viewing human society with a 
clear and dispassionate eye, he says that it was made up of many political 
communities, each independent of the other.  Yet in all this political diversity 
he also perceived a certain unity.  It was not organic or artifical, not imposed 
by force of arms, but natural in the sense that it was a unity growing out of 
human nature itself.  This perception lies at the core of his philosophy of 
international law and of the international community, a philosophy summed 
up in classic terms in the second book of his De legibus. 
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He conceived of the law of nations as having a ‘rational basis’, which 
consisted, he declared, ‘in the fact that the human race, into howsoever many 
different peoples and kingdoms it may be divided, always preserves a certain 
unity’.  The unity he had in mind was not merely that of ‘a species, but also a 
moral and political unity (as it were) enjoined by the natural precept of mutual 
love and mercy’.  For this precept is applicable, according to Suárez, not 
merely among members of the family, among friends, or among fellow-
citizens; it applies, or should be applied, ‘to all, even to strangers of every 
nation’.  It is clear from these statements that he rests his law of nations upon 
a foundation which is at once reasonable, natural and moral.78 
Thus the world phenomenon is principally a social one in the first instance; Scott 
adopts Vitoria’s premise that the inclination towards sociability serves as the 
foundation of human society, whether in its particular manifestations or in its 
universal form, encompassing the world as a whole.79  While particular societies 
represent express bonds of communication, however, the universal society must 
represent potential bonds of communication.  It is an argument drawn from 
capacity that boils down to immanence: the world phenomenon is an immanent 
society, inherent in the possibility for communication across people and peoples. 
Scott insists, however, that the idea of universal human society as a normative force 
is not a mere abstraction.  Rather, it represents a real and verifiable phenomenon in 
the world: 
we are not dealing with the abstract question – if such there be – but with 
human beings in society; and that the rule of conduct in such a case should be 
that which is consistent with the nature and dignity not alone of human 
beings, as such, but of human beings in a state of society, and which changes 
to meet changed conditions and the needs of a progressive civilization.80 
The world as a whole represents a discrete society with normative force capable of 
giving effect to international law, and, in the absence of a world legislature 
representative of the world as a whole, proper observation of the norms of humans 
in society will yield applicable and appropriate rules of international law.  In sum, 
the world as a whole is capable of making international law and authorizing 
punishment of its violation.81  The world approximates a superstate, though it lacks 
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the formal attributes of a state: “there are the States and a larger State, an 
international community, existing by the mere coexistence of the States, even 
though there be no formal organization.”82  Scott elaborates on the relationship in a 
passage also worth quoting at length: 
[I]nternational community is not a superimposed State; it is coexensive with 
humanity – no longer merely with Christianity.  It is composed of the States 
and is their representative; it is likewise the representative of the common 
humanity rather than of the common religion binding the States.  It is a union 
of the States, and the sum total of the States is necessarily more powerful than 
any of its parts.  Its will is the will of humanity, speaking in terms of peoples; 
its will is international law, speaking in terms of States.  But this law reaches 
the individual through the State, and it controls the actions of the States in 
their relations with one another. 
The international community, therefore, in the Victorian system, possesses 
the inherent right to impose its will – in the form of law applicable to the 
individual State – and to punish its violation, not because of a treaty, of a pact 
or a covenant, but because of an international need.  For just as the State is 
not a ‘perfect’ State if it be not self-sufficient, so would the international 
community be imperfect if it were not self-sufficient in a superior and 
universal sense and if it could not impose its collective judgement, in the form 
of the law of nations, upon humanity – considered as such – and upon the 
States as members of the international community.83 
In the Vitorian system as described by Scott, exemplary of the innate cosmopolitan 
model, the world as a whole enjoys a will and interests of its own, which establishes 
norms and normativity foundational to international law. 
Scott’s work to reinvigorate the innate cosmopolitan model in international law was 
complimented by the contemporaneous perception of  a world materially changed 
by the political and industrial revolutions of  the prior epoch.  Scholars and 
practitioners proposed new normative foundations for international law, drawn 
from the innate cosmopolitan model, intended once again to achieve an objective 
authority capable of  controlling subjective will in the international system.  Prior to 
World War II, the focus was on renewed doctrine for objective norms, founded in a 
world perceived to have arrived at a stage of  appreciable interconnectedness.   
Following World War II, the attention turned to actual research programs necessary 
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to verify the perception of  interconnectedness and to substantiate the renewed 
aspiration to objective normative grounds for international law, as well as to explore 
the professional and policy implications flowing from potential empirical conditions.  
Assumptions of  sociological premises permeate both periods.  Below, I proceed 
roughly chronologically through both periods, before concluding with 
contemporary scholarship thereafter. 
 
Hudson, Álvarez, Lansing & Madariaga 
I will first consider the following scholars and practitioners to establish the initial 
scope of the 20th century return to the innate cosmopolitan model: Manley Hudson, 
Alejandro Álvarez, Robert Lansing, Salvadore de Madariaga.   Following these 
scholars and practitioners, I will turn to the work of Hersch Lauterpacht for further 
refinement of the innate cosmopolitan model, and thereafter to certain of his 
successors who adopted and expanded on the innate cosmopolitan model, before 
concluding with the continued engagement with innate cosmopolitan ideas and their 
legacy in current doctrine. 
Hudson and Álvarez are both significant for contributing to the contemporary 
renewal of innate cosmopolitanism as scholars and practitioners, Hudson having 
served as a judge on the Permanent Court of International Justice, and Álvarez as 
one of the first judges on the International Court of Justice.  Their work exhibits the 
contemporary theoretical bedrock of innate cosmopolitanism, as well as the seeds of 
its application in international jurisprudence.  Lansing, a former U.S. Secretary of 
State, and Madariaga, a Spanish diplomat who enjoyed several posts throughout his 
career, including at the UN, demonstrate an appeal to innate cosmopolitanism as a 
matter of diplomatic practice.  The combination of perspectives prefigures the 
development of politically- and empirically-oriented theory following the Second 
World War.  The world developments to which they point in defense of their thesis, 
empirical or intuited, exhibit an emphasis on sociology, psychology and 
communications underlying the innate cosmopolitan scholarship that went forward, 
in calls for a variety of research programs, following the interwar period. 
Hudson observed technological advances throughout the 19th century to have 
produced a consolidation of  world society in the 20th century.  Thus, “the 
development of  communication and industry proceeded at such a fast pace during 
the nineteenth century that the nature of  our world society has been radically 
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transformed.  It has become indeed a single world society”.84  Following the change 
in world society, he proposed to revisit the normative foundations of  international 
law: “The foundations of  our law, its aims and its philosophic roots, must be re-
examined.”85  The goal was to organize world society into a viable political or legal 
community.86 
Hudson's principle critique of  mainstream international law, as he understood it, 
was the bedrock analogy of  sovereign states in their international relations to private 
parties in personal affairs, rather than public participants in a forum for world 
governance.  Thus he argued for a legislative, rather than strictly contractual 
character of  some treaties.87  But the norms of  world society, following Hudson, are 
not strictly a matter of  conventional legislation among states.  Rather, “a sound 
philosophical basis for the international law of  the twentieth century can only result 
from a functional critique of  international law in terms of  social ends.”88  The social 
ends of  world society dictate the new – or renewed – normativity of  international 
law.  In sum, the system of  international relations and international law resembles a 
comprehensive forum, rather than an anarchy, dedicated to the social ends of  the 
world, beyond those of  the state. 
To ascertain the normative regime drawn from his wide range of  world social ends, 
Hudson proposed a broad research agenda: “the future law of  nations must seek 
contributions from history, from political science, from economics, from sociology 
and from social psychology if  it would keep pace with the society which it serves”.89  
Thus the cosmopolitan world unit must be ordered objectively, according to the 
study of  its nature, rather than according to any preconceived or subjective 
normative agenda. 
Like Hudson, Álvarez predicated world norms on a world social phenomenon, 
expressly cosmopolitan: “Economic life and human activity have become 
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cosmopolitan.”90  A cosmopolitan world meant diminished normative individualism 
in international affairs, in favor of  global solidarity: “This new direction was the 
complete abandonment of  metaphysics, and chiefly of  individualism which has 
dominated the science of  law up to the present time, in favor of  a more social point 
of  view; that is to say, an attitude more in harmony with the solidarity which these 
factors themselves required.”91 
The foundations and ends of  modern international law change accordingly: ““The 
new conception of  law is that of  a realization of  solidarity; that is to say, the 
regulation of  jural relations not in the interest of  the individual, but in the interest 
of  society.”92  Again, the new normative regime, founded in the interests of  world 
society rather than individuals or individuated collectives in the world, is not to be 
the product of  any subjective or even merely neutral agenda.  Rather, “[t]he same 
factors or phenomena which led to the elimination of  individualism furnish the 
outline and principal applications of  the new idea.”93  There inheres proper ends to 
the cosmopolitan order, discernible in the nature of  the cosmopolitan social 
phenomenon. 
Similar to Hudson, Álvarez ties the substance of  the cosmopolitan order to the 
product of  two proposed fields of  study, “two new and closely inter-related 
sciences, the 'science of  international life' and the 'science of  national psychologies 
in international affairs'.”94  Their combined scope includes attention to “the various 
conceptions of  law which have flourished, and to the various legal systems which 
have appeared in history or which now exist.”95  Álvarez adumbrates their scientific 
mission as follows: 
That study must trace out the lines of  legal evolution in the course of  
history; next mark out the diverse conceptions of  law which have prevailed 
in different groups of  countries during the nineteenth century, in a 
comparison of  the fundamental institutions of  these various groups; and 
lastly investigate the different social factors which from the second half  of  
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the nineteenth century have operated in all countries in a uniform direction 
toward the inauguration of  a new legal epoch - the socialization of  the 
law.96 
Álvarez is equally ambitious in his description of  method: 
This method should be historical and comparative and should be 
supplemented by observation of  contemporary life. A true philosophy of  
law is possible only when it is based on a judicious investigation of  
institutions athwart the ranges of  time and space, and the influences 
bearing on them through surrounding social phenomena.97 
Álvarez's emphasis is on the “social factors”: “it behooves us to study from as broad 
a standpoint as possible the life of  the international community in all its present 
manifestations.”98  In the broad scope of  the life of  the international community, it 
is the psychological life of  the international community in particular that Álvarez 
proposes to focus on: 
We must study, moreover, international life in all its depth, that is to say, we 
must consider not only the material but also the immaterial factors which 
are involved, the 'imponderables' often spoken about without more accurate 
definition.  Of  these the most important are psychological in nature; they 
are sentiments of  one kind or another, such as national sentiment, the 
sentiment of  international good neighbourliness, anti-social sentiment, as 
well as ideals, states of  mind, doctrines, etc.  The nations are guided in their 
international relations much more in reality by psychological factors such as 
these, or by economic considerations, than they are by reason or justice.99 
Anticipating considerable reliance by scholars and practitioners on psychological 
conditions purportedly characteristic of  participation in world community – 
scholars and practitioners including, among those who’s work is considered here, 
Harold Lasswell and the New Haven School, various judges of  the ICJ, Jutta 
Brunnée and Stephen Toope, as well as Jens Bartelson – Álvarez suggests that the 
psychological life of  the international community forms the normative bedrock of  
world law: “The psychological character of  the law of  nations, itself  a consequence 
of  the psychological character of  international life, is apparent particularly in the 
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origin and basis” of  the new international law.100  The emphasis on psychological 
factors underscores the normative weight given as a matter of  innate 
cosmopolitanism to world public opinion, or world juridical conscience, which, as 
will be seen in Chapter 4, plays a meaningful role in the juridprudence of  the ICJ.101  
Thus, following Álvarez: “The object of  this new philosophy of  law should be the 
illustration of  public opinion giving it a clearer estimate than it has hitherto 
enjoyed.”102 
In sum, Álvarez follows Hudson's call for a broadened science of  international law 
with a call for entirely new sciences concerning international life generally.  By 
identifying the source of  cosmopolitan norms with world public opinion, however, 
Álvarez ties world normative authority to a specific political phenomenon, though 
not a well-defined one.  The broad study of  the world affairs is meant to correct 
that imprecision, discerning in the unique psychological and material life of  the 
historical world community objective rules for its collective conduct, rules not 
derived from any subjective interest or presumed doctrine of  law or relations.  
Notably, however, the observation of  behavioral patterns as a matter of  sociology 
or observational science is not identical with public opinion as it may be discerned 
or affirmed by one or another theory of  political or communicative agency.  The 
ambivalence between reliance on one or the other grounds for normative authority 
reflects a certain ambivalence in the innate cosmopolitan model.  I return to this 
point in the conclusion. 
Moving on, Robert Lansing, US Secretary of  State under Woodrow Wilson, 
published an unusual piece in the American Journal of  International Law,103 exhibiting a 
similar appreciation of  one world community, rich in historical overtones, 
proclaiming that “the entire human race ought to be considered, and in fact is, a 
single community, which awaits the further development of  modern civilization to 
complete its organization and make of  all mankind a great, universal political 
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state.”104  Moreover, Lansing effectively connects canonical authorities and more 
recent writers by suggesting that historical compliance with international law 
demonstrates the validity of  the innate cosmopolitan model.  He writes of  the single 
human community that “the great states of  the civilized world have recognized, 
perhaps unconsciously, its existence in the applied law of  nations, just as they have 
recognized it in the sphere of  morals by giving binding effect to the principles of  
humanity.”105 
Likewise, Lansing anticipates the political theory of  Jens Bartelson, describing the 
innate cosmopolitan model as an immanent condition in the world.  By this theory, 
the world community exists, if  only as a constant potentiality.  Lansing, unlike 
Bartelson, argues from the hypothetical potential of  consolidated democratic power 
in the world: 
Since it is possible to conceive of  the human race as one body composed 
of  a large number of  political groups including millions of  individuals, or 
as one body with these individuals as units, and, in either case, as a 
community, it follows from the very nature of  things that in this 
unorganized mass of  humanity there must be a certain body of  individuals 
possessing a physical might sufficient to compel obedience by every 
member of  the human race throughout the world. Such superior physical 
might constitutes sovereignty, and, since its only limit is the earth, it may 
properly be termed World Sovereignty.106 
Significantly, Lansing suggests that the world community, even an inchoate world 
community, is the only truly independent political community.  In rendering the 
immanent world community as the only independent political community, he 
affirms it to be the singular objective grounds for the system of  international law: 
sovereignty in every modern state lacks the essential of  real sovereignty, 
namely independence. Sovereignty, as it exists in a state, stands in much the 
same relation to the supreme might of  the world that civil liberty stands in 
relation to the sovereign power in a state. From the broader point of  view, 
therefore, the sovereignty in a state is dependent upon the collective 
physical force of  mankind, or rather upon the collective will of  those, 
whether considered as political groups or as individuals, who possess the 
preponderance of  such force, and who are because of  such possession 
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actually independent. In the case of  this dominant body all the essential 
qualities and attributes of  real sovereignty are present, but it is unorganized, 
undetermined, and necessarily variable, composed of  a multitude of  
individuals who are members of  numerous states and offset against one 
another by race, national allegiance, and other differences.107 
Lansing's own intuition about the inchoate world community suggests a Kantian 
framework in accordance with its innate cosmopolitan reconstruction, wherein the 
autonomy of  any international actor is derived by reference to the whole of  the 
international community.  Lansing also envisions a future federal world political 
organization, drawing together the innate and constitutional aspects of  Kantian 
theory: 
It may be said then that every state, whether strong or weak, whether great 
or small, whether rich or poor, whether civilized or barbarous, is in a sense 
a protectorate, a ward of  the other states of  the world, holding its political 
powers of  them and responsible to them for its international conduct. In a 
word, every state is a member of  the Community of  Nations, wherein 
resides World Sovereignty, and which in the fullness of  time will become, 
through the positive expression of  that sovereignty, an organized political 
union, a Federal World State.108 
Lansing acknowledges a normative problem associated with an inchoate or merely 
immanent world human community, but the problem is not about the fact or 
normativity of  the community itself.  Rather, the problem is a matter of  
communicating norms in the absence of  any clear and consolidated source of  
independent authority capable of  articulating world law.  In his terms, the world is 
“without a government, and therefore without an agent of  the sovereign to 
formulate in terms and formally proclaim rules of  human conduct,” such that the 
will of  the world human community “cannot find expression through the usual 
channel of  enacted law, by which the sovereign will is announced in a state.”109 
Lansing suggests two possibilities to address the absence of  a clear normative 
source capable of  announcing the will of  the world: one is reminiscent of  the 
subjective legal doctrine of  Emerich de Vattel, and with it the failure of  
cosmopolitan law; the others resembles the jurisprudence of  Hudson and Álvarez.  
Lansing appeared to favor both equally, at least as near-term possibilities at the time 
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of  his writing.  Recalling Vattel, the normative will of  the world community is 
largely reduced to an ethical mandate, and left for its interpretation and enforcement 
to the auto-execution of  each sovereign state.110  Alternatively, recalling Hudson and 
Álvarez, and Vitoria before them, valid world law is a question of  properly 
comprehending the nature of  the world community, and its will: 
it is necessary to determine, first, what that will is in regard to human 
conduct in the world, and, second, whether the body of  rules which 
governments and publicists recognize as the Law of  Nations, coincides with 
and actually expresses such sovereign will. If  it is thus coincident and 
expressive then it is law in the legal sense; if  it is not, then it is law only in 
name and not in fact.111 
Going further, Lansing reduces the will of  the world, properly understood, to a 
discrete phenomenon similar with the primary source of  world authority identified 
by Álvarez, namely, world public opinion, or, in Lansing's terms, “the collective 
opinion of  nations”.112  He cites the international prohibition of  piracy and the 
slave trade as evidence of  the existence and power of  world public opinion: 
The international adoption of  policies like those relating to piracy and the 
slave-trade is a manifestation of  the existence of  a sovereign will in the 
world, which is super-national and supreme. It is suggestive of  the 
possibilities of  the future. The influence of  the collective opinion of  
nations operating throughout the Community of  Nations compels state 
after state to recognize the superiority of  World Sovereignty over the 
sovereignty in a state and consequently the superiority of  law emanating 
from the higher authority over the municipal legal codes of  states.113 
Salvador de Madariaga, also a diplomat throughout his life, as well as a scholar at 
Oxford, developed a still more comprehensive theory of  innate cosmopolitanism.  
Madariaga primarily focused not on a world conscience, such as Álvarez explored, 
but on a world consciousness.  In positing world consciousness, he falls into a 
tradition of  a common or shared mind or mentality, begun with Averroës and 
Danté, and still more recently revisited to reconstructive effect by Bartelson.114  
Moreover, the world consciousness that Madariaga observes is a function of  self-
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awareness: “the world is everywhere aware of  itself  as a whole”.115  As will be seen, 
Quincy Wright later also adopted world self-awareness as A key element in an innate 
cosmopolitan theory of  cosmopolitan norms. 
World consciousness or world self-consciousness, as described by Madariaga, is 
reflective of  collectivity in the world, and not reflective of  any particular or 
individual state of  mind.  The world consciousness is a unique phenomenon that 
comprises all self-aware individuals in an inescapable relation of  unity, and is not 
identical with the thoughts or feelings of  any one or several of  them.  Thus the 
phenomenon of  the self-aware world is not contingent on any particular plan or 
state of  mind.  Rather, the development of  a self-aware world “has come about on 
the plane of  things, as a progress of  the solidarity of  things, not initiated and willed 
by men, but suffered by them in all passivity and for the most part in all 
ignorance.”116  The status of  being a thing in the world is what lends the condition 
of  solidarity, and the consciousness associated with it, its objectivity.  Madariaga 
observes that “subjective solidarity lags behind objective solidarity, i.e. while men are 
already members of  one world unit, they do not yet feel themselves to be so.”117 
Madariaga proposes a two-step normative program to address the gulf  between 
objective and subjective solidarity: “What is wanted is a world approach, i.e. the 
consideration of  the problem in hand from the point of  view of  an organized and 
conscious mankind.  The second condition is that men should learn to think and 
feel themselves as members of  such an organized and conscious mankind, i.e. as 
world citizens.”118  First, the world consciousness must be understood; thereafter, all 
persons must be brought to appreciate their incorporation in it.  Madariaga ties the 
definition of  progress to the satisfaction of  these conditions: “ultimately, the inner 
meaning of  progress lies in the realization of  the organic character of  mankind as 
the conscious inhabitant of  the planet.”119  Here emergences the link between law 
and policy implicit in the innate cosmopolitan model: the law must be made to 
conform with the telos or mandate associated with the world as a whole, and 
subjects of  the law must be induced to appreciate it. 
Moreover, in now familiar fashion, the legislative function, or the responsibility for 
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world norms, is not left to the exercise of  subjective political will, but to the study 
of  the unique normative phenomenon of  the world consciousness itself, from 
which the norms for the world community flow.  The lawmaker “has therefore a 
double function in legislation and sociology: not only to endeavor to lead empirical 
law towards ideal or natural law, but also to shape current ideas so that customs and 
behaviour evolve nearer and nearer to that ideal, natural law, itself  dependent on 
customs and ideas.”120 
The double function of  sociology and legislation that Madariaga proposes falls 
within the tradition begun with Vitoria.  The lawmaker must induce behavior 
towards an ideal, and presumably away from the current situation at the time of  
writing; the ideal pertaining to the proper recognition of  objective collectivity, the 
current situation reflecting limitations of  unaided, subjective knowledge.  Achieving 
the ideal condition entails better comprehending its reality.  Thus the natural law to 
which Madariaga refers is the natural law of  Vitoria, namely, rightly-reasoned rules 
for the unique world social phenomenon, developed by means of  inquiry into the 
nature of  that phenomenon.  Madariaga says of  Vitoria that his doctrine of  world 
community was fundamentally sound, but failed for coming too soon: “The attempt 
of  the Spanish theologians of  the school of  Salamanca, from Vitoria to Suárez, to 
build up international law on the basis of  the unity of  Christendom, i.e. of  a 
community united in spirit, failed, as it was bound to fail, because it was 
premature.”121  Like Kant, Madariaga suggests an historical process driving the 
cosmopolitan phenomenon: “We are – we always have been – in a process of  
evolution towards a conscious world community, or, in other words, towards a 
World Commonwealth.”122  There is, additionally, a further Kantian aspect to 
Madariaga's assumption of  a world consciousness.  Madariaga, like Kant, attributes 
moral agency to the collective phenomena of  nations, recognizing that “units of  
collective life, or communities, are forms of  nature and therefore possess an 
inherent law”.123  Madariaga treats the nation as a intermediate point between 
individual consciousness and world consciousness; it is “the middle term in our 
human series – men, nations, mankind”.124  Consequently, Madariaga, like Kant and 
Álvarez, too, assigns states a place alongside individuals in the cosmopolitan order: 
“The World Commonwealth ... must be a commonwealth of  men as well as of  
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nations”.125 
The conclusion of  the historical development of  world consciousness is the 
cosmopolitan realization of  “one great city”.126  The city, by Madariaga's definition, 
is “the political institution which expresses a community”.127  The one great city is 
the world city, or cosmopolis: the ordered political institution which harmoniously 
expresses world community.  The reality, however, of  the cosmopolitan vision 
remains, in the writing of  Madariaga, a matter of  intuition: “we find man's progress 
to consist in raising towards awareness a feeling or instinct which had made him 
subconsciously assume that the world obeys one law, has a sense, means 
something.”128  Indeed, Madariaga makes the intuitive nature of  the cosmopolitan 
phenomenon a function of  its objective character: “This unity of  nature, both in 
man and in the world outside, is there, apart from whether man knows, guesses or 
feels it.  Secondly, man feels or guesses this unity even though he does not realize it, even 
though he does not see what a far-reaching assumption he is making.”129  The 
suggestion makes clear the tacit claim that the persistent appeal to the innate 
cosmopolitan model over time, even as an intuitive assumption, establishes its own 
source of  authority. 
 
Lauterpacht 
I turn now to the work of Hersch Lauterpacht, from whom innate cosmopolitanism 
received perhaps its most compelling expression.  Lauterpacht has lately been 
thoroughly revisited by Martti Koskenniemi, prompting others to do so as well, and 
Koskenniemi’s work on Lauterpacht is littered with references to cosmopolitanism.  
But cosmopolitanism is a broad term in the larger body of Koskenniemi’s work.  I 
need here only briefly review aspects of Lauterpacht’s work to bring out those 
specifically expressive of innate cosmopolitan tenets and initiatives. 
Innate cosmopolitanism, to return to a basic point, includes the use of a political-
theoretical idea to influence the form and function of international law.  Lauterpacht 
was more clear than many legal scholars about the role of political theory in law, and 
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more assertive in endeavoring to marshal or control political theory in favor of a 
progressive vision of international law.  His international legal theory begins with an 
appreciation for the juridical consequences of foundational assumptions of political 
philosophy: 
the philosophical bases of international law and its position among cognate 
social and legal sciences cannot be better illustrated than by disclosing the 
manner in which representative systems of thought ended in the treatment of 
the problem of relation of states to humanity, i.e. of their relations to one 
another.130 
In his relatively early article on the influence of Spinoza in international law, 
Lauterpacht writes that “the relation between political theory and international law 
is of a more pervading character than is commonly assumed.”131  Thus, “political 
doctrine based on the omnipotence and glorification of the state as an end in itself 
will naturally result, and has usually resulted, in the negation of the law of nations as 
a body of rules which, both in its binding force and in its creation, is independent of 
the will of the state.”132  He dedicates his article on Spinoza to neutralizing a 
tradition of political philosophy largely understood to do precisely what he has 
described negatively – glorify the state to the detriment of the law of nations. 
Later, in his article on the Grotian tradition, Lauterpacht may be observed to take 
the next step.  Not to rebut an opposed political theory, but to put forward political 
theory in support of international law as he would have it.  It is clear, first of all, that 
Grotius is more than strictly a legal scholar.  He is compared with or opposed to 
Erasmus, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke, among others.  The legacy of Grotius’s 
political theory and influence in international law is for Lauterpacht “the tradition of 
progress and idealism.”133  Thus Grotius’s work comes by the end of the article to 
represent not only “a source of evidence of the law as it is, but also as a well-spring 
of faith in the law as it ought to be.”134  Grotius’s work serves as a model or guide in 
the way that Lauterpacht makes clear in his treatment of Spinoza, whereby 
philosophical bases and political theory will determine the end point of the system 
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that applies to the “relation of states to humanity”.135  The work is, for that reason, 
“an invaluable asset.... an exposition of international law woven into the structure of 
a general system of law and jurisprudence – a significant affirmation of the unity of 
all law”.136 
The sum of the guiding features of the Grotian tradition as Lauterpacht identifies it 
remains largely synonymous with much of innate cosmopolitanism.  Consider the 
first principle features that Lauterpacht draws out: 
They are: the subjection of the totality of international relations to the rule of 
law; the acceptance of the law of nature as an independent source of 
international law; the affirmation of the social nature of man as the basis of 
the law of nature; the recognition of the essential identity of states and 
individuals; the rejection of ‘reason of State’; the distinction between just and 
unjust war…137 
The whole of international relations is subject to international law, which is not 
reducible to state will alone.  Rather, the state is placed alongside individuals 
internationally, and the law of nature – which is an affirmation of the human social 
character, not derived from a Hobbesian state of nature – is elevated to a source of 
norms alongside the formal sources of law identified with state consent, and indeed, 
as Lauterpacht makes clear elsewhere, is prior to them. 
Lauterpacht’s work is directed against sovereign prerogative, and especially against 
prerogatives of war and even self-defense.  He recognized “an inherent antagonism 
between international law, which, except when conceived as an empty and 
contradictory ‘law of co-ordination’, means restraint upon freedom of action, and 
the idea of reason of state, which means freedom from restraint.”138  Stronger still: 
“Modern international law recognized for a long time the existence of gaps which 
obliterated altogether the border-line between law and lawlessness in international 
relations.  Of these gaps the admissibility of war as an absolute right of states, 
requiring no other legal justification, is the outstanding example.”139  He writes with 
admiration of the “emphasis with which Grotius denies the absoluteness of the right 
to act in self-preservation”, a conclusion the International Court of Justice was not 
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able to reach in its Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, despite clear 
cosmopolitan sympathies discernible there, as well.140 
The social unit that defines international law, and in accordance with which 
international law is defined, is, alternately, international society and international 
community, as the title of Lauterpacht’s most famous work indicates.141  
International community exhibits “social and political realities” of its own, 
international society its own needs.142  Together they represent “the legal and moral 
unity of mankind.”143  The unity of mankind, again, derives from the social nature 
of humankind; thus the law of nature that is crucial to Lauterpacht’s reading of the 
Grotian tradition is principally identified with “the social nature of man and the 
preservation of human society”.144  Moreover, it is from the social character of 
humankind that international law derives the force of its legal norms: “the binding 
force of even that part of it that originates in consent is based on the law of nature 
as expressive of the social nature of man.”145  In sum: 
The place which the law of nature occupies as part of the Grotian tradition is 
distinguished not only by the fact of its recognition of a source of law 
different from and, in proper cases, superior to the will of sovereign states.  
What is equally significant is Grotius’s conception of the quality of the law of 
nature which dominates his jurisprudential system.  It is a law of nature largely 
based on and deduced from the nature of man as a being intrinsically moved 
by a desire for social life…146 
What results is a model of a unified legal system that enjoys an objective normative 
foundation grounded in a world social phenomenon, its norms directed to the 
proper expression of the universal social character of humankind. 
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Kelsen’s opposition 
Consider briefly, for point of contrast, select aspects of the work of Hans Kelsen.  
Kelsen may be considered cosmopolitan in some respects, by virtue of his 
affirmation of the unity of law in the world, but his pure theory of law does not 
represent or incorporate innate cosmopolitanism.  Rather, his pure theory of law 
eschews the ambition to achieve an objective law by reference to an otherwise 
inchoate community such as the world collective, as posited by adherents of the 
innate cosmopolitan model. 
There are aspects of Kelsen’s work that superficially resemble the innate 
cosmopolitan model.  Kelsen writes of the Pure Theory of Law, for instance, that it 
has “the tendency to blur the border line between international and national law, so 
that as the ultimate goal of the legal development directed toward increasing 
centralization, appears the organizational unity of a universal legal community, that 
is, the emergence of a world state.”147  He almost sounds like Álvarez when he 
writes that “a conflict of norms between international law and national law can 
never occur.”148  Likewise, he sounds like both Álvarez and Lauterpacht, among 
others, when he writes that “[a]ny conflict between States as well as between private 
persons is economic or political in character; but that does not exclude the 
possibility of treating the dispute as a legal dispute.”149  Nonetheless, these several 
similarities do not run deep, and Kelsen’s work opposes innate cosmopolitanism in 
a number of more telling ways, which I review here briefly for the particular limits 
that they demonstrate with respect to the substance and appeal of the innate 
cosmpolitan model. 
Some primary grounds of distinction are as follows: as a scientific theory, the Pure 
Theory of Law represents a formal exercise that does not allow for an ideological 
orientation comparable to the progressive telos typically associated with innate 
cosmopolitan ideas.  Moreover, Kelsen eschews pretensions to a prior community 
serving as an objective foundation for legal norms independent of the positive law.  
Likewise, the Pure Theory of Law is a positivist exercise at odds with a natural law 
tradition which includes the innate cosmopolitan model.  As a function of all of the 
foregoing, Kelsen is critical of the way concepts such as the innate cosmopolitan 
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model may lend more authority to law makers than the law properly would allow.  
Each of these grounds of distinction and opposition, to which I turn immediately 
below, make clearer some bounds of the innate cosmopolitan idea as it has been 
treated in the work of the figures already considered, from Scott to Álvarez to 
Lauterpacht. 
As a formal exercise, the Pure Theory of Law purports to demonstrate the unity of 
law in the world.  But the unity of law does not necessarily hold that international 
law is primary, or superior to municipal law.  Rather, both are potentially primary, 
and the Pure Theory of Law is agnostic as between the two possibilities, indicating 
only that it must be one or the other.  Thus the unity of the law may just as well find 
its focal point in the sovereign state, as in the world order.  Referring to 
“subjectivisitic” and “objectivistic” systems, Kelsen writes: “Both systems are 
equally correct and equally legitimate. To decide between them on the basis and 
with the specific means of the science of law is impossible.”150  Likewise, the Pure 
Theory of Law is equally agnostic as between political projects (such as imperialism 
and pacifism) to which each theoretical order is typically joined: “the Pure Theory of 
Law opens the road to either the one or the other political development, without 
postulating or justifying either, because as a theory, the Pure Theory of Law is 
indifferent to both.”151 
The Pure Theory of Law, however, is not at all indifferent about the innate 
cosmopolitan model supposition of an otherwise inchoate world community, from 
which normativity flows.  Putting the matter bluntly, and in the process dismissing 
the innate cosmopolitan appeal to the interest of the posited world community for 
normative authority, Kelsen writes: “The fact that several individuals have an 
interest in common does not constitute a community any more than the fact that 
they have dark hair in common.”152  With more nuance, he holds that “it is 
impossible to determine the unity in the plurality of individuals we call state by a 
criterion independent of the social order we call the law of the state”.153  The 
rejection is tied to his rejection of natural law.  He is especially critical of natural law 
for its ambiguity concerning the articulation of law, insofar as natural law – and 
innate cosmopolitan law with it – purports to observe law rather than enact it.  
Natural law “need not be created by the act of man, since it issues directly from the 
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nature of men or the nature of the relations of men, and as such need only be 
recognized by man, not created by an act of will.”154  The effect of this failure to 
acknowledge responsibility or volition in the formulation of law is particularly 
problematic, following Kelsen, because “the doctrine which denies that the positive 
law-makers really are what they pretend to be – the creators of the law – has the 
effect, if not the purpose, of strengthening their authority.”155 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Kelsen offers a clear statement of separation 
distinguishing his Pure Theory of Law from the pretension to objective law such as 
represented by the innate cosmopolitan model: “the Pure Theory of Law insists 
upon a clear separation of the concept of law from that of justice, be it called 
natural, true or objective law,” and “the Pure Theory of law renounces any 
justification of positive Law by a kind of super-law, leaving that problematical task 
to religion or social metaphysics.”156  In sum, the positivist Pure Theory of Law 
limits the field of law to an express forum of human agency.  Kelsen’s own 
sociological investigations led him to reject the possibility of identifying a super-
order in the extra-legal behavior of people in the world.157  By contrast, innate 
cosmopolitanism insists on the possibility of observing behavior in the world in 
such a way as to discern normative patterns capable of supporting basic tenets of 
law for an interdependent world, in the absence of a legislator or legislature capable 
of achieving a more adequate system of law for world relations.  I return to Kelsen’s 
grounds of critique in the Conclusion of this work.  For now, it will suffice to have 
observed that Kelsen’s positivism does not accept the heuristic model of innate 
cosmopolitanism, and the way in which the volitional nature of positivism under the 
Pure Theory of Law is opposed to the assertion of a right normative arrangement 
discernible in the world as a whole.  Both the Pure Theory of Law and innate 
cosmopolitanism allow for a cosmopolitan understanding of law in the world; each 
model understands the normative grounds of that system differently. 
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Observational science and world policy 
As against Kelsen’s opposition, and the opposition of less sophisticated positivists, 
it remained for the innate cosmopolitan project to take farther the method that 
Vitoria and Kant suggest, namely to arrive at world norms by the proper study of 
the nature of the world – empirically to demonstrate and determine the reality of 
social and political potentialities identified by Lauterpacht and others with the 
international community.  20th century scholars took up the project with gradually 
accelerating proposals for an increasingly elaborate program of scientific inquiry to 
ascertain the nature of the world phenomenon, and the norms that may guide it.  In 
short, the world social or political unit remained to be understood, with the law to 
follow, such that the normative regime of international law might achieve the 
independence and objectivity aspired to from Vitoria forward, representing neither 
the product of subjective interest, nor received values, nor a formal exercise in 
neutral principles. 
Post-World War Two scholarship exhibited new initiatives in two related directions.  
One included research programs engaged in empirical efforts to discover and 
promote the empirical grounds of the innate cosmopolitan phenomenon.  The other 
included further theoretical efforts to project a progressively more complex research 
agenda, or conceptual blueprint, necessary to realize the cosmopolitan 
phenomenon.  Both exhibited increasing multi-disciplinarity in scope.  Together, 
they represented what Josef Kunz referred to skeptically as the “changing science of 
international law”.158 
Research programs engaged in empirical efforts to discover and promote the 
empirical grounds of  the innate cosmopolitan phenomenon included activities of  
the World Rule of  Law Center at the Duke Law School, the Cornell Project on the 
Common Core of  Legal Systems, and the activities of  the Committee for the Study 
of  Mankind.  Giovanni Longo wrote of  the Common Core project, touched on in 
the Introduction to this work: “Whatever the judgment on the final results of  the 
research, it is at least notable for its attempt to re-discover or to promote a 
rebuilding of  that kind of  positive ius naturale or ius gentium which the Romans 
referred to by saying: “... Quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit.”159  The 
attempt to re-discover or promote the rebuilding of  ius naturale or ius gentium takes 
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forward the innate cosmopolitan reliance on a Vitorian conception of  natural law 
and objective, independent normativity for an ordered world community.  The 
World Rule of  Law Center similarly proposed to discover the unity of  one possible 
world normative system under law.  Its first major project was an inquiry into the 
normative treatment globally of  incitement in international communications, with 
the aim of  identifying viable grounds for world speech law, i.e., establishing the 
allowances and limitations for speech in world community.160  The largest project 
undertaken by the Center challenged the nature of  sovereignty.  Results of  the 
project purported to demonstrate that all major civilizations in the world hold the 
expression of  sovereignty to be bounded by law, thus paving the way for “the 
concept of  a jurisprudence that is higher than and independent of  the will of  any 
particular local sovereign.”161  The dean of  the World Rule of  Law Center, Arthur 
Larson, produced a book composed entirely of  a list of  proposed research items for 
international law.162 
The primary object of  the Committee for the Study of  Mankind was “to make 
mankind aware of  itself  and to make this awareness influential at all levels of  
decision-making.”163  Self-awareness, as noted in the discussion of  Madariaga, 
reflects the embrace of  a vocabulary of  psychology common to the innate 
cosmopolitan model, by which the innate cosmopolitan phenomenon is 
substantially identified with a singular psychic capacity associated with the 
comprehensive human collective.  Following the work of  the Committee, two 
objectives are paramount to making mankind aware of  itself, namely, world law and 
world society, which objectives Quincy Wright addressed in the name of  the 
Committee.  Law, by Wright's formulation, is essential to communal self-awareness: 
“to be aware of  itself, mankind – the largest and most complex human group – 
must have a law.”164  Society, by the same formulation, is joined to law, though there 
is a problem of  circularity: “Neither society nor law can exist without the other, but 
like the hen and the egg, one or the other must come first.”165  Putting to one side 
the circularity dilemma, the formula guiding the mission of  the Committee held as 
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follows: “A law of  mankind implies that, in some degree, mankind is a society, and 
this implies that mankind is a public, the members of  which, on some matters, have 
a relatively homogeneous opinion.”166  Thus, public order for all-inclusive world 
society – i.e., cosmopolitan order – resolves into the same phenomenon emphasized 
by Álvarez, namely, “world public opinion”.167 
World public opinion thereby becomes a primary normative foundation for 
cosmopolitan community: “Thus it is through the development of  a world public 
opinion, manifesting general understanding and recognition of  emerging principles 
of  universal law, that mankind can become aware of  itself, of  its value, and of  its 
intuitions of  justice, and can become a functioning society”.168  The research agenda 
of  the Committee became synonymous with research into the nature of  world 
public opinion: “The analysis of  public opinion may suggest the best approach to 
conscious control of  this process [of  the consolidation of  human society] and to 
creation of  conditions for a more adequate law of  mankind.”169  Significantly, 
however, the research agenda can be seen to have shifted from discovery of  the 
nature of  the cosmopolitan phenomenon, to the means of  directing it.  The move 
to direct the cosmopolitan phenomenon reflects what becomes an increasingly thin 
division in innate cosmopolitan scholarship between an inquiry into objective world 
norms and a particular program of  world policy, an issue to which I return in 
touching on the work of  the New Haven School. 
Where Wright, in the name of  the Committee for the Study of  Mankind, described 
a “universal law for mankind”, Wilfred Jenks proposed a “common law of  
mankind”.170  Jenks's formulation, not part of  any greater research project, belongs 
to the body of  scholarship intended to articulate a more complex blueprint for the 
study of  the innate cosmopolitan phenomenon.  His work in the field, as he 
described it, was 
but one of  the many contributions to this process of  exploration and 
definition which will be required for the purpose of  formulating in a 
generally acceptable manner on the basis of  current practice the alternative 
conception that international law represents the common law of  mankind 
                                                                
166 Ibid., p. 442. 
167 Ibid., p. 442. 
168 Ibid., p. 443. 
169 Ibid., p. 443. 
170 C. Wilfred Jenks, The Common Law of Mankind (London: Stevens 1958). 
65 
 
in an early stage of  its development.171 
Jenks's common law of  mankind presupposes the innate cosmopolitan 
phenomenon of  the world as a whole, or world community as Jenks used the term 
in 1954, synonymous with mankind: “By the common law of  mankind is meant the 
law of  an organized world community”.172  Moreover, the norms of  Jenks’s world 
community represent more than mere formal association: “The common law of  
mankind towards which the international legal system has already evolved so far is 
increasingly a law with a developed social content.”173  Indeed, Jenks holds “[t]hese 
rules are in the fullest sense ‘an expression of  the life of  a true society’ and not 
merely a ‘means for regulating external contacts’.”174 
Jenks’s idea of  an ordred mankind supplants the exclusive function of  the sovereign 
political community, exhibiting “a merger of  international and national law which is 
a further illustration of  the evolution of  the law of  nations towards a common law 
of  mankind.”175  The effect elevates the position of  individuals under international 
law: “the law has long since evolved from a law between States only and exclusively 
into a law which creates for the benefit of  individuals rights the international and 
national character of  which is merged.”176  In a position, however, in keeping with a 
reading of  Kant according to innate cosmopolitanism, echoed by Álvarez, 
Madariaga and others, Jenks observes states to retain a place under the norms of  
world society, holding that “[s]tates continue, and will long if  not always continue, to 
be the basic units of  organization of  the international community, and the law 
governing the relations between States, while no longer representing the whole of  
international law, therefore continues, and must continue, to be a leading division of  
the law.”177  States represent an undeniable political authority, but must cede before 
the objective authority that recalls the theory and intuition of  Vitoria, Lansing and 
the rest, namely, “the will of  the world community”.178 
Significantly, despite the ongoing powers of  states in the international system, Jenks 
understands the jurisprudence of  tribunals such as the ICJ to support the nascent 
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cosmopolitan normative regime.  Thus “a general theory of  international law must 
qualify the historical approach of  treating arbitration and judicial settlement as being 
primarily expedients to avoid recourse to violence by States and must regard them 
increasingly as the adjective law of  an organized community.”179  Thus international 
jurisprudence is called upon to serve an innate cosmopolitan program, which Jenks 
describes as follows: 
the collective and long-term task of  rebuilding the intellectual foundations 
of  a more adequate analysis and exposition of  a law of  nations which, 
profoundly transformed by modern developments, is rapidly evolving from 
a law between sovereign states, concerned primarily with the delimitation of  
their jurisdiction, towards a common law of  mankind.180 
The innate cosmopolitan premise, for Jenks, is in equal parts empirically and 
aspirationally grounded.  Empirically, he observes in the law that “the growth of  
strategic and economic interdependence has made the extent of  such common 
responsibility so wide that the interdependence, rather than the independence, of  
nations has become the foundation of  contemporary international relations and 
contemporary international law.”181  He breaks down the empirical foundations with 
lawyerly detail into eight comprehensive areas of  clear legal development.182  
Though otherwise prosaic, Jenks, borrowing from Westlake, defends with more 
exalted language the “significance of  each of  these [eight] divisions for the further 
development of  international law as the law of  the great community, the universal 
commonwealth of  the world”.183  Cumulatively, the sum of  the divisions reflect “the 
transformation of  international law from a law governing the mutual relations of  
States into the common law of  mankind.”184 
Despite the accumulation of  cataloged detail, however, Jenks describes the 
cosmopolitan phenomenon as weak: “The imperfect development and precarious 
nature of  the organized world community is reflected in the early state of  
development of  the law, but does not invalidate the basic conception.”185  
Accordingly, he also frames the innate cosmopolitan program as an ideal, or: 
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a great seminal idea, which recognizes that the law is constantly in motion, 
gives adequate expression to the concept of  interdependence, bridges the 
differences of  tradition, culture and interest which divide the world, and 
furnishes a basis of  obligation which is applicable to the wide range of  
different types of  legal relationship falling within the scope of  the 
contemporary law and can contribute to making a reality of  the universality 
of  international law.186 
Against this backdrop of  aspirations, new empirical initiatives and doctrinal agendas, 
I turn briefly to the New Haven School and especially the work of  Myres 
McDougal.  The New Haven School effectively merges the broad social research 
agenda of  Wright's Committee for the Study of  Mankind, with Jenks's lawyerly 
account of  interdependence.  Interdependence is the grounds for a strong claim: “It 
is the fact of  an interdependent world community that makes some system of  
international law inescapable.”187  At the same time, the scope of  interdependence 
incorporates the fullness of  Wright's research agenda, and perhaps more, potentially 
subsuming acts and expectations discernible in the interpersonal pursuit of  any 
value, anywhere in the world.  It bears noting here that the complexity and scope of  
the New Haven School – a sophisticated and developed doctrine of  its own – takes 
it in some respects beyond the innate cosmopolitan model.  I explore it here only 
for certain points of  overlap. 
Concerning the range of  all values, McDougal, Lasswell and Reisman write: “The 
increasing interaction and interdependence which have been noted in a few spheres 
of  human activity could easily be demonstrated in regard to the pursuit of  every 
value which human beings covet.”188  Concerning the involvement of  every 
individual, they write: “sustained global interaction has rendered the life and stable 
existence of  every individual dependent upon numerous factors operating beyond 
his local community and national boundaries”.189  The enormity of  the field of  
interdependence, however, reduces to its effects on individuals, “[t]he fact which 
requires emphasis is the highly personal impact of  all this interaction and 
interdependence upon the lives of  individual human beings”.190 
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By positing such an expansive field of  transnational interdependence, the New 
Haven School purports to make good in definitive manner on the comprehensive 
objective reality that the innate cosmopolitan model represents.  The viability of  
world community is no longer contingent on certain qualifying acts of  
interdependence, à la Jenks, nor on a possible psychological state of  collective self-
awareness, à la Wright, nor on any other common capacity that may lie dormant or 
go unrealized, but rather on the sheer fact of  all acts and expectations expressive of  
interdependence.  The sense of  a world community that remains to be 
substantiated, discernible alike in theories of  immanence and the idealistic tone 
adopted at points in Jenks's work, is rejected.  The idea of  a possible world 
community is hardened into the comprehensive reality of  a world community that 
exists undeniably in the everyday acts of  individuals everywhere: “The inhabitants 
of  the contemporary globe are, unquestionably, the members of  a ‘group,’ not 
merely an ‘aggregate,’ since they share a sufficiently high frequency of  perspectives 
and interaction.”191  The global group is synonymous with world community, 
connoting a relatively thick social order: “The interdetermination of  peoples on a 
global scale and the pervasiveness of  its perception justify the characterization of  a 
‘world community’.”192 
In sum, adherents of  the New Haven School “use the expression 'world community' 
... not in a metaphoric or wistfully aspirational sense but as a descriptive term.”193  
Norms of  international law flow from the objective world phenomenon: “The 
specialized process of  interaction commonly designated international law is part of  
larger world social process that comprehends all the interpenetrating and 
interstimulating communities on the planet.”194  The world social phenomenon is 
the ultimate grounds for international law, reflecting the basic character of  the 
innate cosmopolitan model as a political-theoretical concept at work in international 
law: “It is … this most comprehensive social process that comprises the events 
which give rise to claims to authoritative decision”.195 
                                                                                                                                                               
to show some similarity, however rough, with the world constitutional scheme proposed by Habermas, 
whereby global constitutional norms are reflected in personal apprehension, and the objective order is 
made contingent on the subjective appreciation of  it by individuals in the world. 
191 Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, W. Michael Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of 
Authoritative Decision, 19 J. Legal Educ. 253 (1966), p. 255. 
192 Ibid., p. 256. 
193 McDougal et al., supra note 187, pp. 808-09. 
194 Ibid., p. 808. 
195 Ibid., p. 811. 
69 
 
The distinction of  the New Haven School from the Vitorian tradition of  innate 
cosmopolitanism is the enhanced proposal to move from intuition and theory to 
empirical fact, without falling back on the idea of  merely-possible community.  The 
naturalist Vitorian reliance on intuition and possibility, though accurate according to 
the New Haven School as a matter of  sensibility, is too subjective to substantiate 
objective world norms: “the early 'natural' law approach, though sometimes 
cognizant of  the larger community of  humankind, more often adopted partial and 
unevaluated conceptions of  that community and did not develop the notion of  
interpenetrating community processes embracing all peoples.”196 
As suggested also by Madariaga, subjective failure to perceive or appreciate the 
world community does not diminish its empirical reality.  It is an objective 
phenomenon, regardless of  the subjective phenomena that it comprises: 
many members of  the world community, as of  less inclusive communities, 
betray little understanding of  the impact their behavior has on others and 
that of  others’ has on them.  There is, thus, no necessary correlation 
between the facts of  interdetermination and the perception of  that 
interdetermination, including a recognition of  the necessity for the 
clarification of  common interest.197 
Thus the world community is an objective reality, not contingent on subjective 
perception, and not merely a possible or theoretical condition to be realized.  In 
consequence, each individual is, objectively and inescapably, a world citizen: 
“Interdependence has made world power processes and world law as relevant to 
each individual as the decisions made in the municipality in which he lives.  
Responsible citizenship, then, extends from the municipality to the limits of  the 
enormous arena in which man interacts.”198 
Only a policy commensurate with the scope of  the world order remains 
undeveloped: “A globally inclusive system of  public order, though operative, is 
visibly incomplete, proving inadequate to the task of  maintaining a minimum level 
of  world public order.”199  Here McDougal signals another distinction of  the New 
Haven School.  Typically, as was noted in the Introduction and to which I will return 
in Chapter 3, the innate cosmopolitan model is invoked for ad hoc purposes, and 
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lacks the systemic character of  constitutional cosmopolitanism.  The innate 
cosmopolitan model thereby supports an expression of  authority in accordance with 
the interest or will of  the world, but does not typically do so by reference to an 
articulated order in its entirety.  Even Jenks suggests that his eight foundational 
categories are only rudimentary and partial, with further research and development 
proceeding incrementally.  McDougal and the New Haven School, however, 
propose a vast project capable of  rendering a systemic snapshot of  the world order 
under an innate cosmopolitan model at any given point in time.  But because the 
project remains nonetheless to be substantiated, and right policy remains to be 
determined, subjective perception of  the objective world community, and 
engagement with it, are not irrelevant: “It is the perception of  interdependence in 
community process that leads participants to appreciate the relevance of  pursuing 
common interests and motivates them to clarify it.”200 
Here, however, some confusion arises: the objective fact of  world norms is the sum 
of  subjective acts and expectations in the world interdependent complex, but the 
subjective actors are largely unconscious of  their contribution to the normative 
scheme.  McDougal, Lasswell and Reismann write that “[i]n the optimum public 
order which we recommend, the expectations of  all individuals equally comprise 
authority.”201  The normative basis shifts between an objective world phenomenon 
and the countless subjective acts that it comprises.  Right policy, then, must be 
adopted to ensure that the sum or mean of  world subjective acts and expectations 
conform to desirable outcomes, such that the New Haven School tasks itself  with 
“the invention and evaluation of  the alternatives in policy most economically 
designed to move us through these troubled times of  contending systems toward 
the more complete and perfect world order we seek.”202  The line between inquiry 
into grounds for world norms, on the one hand, and an exercise in policy-making 
on the other, is eroded to the point that the complex assertion of  interdependence 
clearly becomes a statement of  policy and normative ends, rather than a defense or 
exploration of  normative grounds. 
The New Haven School recognizes the new incorporation of  policy interests by 
terming itself  a policy science, and by frank adoption of  select policy ends.  
McDougal expresses the necessity of  normative choice anecdotally: “It may be that 
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... one may without 'disastrous consequences' take coffee from the Arabs and tea 
from the Chinese, but it does not necessarily follow that one may take cannibalism 
from the cannibals and remain ... wholly dedicated to the minimal-order principle of  
no cannibalism.”203  Moreover, McDougal is clear that the value-goals associated 
with human dignity, the adopted telos of  New Haven School policy, are neither 
neutral nor transcendent: 
The essence of  a reasoned decision by the authority of  the secular values 
of  a public order of  human dignity is a disciplined appraisal of  alternative 
choices of  immediate consequences in terms of  preferred long-term 
effects, and not in either the timid foreswearing of  concern for immediate 
consequences or in the quixotic search for criteria of  decision that 
transcend the world of  men and values in meta- physical fantasy. The 
reference of  legal principles must be either to their internal-logical-
arrangement or to the external consequences of  their application. It 
remains mysterious what criteria for decision a “neutral” system could 
offer.204 
The values associated with human dignity, then, determine the substance and 
application of  international law: “an international law so conceived will demand that 
all specific decisions be related to, or grounded in the authority of, the empirical, 
social-process, secular values of  human dignity.”205 
Thus the New Haven School conjoins innate cosmopolitanism to the particular 
values of  human dignity.  But the embrace of  human dignity by Myres McDougal, 
if  not the whole of  the New Haven School, became largely synonymous with 
western liberal values in general and U.S. foreign policy in particular.206  The New 
Haven School, it should be clear, is not liberal in the sense of  liberal 
cosmopolitanism: it begins with the world phenomenon, rather than the individual, 
and likewise does not reduce to the individual alone, though sensitive in theory to 
the role and importance of  individuals in the world.  The result being that, as an 
exercise in world public order proceeding from the world collective, but embracing 
select liberal values in particular, the method and policy represented by the New 
Haven School takes on a liberal hegemonic character.  In the words of  Myres 
McDougal, “[t]he goal of  a law of  freedom is not the extreme of  anarchy, but an 
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ordered, productive, shared liberty and responsibility.”207  In the words of  critics, 
however, the New Haven School represents “ social engineering” , or cover for US 
foreign policy.208 
 
Continued theoretical import 
The New Haven School of  thought persists to this day, and I turn now to other 
contemporary theories.  The various research projects of  the latter half  of  the 20th 
century proved largely chimerical; the New Haven School has received substantial 
critique and moreover proved so complex as to limit its persuasiveness;209 and the 
pretension to cosmopolitan international law generally has lately been subject to 
substantial deconstructive critique, noted in Chapter 1, and to which I return in 
Chapter 5.  Nonetheless, the innate cosmopolitan idea survives in largely the same 
capacity that it is argued to have enjoyed since Vitoria, namely as a necessary 
political-theoretical premise for the realization of  normativity, and a coherent and 
effective system of  international law in the world. 
The ongoing vitality of  the innate cosmopolitan model remains especially apparent 
in juridical theory that joins an appreciation of  process or intersubjective experience 
to an argument about the normativity of  international law.  Thus, for instance, the 
transnational legal process school and interactional theory both adopt or exhibit 
aspects of  innate cosmopolitanism.  Each goes beyond the formal constraints of  
international law to identify effective world norms with a global intersubjective 
process.  A comprehensive complex of  interaction shapes the identity of  actors and 
norms alike, such that world norms may flow from the world itself  as a normative 
unit.  It bears noting, however, that, like the New Haven School – a forerunner to 
both transnational legal process and interactional theory – neither transnational legal 
process nor interactional theory is wholly synonymous with innate 
cosmopolitanism.  Transnational legal process entertains a rich idea of  process that 
takes it outside of  innate cosmpolitanism in certain respects; likewise the 
constructivist premises of  interactional theory correspond with innate cosmopolitan 
premises but are not identical with them.  I explore transnational legal process and 
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interactional theory, below, for the points of  overlap with innate cosmopolitanism, 
but not to offer a comprehensive treatment of  either theoretical school on its own 
terms. 
Consider first Harold Koh’s work concerning transnational legal process.  His 
seminal article, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, opens with a history of 
international legal doctrine – common, as noted, to scholarship invoking innate 
cosmopolitan ideas – that selectively highlights commitments in the name of 
international community.  The historical canvass begins with Roman law and 
proceeds through the Spanish School and Grotius; among other 20th century figures 
included, Alfred Verdross is cited for his invocation of an international “Grotian 
commonality of interests and values”, and Brierly is cited for his embrace of world 
solidarity.210  The doctrinal history, however, is prefatory to the fuller realization of 
international society facilitated by contemporary interconnectedness.  The legal and 
political doctrine observed by Koh finds its ultimate purchase today, as part of a 
new era exhibiting “increasing interpenetration of domestic and international 
systems” within “a much broader fabric of ongoing communal relations.”211 
The world as a whole, according to Koh, is still more thoroughly interdependent 
than ever, such that he observes a world-wide, transnational phenomenon, 
characterized by pervasive interaction and consequent intermixing values and 
interests.  Moreover, in keeping with the heuristic application of innate 
cosmopolitanism, transnational legal process represents a political model by which 
to comprehend bedrock normative grounds of international law: transnational world 
arises out of and reflects nothing other than the world “body politic”, for which 
international lawyers, among others, are responsible.212 
The world body politic, then, features a “global legal process”, which, in itself, is 
“normative, and constitutive”.213  Koh describes the normative operation of the 
global legal process, or transnational legal process, as follows: 
One or more transnational actors provokes an interaction (or series of 
interactions) with another, which forces an interpretation or enunciation of 
the global norm applicable to the situation. By so doing, the moving party 
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seeks not simply to coerce the other party, but to internalize the new 
interpretation of the international norm into the other party's internal 
normative system. The aim is to "bind" that other party to obey the 
interpretation as part of its internal value set. Such a transnational legal 
process is normative, dynamic, and constitutive. The transaction generates a 
legal rule which will guide future transnational interactions between the 
parties; future transactions will further internalize those norms; and 
eventually, repeated participation in the process will help to reconstitute the 
interests and even the identities of the participants in the process.214 
The product is a self-perpetuating world phenomenon, contingent on the continued 
interaction of actors in the world.  Legal process is essential to the phenomenon, 
insofar as values that Koh holds fundamental to legal practice will constrain the 
range of normative outcomes to be expected as a matter of interaction and 
process.215  But while the process is normative, it is not determined.  The sum total 
of acts and expectations will dictate appropriate norms at any point in time, subject 
to the constraints established as a matter of legal process.  Actors in the 
transnational legal process become “carriers of history” in an international society 
that is always and necessarily emerging, not unlike the immanent world community 
envisioned by others canvassed here.  Thus repeat participation in the transnational 
legal process “helps to reconstitute national interests, to establish the identity of 
actors as ones who obey the law, and to develop the norms that become part of the 
fabric of emerging international society.”216 
In Koh’s account, international society is the merged product of identities and 
norms that run in two directions, from the international level to the individual actor 
and back.  The sum total of these multi-directional engagements is a unitary 
phenomenon with normative consequences.  The substance of that phenomenon is 
not fixed, but can be observed in the totality of the acts and expectations in all of 
the transnational engagements at any given time.  As such, it embodies the innate 
cosmopolitan model. 
The interactional theory of international law, developed principally by Jutta Brunnée 
and Stephen Toope, bears a family resemblance with transnational legal process.  
Both, as noted, find antecedents or “analogies” in aspects of the New Haven 
School, and share some of that school’s points of overlap with innate cosmopolitan 
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theory.217  Both transnational legal process and the interactional theory of law 
contemplate the totality of acts and expectations – or understandings, another term 
used by Brunnée and Toope – falling loosely within the overarching structure of 
international relations and law at any given point in time, with the new wrinkle that 
something particular about the practice of law serves as a constraint on the 
normative phenomenon associated with the world as a whole, though that 
normative phenomenon is otherwise open with respect to the historical norms wo 
which it may give rise.  Thus both understand the normativity assocated wih the 
world as a whole to give rise to an open list of norms, constrained principally by 
something particular to legal discourse or doctrine.  Interactional theory observes a 
constantly changing, intersubjective complex that represents the primary or bedrock 
normative grounds of international law. 
Interactional theory relies largely on the international relations school of 
constructivism, merged with the legal philosophy of Lon Fuller.  Brunnée and 
Toope rely on constructivism particularly to show “how international law can be an 
important force in socializing actors and shaping their interests and choices.”218  
Actors are socialized into the overarching complex from which international law 
and relations derive their normative force, and in which actors and structure “are 
mutually constituting, and both are inherently social.”219  Bartelson, notably, refers 
similarly to mutually implicating relationships in his articulation of the innate 
cosmopolitan model.220  Moreover, interactional theory captures a central feature of 
innate cosmopolitanism from Vitoria forward: interactional theory is rooted in “an 
assumption about human nature, which is that the main goal of human life is not 
mere survival, but ‘maintaining communication with our fellows.’”221  As such, the 
interactional complex approximates the innate cosmopolitan intuition generally and 
recalls in particular the appeals to capacity and communication common throughout 
the innate cosmopolitan narrative.  In sum, the world is an intersubjective complex 
in which actors will be socialized, and which is a consequence of the natural capacity 
for and inclination towards communication.  As a comprehensive intersubjective 
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complex into which all actors are socialized and which is grounded in assumptions 
of natural fact, the world as a social whole enjoys an objective claim to normative 
authority. 
The normative potential that flows from the complex of world social unity, as 
observed by Brunnée and Toope, represents the primary foundation of the 
international legal system.  Moreover, like other innate cosmopolitan proposals, 
interactional theory ties the objective norms of international law to the proper 
recognition of the diversity that makes up the world complex, alternately referred to 
as international and global society by Brunnée and Toope.  Thus “the rule of law 
upholds and supports diversity in moral and political ends while at the same time 
helping to build a stronger global society”.222  Likewise, the appreciation of diversity 
signals the innate cosmopolitan aspiration to accommodate the particular and the 
individual as well as the universal and the collective.  Following interactional theory, 
the international legal system will enjoy legitimacy and effectiveness “only to the 
extent that law supports autonomy while facilitating social interaction”.223 In short, 
“[t]he fundamental commitment is to enabling participants to pursue their own ends 
while being guided by law.”224 
Global society, in the terms of interactional theory, is a social phenomenon properly 
guided by universal norms that facilitate diverse expressions of the human 
inclination to communication and interaction.  The global society of interactional 
theory represents a telos in keeping with the heuristic use of the innate 
cosmopolitan model, such that international law will be recognized as legitimate 
only insofar as the social capacity of humankind may achieve adequate expression.  
Accordingly, “the first step in building interactional law is the creation of social 
legitimacy through the emergence of widely shared understandings.”225  Notably, 
however, there appears some ambiguity typical of the innate cosmopolitan model.  
It is not clear whether the basic criteria of legitimacy arise naturally or must be 
manufactured: law is either created or it emerges.  The potential arises, as per 
Kelsen’s critique of the natural law and the innate cosmopolitan model, treated 
supra, for interactional theory to divest the law-maker or magistrate of responsibility 
for announcing the law.   
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Moreover, there appears a contradictory potential in the terms of the interactional 
program, one that is not unfamiliar from other innate cosmopolitan proposals.  The 
world as a whole enjoys normative authority, which authority will be discerned in a 
diversity of behavior in the world, but the legal manifestation of which will be 
contingent on the relative homogeneity of shared understandings.  The innate 
cosmopolitan model recognizes and incorporates diversity, but operates in terms of 
the collective unit.  Coupled with the potential divorce of responsibility for the 
articulation of norms, interactional theory appears to harbor a common policy 
potential that has marked innate cosmopolitanism throughout its modern history. 
Additionally, it bears emphasizing that interactional theory is not a theory about 
what international law might be; rather, it is about what international law must be: 
“The primary test for the existence of law is not in hierarchy or in sources, but in 
fidelity to internal values and rhetorical practices and thick acceptances of reasons 
that make law – and respect for law – possible.”226  In keeping with the innate 
cosmopolitan model, interactional theory addresses perceived shortcomings in the 
traditionally-recognized sources of international law, to allow for the expression of 
norms arising from the global whole, rather than the volition of sovereign states 
alone: 
[I]nternational lawyers can finally eschew the preoccupation with legal 
pedigree (sources) that has constrained creative thinking within the discipline 
for generations.  Sources of law can be understood as shorthand for shared 
understandings, the processes of their invocation made legitimate both by 
strong adherence to an internal morality and by highly circumscribed tests of 
substantive content.”227 
The appeal to a source of law outside of those captured in Art. 38 of the statutes of 
the World Court, represents a primary use of the innate cosmopolitan model 
identifiable in the jurisprudence of the ICJ, as will be seen in Chapter 4. 
Finally, Brunnée and Toope, following Fuller, anchor the social complex of global 
community to a common morality.  They take pains to eschew substantive political 
ends for the global community, but interactional international law is conditioned on 
an internal morality, and subject to external morality, such that “the internal 
morality of the law will tend to favor stasis, as upholding settled expectations and 
predictability, the external morality, rooted in human ends, will appropriately 
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demand change.”228  They borrow their moral criteria from Fuller, part of a 
Fullerian “vision of the moral community that is a direct challenge to international 
lawyers and IR theorists.”229  The internal morality of interactional law represents a 
discrete morality appropriate to law, universal in nature, including attributes that law 
must always and everywhere exhibit to qualify as legitimate and effective where 
transnational legal process observed normative constraints on the world 
phenomenon arising out of characteristics typical of lawyers and legal practice or 
legal discourse, interactional theory finds constraints arising out of moral terms 
identivied with law as a theoretical construct. 
For interactional theory, external morality – as opposed to internal – reflects 
historical values associated with a given community.  As such, external morality 
corresponds with the observational premises of innate cosmopolitanism, by which 
international legal norms must reflect normative acts and expectations discernible in 
the world community.  Brunnée and Toope indicate that “modest substantive 
commitments to an external morality evidence an underlying congruence with 
commonly shared understandings in society”.230  Internal morality, on the other 
hand, recalls the turn to policy already evident in the work of Wright and 
McDougal, among others.  As was seen above, for those innate cosmopolitans who 
turned expressly to matters of policy, the move was intended to constrain the 
apparently endless normative ends at which a genuinely observation-oriented innate 
cosmopolitan model might arrive; recall McDougal’s words that one may not “take 
cannibalism from the cannibals and remain ... wholly dedicated to the minimal-order 
principle of no cannibalism.”231  For interactional theory, a fixed and universal 
internal morality is adopted at least to constrain the range of normative possibilities 
available to international law, since the allowance for and sensitivity to external 
morality otherwise admits no clear normative distinction or priority as between 
competing moralities and corresponding normative ends.  In that sense it is typical 
of a move in the latter half of the twentieth century to join an appreciation of 
diversity in world relations to a responsibility to guide those relations by means of 
normative constraints, in the name of the phenomenon represented by the world as 
a whole. 
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In sum, interactional theory, in its development of constructivist insights, reflects 
the innate cosmopolitan model of a unified world social phenomenon with 
normative consequences capable of conferring an objective grounds for 
international law, irrespective of traditionally-recognized sources, grounds 
presupposed to underlie and facilitate interaction across the diverse expressions of 
community in the world.  Moreover, Brunnée and Toope expressly distinguish 
interactional theory from the other schools of cosmopolitanism considered here: 
“Our theory of legal obligation is not aligned with cosmopolitan liberalism … or 
with visions of global constitutionalism.  Rather, we envisage interactional law as a 
particular kind of ‘community of practice’”.232  Theirs is a vision with roots in a 
normative potential purportedly established by and for the world as a whole. 
 
Conclusion 
Proceeding largely by example from historical doctrine and modern scholarship, a 
consistent picture emerges from the varied manifestations of the innate 
cosmopolitan idea observed in international legal discourse.  I will continue the 
theoretical investigation of innate cosmopolitanism by comparison with liberal and 
constitutional cosmopolitanism in the next chapter, and I will turn to critique in the 
Conclusion.  It will suffice here briefly to summarize the form innate 
cosmopolitanism has taken in scholarly discourse.  From the inception of modern 
international law, there has been a perceived need for an independent source of 
normativity to substantiate legal rules of world conduct.  The innate cosmopolitan 
idea locates that independent source of authority in the world collective, or world as 
a whole.  The world as a whole has been endowed with a voice, in the form of 
world public opinion, and some capacity for agency, whether by reference to some 
communicative potential, some psychological condition, or the sheer possibility of a 
world democratic majority.  What began with the natural law of Vitoria, vested in 
right reason applied to human nature, remains natural in the sense of a normative 
complex arising necessarily out of the social dimension of the world community, 
which complex precedes and is not reliant of its normativity on any expression of 
community as a matter of positive law. 
Though 20th century research programs into the details of that normative complex 
and social dimension proved largely chimerical, and though the New Haven School 
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suffered under the weight of its own complexity, the innate cosmopolitan model, in 
various contemporary manifestations, continues to found an assumption of 
normativity in the intersubjective acts and expectations that are argued to make up 
normative interconnectedness in the world.  Thus the innate cosmopolitan model 
shows the most continuing vitality in international legal scholarship grounded in 
process theory or the constructivism associated with international relations theory.  
In each articulation, the innate cosmopolitan model observes the world as a whole, 
for the purpose of determining and authorizing norms proper to it.  But in its 
contempoary articulation, the innate cosmopolitan model is increasingly recognized 
to exhibit an open normative potential, such that certain constraints are necessary to 
prevent arrivin at undesirable ends.  Consequently, throughout the various 
instantiations of the innate cosmopolitan model, the line between world norms and 
world policy becomes increasingly indistinct, and in some cases is expressly 
collapsed.  I will return to this point in the Conclusion. 
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In this Chapter, I will compare the innate cosmopolitan idea, as it has been 
observed in Chapter 2, against the alternative schools of liberal and constitutional 
cosmopolitanism.  Thereby, I hope further to map the different domains occupied 
by the different schools of cosmopolitan thought in the discourse of international 
law, and further to distinguish and shed light on the domain particular to innate 
cosmopolitanism.  To restate the underlying commonality among the three schools: 
cosmopolitanism in international law generally calls for achieving some unified, 
objective grounds for international law beyond the subjective prerogatives 
traditionally associated with states in the international system.  Innate 
cosmopolitanism would achieve objectivity according to a special normative 
potential bound up with a vision of the world as a collective whole.  Liberal and 
constitutional cosmopolitanism would do so differently, liberal cosmopolitanism 
according to an ethical framework developed out of certain moral premises, and 
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constitutional cosmopolitanism according to certain developments within the body 
of positive international law.  I will take each of the two in turn, looking first at 
liberal cosmopolitanism, then constitutional. 
The intent here is not to reproduce the fullness of liberal and constitutional 
cosmopolitan doctrine.  The intent being to trace the domains of each of the three 
cosmopolitan schools of thought, I will attempt to treat core aspects of liberal and 
constitutional cosmopolitanism, in addition to special attributes of each school that 
serve to distinguish the three from one another.  Relative to the vast body of 
literature that exists for both liberal and constitutional cosmopolitanism, I will rely 
on a narrow selection of authors and literature, chosen as representative of main 
streams of thought within each school, and for raising matters especially pertinent to 
the distinctions among the three cosmopolitan schools.  Additionally, in the case of 
liberal cosmopolitanism, I have tried to emphasize select works particularly 
interested in the application of liberal cosmopolitan political theory to international 
law.  The liberal cosmopolitan literature drawn on here includes select work by 
political theorists Thomas Pogge and Allen Buchanan and Charles Beitz, among 
others, as well as work by international legal theorist Fernando Tesón.  For 
constitutional cosmopolitanism, this includes work by Bardo Fassbender, among 
others, as representative of a school of thought tending to elevate the UN Charter 
as a constitutional document, and work by Erica de Wet and Anne Peters, among 
others, as representative of international legal scholars who observe formal 
constitutional development in a hierarchy of norms arguably recognized under 
international law. 
 
Liberal cosmopolitanism and innate cosmopolitanism 
Historical and ahistorical foundations 
Liberal cosmopolitanism is an ethical doctrine that, applied to law, takes the form of 
a doctrine of cosmopolitan justice, against which historical acts and contingencies 
may be measured.  The terms of liberal cosmopolitan justice claim objectivity by 
virtue of being developed out of moral premises, according to a constructivist 
process.  Thus liberal cosmopolitanism relies on a constructivist technique that 
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typically begins with a-historical, moral premises, such as the equal dignity of the 
individual.233 
Thus liberal cosmopolitanism attains to normative objectivity, in application to 
international law and otherwise, by virtue of properly applying a constructivist 
method commencing with select moral premises that are argued to be universally-
acceptable.  Those premises are drawn from observations about human nature, or 
the condition of being human, and are not predicated on changing historical 
constraints that impact the condition of being human.  Rather, ethical standards are 
constructively developed out of universally-acceptable moral premises concerning 
the condition of being human, such that changing historical conditions, together 
with the politically-empowered institutions those conditions comprise, may be 
subject to a critique that is not conditioned on historical factors. 
Applied to international law, the ethical system of liberal cosmopolitanism is 
autonomous of the acts and institutions to which liberal cosmopolitan theory will be 
applied in passing judgment.  Incorporated into international law, autonomous 
premises are constructively developed into norms suitable to global application.  
The norms liberal cosmopolitanism arrives at may exhibit sensitivity to the 
constraints of historical conditions, but remain ahistorical and non-contextual in 
their origin and core substance.  Innate cosmopolitan norms, by contrast, are 
neither ahistorical nor non-contextual.  Rather, innate cosmopolitan norms must be 
discovered by observation because they inhere in the historical expression of the 
world social phenomenon. 
Developed autonomously of the historical contingencies of international law, liberal 
cosmopolitan norms typically are not identical with actually-existing rules and rights, 
such as human rights actually existing as a matter of law.  Rather, liberal 
cosmopolitan rules and rights refer to “preexisting” (also referred to as pre-political) 
rules and rights, or “moral human rights”.234  The distinction is important insofar as 
it allows liberal cosmopolitan doctrine to retain independence from the actually 
existing regime of international law: “recognition of moral human rights is 
important because it makes room for an independent critical assessment of existing 
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international law.”235  Likewise, autonomy and independence from historical 
conditions also implies independence from the status quo.  Innate cosmopolitanism, 
by contrast, claims objectivity by reference to a discrete phenomenon, namely a 
historical world community, and as a result looks by comparison considerably more 
invested in the status quo. 
While liberal cosmopolitanism may serve to correct conditions of historical 
circumstance, it does not accept them as a normative point of departure or allow 
them to overthrow the constructivist validity of the normative model.  The liberal 
cosmopolitan method typically begins, following the social contract thought 
experiment as updated in the work of John Rawls, with an imagined original 
position, and proceeds constructively to right principles for social organization.236  It 
is from disagreement over the ability to apply to the world at large, for purposes of 
international law or for critiquing international law, the method Rawls pioneered, 
that liberal cosmopolitanism takes its impetus.  Charles Beitz, critiquing Rawls’s 
failure to adopt liberal cosmopolitanism, criticizes Rawls for straying too far from 
ideal principles developed according to constructivist method, and for instead 
entertaining “considerations of political realism” that “have to do with constraints 
imposed by the status quo on prospects for change, and thus they pertain to 
questions about institutional design and reform rather than to those about standards 
of moral appraisal.”237 
By contrast, law generally, and international law in particular, will typically proceed 
as discourse and practice according to a given set of political conditions and ordered 
historical authorities.  International law represents rules of international conduct 
that take their legitimacy and purpose from a set of assumptions about institutions 
as they have developed.  As Lea Brilmayer puts it: “International law takes the status 
quo for granted as the appropriate point of departure.”238  The typical rule of public 
international law is designed to reinforce conformance with a social and political 
order in the world as it is understood to exist, by actors empowered to establish 
international norms.  Even rules designed to achieve a measure of change typically 
aim at change that begins from and affirms the general ambit of the established 
order: the status quo remains the point of departure.  By comparison, the liberal 
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cosmopolitan adoption of an independent position in opposition to the status quo, 
typified above by Pogge and Beitz, proceeds from a different point: norms are 
predicated on an ideal condition that is not contingent on historical conditions or 
the status quo – indeed, the liberal cosmopolitan norm demands justification from 
outside of the historical order of international law.  Thus liberal cosmopolitan 
norms are indicative of moral human rights, “whose validity is independent of … 
governmental bodies [and international law]”, thereby providing “a more solid basis 
for critical assessment” of international law than any “internal assessment” might 
otherwise achieve.239  Where liberal cosmopolitan norms basically hold that 
international actors ought to act in compliance with ideal standards developed 
constructively out of select moral premises, public international legal rules typically 
hold that international actors ought to act in a way that conforms to order in the 
international world as it is understood by relevant actors to exist. 
The connection between the typical aim or orientations of legal rules, on the one 
hand, and the perceived reality of the order by and for which it is developed, on the 
other, underscores why the assumption that the world social phenomenon actually 
and already exists is so important to the innate cosmopolitan model: the innate 
cosmopolitan model purports thereby to remain with a traditional, legal discourse 
appropriate to international law, however transgressive it may seem other respects.  
The world phenomenon must be perceived to be a reality to substantiate a valid and 
viable system of rules of public order and international law, even if the world 
phenomenon has not otherwise been recognized as such according to traditional 
terms of volutary positivism in international law.  At the same time, this position ties 
the innate cosmopolitan model to the status quo in a way that liberal 
cosmopolitanism rejects.  I return to that relationship between innate 
cosmopolitanism and the status quo in the Conclusion of this book. 
Liberal cosmopolitanism, by virtue of its character as an ethical system of norms, 
takes the world as it ought to be as grounds for identifying norms and generating 
new law.  As such, liberal cosmopolitanism demands justifications of real world 
institutions according to a critique based in the first instance on, following 
Sidgwick’s statement of method, “an ideal system of rules” which “ought to exist, 
but perhaps have never yet existed”.240  To quote Arnold Brecht: “Only that is of 
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ethical value which ought to exist”.241    Derived from ideal rules, liberal 
cosmopolitan norms exhibit less attachment to historical conditions than is typical 
of legal norms, and especially international legal norms. The ethical orientation of 
liberal cosmopolitanism means that liberal cosmopolitan norms are designed in the 
first place to achieve or encourage compliance with an ideal world that ought to 
exist, as opposed to the status quo conditions in the world as it is understood to 
exist.  Where norms of international law typically are oriented to rules of behavior 
that conform with the world as it is understood to exist, norms of liberal 
cosmopolitanism typically are oriented to rules of behavior that conform with an 
understanding of how the world ought to be. 
It bears noting that this treatment of the world as it is understood to exist and an 
understanding of the world as it ought to exist is not identical with the use of the 
terms is and ought to describe the definition of a norm under Kelsen’s pure theory of 
law, whereby is either represents the objective act of the legislature, such as the 
sanctioned raising of hands, or any other completed act or natural condition, while 
ought represents the prescriptive content of a norm, or what the norm purports to 
command.  By contrast with the pure theory of law, here the world as it is 
understood to exist and an understanding of the world as it ideally ought to exist 
represent competing perspectives concerning the mission of the legislator: the 
legislator, as a matter of law, is typically interested to produce norms that ensure 
conformance with an existing system of public order.  There may be incremental 
change, including incremental change encouraged by law, but the law, in the first 
instance, remains dedicated to sustaining the over-all order within which it 
functions.  For this reason, the observational method associated with innate 
cosmopolitanism is dedicated to demonstrating that innate cosmopolitan norms 
flow from an order that already exists, namely the world social phenomenon, and 
would produce norms that comply with the acts and expectations actually manifest 
in the world social phenomenon. 
Innate cosmopolitanism is more or less radical for proposing to affirm legal norms 
on the basis of a source of norms – the interests or will of the world as a whole, 
autonomously expressed – not included among the traditionally-recognized sources 
of law in international law; but innate cosmopolitanism remains nonetheless within 
the broader confines of legal discourse generally, insofar as it purports to identify a 
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viable source of legal norms within the general structure of a historical social and 
political order in the world as it may be perceived to exist.  The innate cosmopolitan 
phenomenon does not overthrow international law; rather it supplements 
international law with a source of law that purports to be in some respects superior 
to the traditional sources of international law, but is not per se exclusive of them.  
In terms of ascertaining law, innate cosmopolitanism would adhere to the 
framework discernible in international law generally,242 but would add to the precise 
terms comprehended under that framework today.  The recognition of sources 
would extend to acknowledged means of recognizing norms associated with the 
world as a whole. 
In sum, the innate cosmopolitan model does not describe a different world, nor an 
ideal world, but the historical world of the present, as it may be observed to exist.  
Liberal cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, by operating from an ideal perspective 
established according to constructivist or deductive method, and beginning with 
select moral premises, proceeds in a manner opposite to that of innate 
cosmopolitanism.  In this way, while innate cosmopolitanism remains within the 
bounds of traditional legal discourse, liberal cosmopolitanism operates from outside 
of it; it is situated in a discourse founded in the ideal strictures that characterize 
ethics and justice, and demands justifications of institutions for variance from the 
way things ought to be.  Innate cosmopolitanism, by contrast, is a model founded 
on the reality of historical constraints, and fits within a discourse by which law  and 
the ascertainment of law represent means for sustaining an existing order. 
 
Normative individualism and public authority 
The norms of liberal cosmopolitan justice are derived constructively out of 
autonomous, moral premises that flow from what are argued to be universally-
acceptable assumptions about human nature, expressed in terms of normative 
individualism.  Normative individualism holds that individuals are the “primary 
normative unit”, and the “ultimate unit of concern”,243 and follows in the liberal 
cosmopolitan tradition from Rawls’s statement that individuals are “self-originating 
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sources of valid claims”.244  Rawls’s statement, in larger context, follows from 
Kant’s proposition that “any rational being exists as an end in himself”, and is 
basically synonymous with the dignity of the individual.245  Liberal cosmopolitans 
understand the individualism of normative individualism according to two primary 
features: universality or all-inclusiveness; and generality.  Universality or all-
inclusiveness means “the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living 
human being equally”.246  Generality means that individuals are “the ultimate units 
of concern for everyone”, generating “obligations binding on all.”247  Thus liberal 
cosmopolitan justice attains to objectivity by comprehending the value of the 
individual in terms of first moral principles.  The process is constructive or 
deductive: moral norms are reasoned from universally-acceptable attributes of 
individuals generally. 
Though not reliant on the history of its own discourse in the way that innate 
cosmopolitan arguments in international law are, liberal cosmopolitanism in 
international law nonetheless draws on a tradition of natural law concepts particular 
to classic liberal political theory.  The human rights that are characteristic of liberal 
cosmopolitanism applied to international law are the legacy of original, or pre-
political rights in Enlightenment political theory.  Thinkers such as Locke and Kant 
employed a distinct natural law vocabulary in connection with the thought 
experiments of the social contract and state of nature.  For both Locke and Kant, 
fundamental or original rights attach to individual persons as a function of human 
nature.  Those original rights inhere in the pre-political condition of individuals, and 
serve as a guide for the social contract and a constraint upon it.248  For Locke, “The 
state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one, and reason, 
which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal 
and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or 
possessions”.249  For  Kant, “before a public and legal state is established, individual 
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men, peoples and states can never be secure against acts of violence from one 
another, since each will have his own right to do what seems right and good to him, 
independently of all the others.”250 
Following the social contract thought experiment, select pre-political rights are 
imagined to survive the hypothetical act of contract; they are never ceded to the 
public trust.  Those pre-political rights are moral rights that remain vested in the 
individual, identifiable with human rights.  As the rights that are not or cannot be 
given away in the hypothetical act of contract, human rights define the possible 
scope of that contract, and thereby delimit and take precedence over the resulting 
public authority, at least in a moral sense.  Thereby they are understood to persist as 
basic rights retained by individuals under historical conditions of political context, 
and as universal human rights when that context is global in scope.  Thus Pogge 
writes today that “persons cannot waive their human rights to personal freedom, 
political participation, freedom of expression, or freedom from torture.”251  
Historically contingent norms adopted by empowered bodies of public authority 
must always cede to the pre-political and nonhistorical values that human rights 
represent.  In sum, the liberal cosmopolitan regime is founded in individual rights 
that take precedence above, or cannot be infringed upon by the authority vested in 
the historical manifestation of the political collective.  As such, liberal 
cosmopolitanism is strikingly different from the innate cosmopolitan model, where 
the norms and rules follow on the nature and will of the collective itself. 
In current application to the world as it exists, liberal cosmopolitanism is concerned 
with moral justifications: it “is a doctrine about the basis on which institutions and 
practices should be justified or criticized.”252  Liberal norms are ideals representing 
“basic moral principles that a just society has to satisfy”; and liberal cosmopolitan 
norms applied to international law likewise demand justification of international 
norms and institutions according to certain moral principles.253  Those principles, in 
keeping with normative individualism, are generally concerned with individual well-
being.  Their expression in international law typically takes the form of human rights 
and redistributive norms.  In sum, international legal institutions and practices in 
theory must justify their existence and operation according to their effects on 
individual well-being, as measured with standards of human rights. 
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Following normative individualism, liberal cosmopolitan principles apply 
irrespective of distinctions of nationality; thus the justifications for international 
legal norms and institutions cannot be made by appeal to sovereignty.254  In 
consequence, under ideal conditions of liberal cosmopolitanism, the state is no 
longer sovereign as the term is classically understood as a matter of international 
law.  The state is neither inviolate nor supreme, nor does it serve as a meaningful 
justification for differing historical conditions of well-being among individuals in the 
world.  The collective, qua collective, holds no discrete authority of its own vis-à-vis 
the individual, again reflecting the gulf between liberal and innate cosmopolitanism, 
the latter being founded on the discrete authority of the world collective as a 
‘subjectivized’ entity. 
Thus while innate cosmopolitanism diminishes the subjective authority of the 
sovereign state before the objective normativity of the world phenomenon, liberal 
cosmopolitanism is still less congenial to the state.  Innate cosmopolitanism, even as 
it identifies in the world a collective subsuming all other collectives, recognizes a 
discrete and ineradicable value of collectives – indeed innate cosmopolitanism 
suggests that universal and particular collectives arise out of identical processes, and 
as such exist in a mutually constitutive relationship with one another.  Liberal 
cosmopolitanism, however, allows no discrete value to collectives.  Whatever value 
collectives enjoy is wholly derivative of some demonstrated value for individuals. 
 
Interdependence and natural rights 
As noted, liberal cosmopolitans express the basic moral principles that world society 
ought to satisfy in terms of human rights.  Human rights are understood in one of 
two main ways: as rights triggered by a “global structure of interaction and 
interdependence”, or as natural rights.255  Interaction and interdependence, 
however, play a different role in liberal cosmopolitan discourse than they do for 
innate cosmopolitan discourse, for which the same terms are also important.  
Commonalities among the liberal cosmopolitan strands of interdependence and 
natural rights make clear the different uses of interaction and interdependence in 
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liberal and innate cosmopolitanism; I turn briefly to the two strands of liberal 
cosmopolitanism to do so now. 
The interdependence approach, as the name suggests, is predicated on global 
interrelationship among individuals, whether direct or mediated; its natural rights 
counterpart is drawn from the individual considered in isolation.  As a result, the 
interdependence approach appears to be contextual in a way that the natural rights 
approach is not.  Each, however, derives from the same set of noncontextual 
premises, and the normative content of each approach is substantively the same.  
Differences between the two pertain chiefly to systemic capacities to generate 
positive obligations, as opposed to negative duties. 
The interdependence approach, which Pogge calls an institutional approach, posits 
that all individuals hold human rights, but those rights only arise in the context of 
social institutions: “human rights are activated only through the emergence of social 
institutions.  Where such institutions are lacking, human rights are merely latent and 
human rights violations cannot exist at all.”256  The cosmopolitan order becomes 
material when global institutions begin to encroach on human rights: “the global 
moral force of human rights is activated only through the emergence of a global 
scheme of social institutions”.257  The factual predicate for a cosmopolitan 
normative order under law – i.e., the emergence of “a single, global institutional 
scheme” – recalls Rawls’s description of a basic structure underlying society, globally 
applied.258 
The connection between institutions or interdependence and norms suggests a 
familial relationship with the innate cosmopolitan reliance on interdependence.  
Both models share a like sense that interdependence among people in the world has 
given rise to norms that would not inhere absent such interconnectedness, with 
consequences for international law.  For innate cosmopolitanism, world norms are 
drawn precisely from the historical expression of interdependence in the world, 
measured as a matter of observation and reducible to legal norms by something like 
inductive process.  For the liberal cosmopolitan, however, interdependence merely 
triggers norms that already exist prior to any interaction.  Human rights inhere in 
and are developed out of the nature of the individual: the substance of human rights 
is not a product of the nature of the interdependent community; the need to enforce 
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the human right, however, is.  The substance of human rights and the “moral 
force”, or presumptive normative authority that they call on, preexist the 
interdependent relationship that activates them.  The historical element, namely the 
historical emergence of world interdependence and global institutions, merely 
signals that pre-existing rights and obligations need reinforcement under 
international law. 
In short, liberal cosmopolitan norms associated with interdependence are not 
historically conditioned, but historically activated.  To restate, though human rights 
and norms of justice are activated by the context of social institutions, their 
substance is independent of the context of social institutions, and not conditioned 
by it.  To use Pogge’s language, they are “latent” absent qualifying conditions of 
interdependence, and “activated” by the same; only their violation does not exist 
absent interdependence, hence only their enforcement is contingent. 
Consider the second strand of liberal cosmopolitanism.  Buchanan, who favors the 
natural rights approach, disfavors the interdependence approach largely because “it 
is hard to see how the mere fact of cooperation with others, whether within a basic 
structure or not, is sufficient to ground any obligation to treat them justly.”259  
Buchanan’s language is imprecise, and it is worth noting the potential 
misunderstanding  about the interrelational approach: rights and obligations under 
the interrelational approach are not properly grounded in interrelation, but triggered 
by it.  Buchanan puts it more accurately when he holds that, “[a]ccording to the 
interactionist view, relations of justice only obtain among those who are engaged in 
cooperation with one another.”260  Relations of justice only obtain among persons 
who are interrelated, even indirectly through institutions; but the principles or 
premises of liberal cosmopolitan justice are constant and unchanging across all cases 
in which they arise.  Once triggered, the interrelational rights and obligations reduce, 
in terms of law, to the same liberal set of basic human rights affirmed by Buchanan. 
Buchanan, unlike liberal cosmopolitans focused on interdependence, “does not 
assume that obligations of justice obtain only among those who interact 
cooperatively”.261  Following his natural rights approach, the basic set of moral 
rights and obligations that liberal cosmopolitans draw on are always manifest, and 
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never merely latent.  There is no need for a trigger, the constraints of justice apply 
always.  In part, Buchanan’s preference for the automatic application of the 
constraints of justice is due to skepticism as to whether the worldwide institutional 
scheme “is already sufficiently robust to ground comprehensive principles of justice 
for the international legal order.”262  The principle distinction of the automatic 
approach, however, is that it gives rise to positive obligations without having to 
prove engagement with a global basic structure. 
The natural rights approach is roughly shared by Kok-Chor Tan, among others who 
propose a relatively thick scheme of positive cosmopolitan obligations.  Though 
Tan does not share Buchanan’s skepticism with respect to a robust global basic 
structure, nor does he “share the justificatory claim in Pogge’s approach that we 
have duties of justice only in so far as we are causally via our institutions responsible 
for injustices”.263 
Following the interdependence approach, only negative duties adhere absent 
institutional or cooperative relations, or outside the global basic structure.  Absent 
its violation, the right is not triggered; if an individual is not harmed, there is no 
obligation to further that individual’s rights; and if an individual is harmed, the 
obligation to make right may not fall on those outside of the interdependent and 
institutional context in which the harm occurs.  By contrast, the natural rights 
approach holds that one must affirm and actively support the rights of another even 
absent any act, direct or indirect, by the one affecting the other.  As Buchanan puts 
it, “even if there were no global basic structure of cooperation or any form of 
interaction whatsoever among individuals across borders, we would still have a 
limited obligation to help create structures that provide all persons with access to 
just institutions.”264  Moreover, “this obligation attaches to us as persons, 
independently of any promises which we make, undertakings we happen to engage 
in, or institutions in which we are implicated”.265 
The product is a mandate at law to give effect to predetermined individual rights.  
Though the mandate as a matter of international law may or may not be triggered by 
historical context, depending on the school of thought, the underlying rights 
themselves exist independent of any historical context.  The liberal cosmopolitan 
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rights regime, then, appears substantially different from the innate cosmopolitan 
model, which are drawn in substance from the nature of interdependence, not 
irrespective of interdependence and not merely triggered by it.  Under the innate 
cosmopolitan model, bedrock world norms are not necessarily concerned with 
individual rights (nor are they necessarily opposed to them) but rather with interests 
and will exhibited by the interdependent phenomenon as it is historically expressed 
across and among the diversity of individuals and collectives in the world at any 
given point in time. 
 
Departing from Rawls 
Both strands of liberal cosmopolitan theory, emphasizing interdependence and 
natural rights, respectively, converge around their departure from the work of John 
Rawls.266  Each takes Rawls’s Theory of Justice as foundational to the contemporary 
liberal cosmopolitan project, and each rejects Rawls’s work declining to extend the 
theory of justice directly to the international realm.  In the defining break between 
Rawls and the liberal cosmopolitans, distinctions of methodology and substance 
between liberal and innate cosmopolitanism, as well as occasional sites of 
convergence between them, become still clearer. 
Two sets of distinctions between Rawls and the liberal cosmopolitans are 
instructive.  First, distinctions between Rawls’s constructivist method underlying his 
theory of justice, and the constructivist method as applied in theories of liberal 
cosmopolitan justice.267  Second, broadly, between the objectives of Rawls’s law of 
peoples, and the objectives of liberal cosmopolitan normative regimes that draw on 
his theory of justice.  I turn to the two sets of distinctions in order. 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls employed a constructivist method featuring deductive 
reasoning based on assumptions about persons as individuals.  He did not, however, 
use the term constructivism anywhere in A Theory of Justice.  Instead, he described 
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what he referred to as “one Kantian variant” of constructivism in a subsequent 
article, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, which Kantian variant of constructivism 
he identified with his method in A Theory of Justice.268  A brief version of the 
definition he offers in Kantian Constructivism is as follows: 
What distinguishes the Kantian form of constructivism is essentially this: it 
specifies a particular conception of the person as an element in a reasonable 
procedure of construction, the outcome of which determines the content of 
the first principles of justice. Expressed another way: this kind of view sets up 
a certain procedure of construction which answers to certain reasonable 
requirements, and within this procedure persons characterized as rational 
agents of construction specify, through their agreements, the first principles 
of justice.  The leading idea is to establish a suitable connection between a 
particular conception of the person and first principles of justice, by means of 
a procedure of construction.269 
Significantly, in Kantian Constructivism, Rawls also held that his method applied to a 
closed society, his own, and he grounded his assumptions in observations of 
historical commonality.270  Moreover, as Rawls evolved his method in conjunction 
with his turn to a theory of political liberalism, he acknowledged Kantian 
constructivism to incorporate “basic conceptions of person and society” grounded 
in Kantian theory of transcendental idealism.271  In sum, the conception of the 
individual that Rawls’s method provides for, in A Theory of Justice and Kantian 
Constructivism, is broad, but not limitless in its allowance for distinctions. 
Liberal cosmopolitans apply their method to encompass the whole world, and, in so 
doing, diminish recourse to historical commonality, relying instead on universal 
assumptions about persons as individuals that Rawls avoided.  In its operation, 
Rawls's constructivist methodology purports to arrive at first principles of justice by 
deducing necessary principles from accepted premises.  By means of the veil of 
ignorance applied in the original position – Rawls’s modified social contract thought 
experiment – Rawls abstracts out essential and noncontextual values of the 
individual from the adopted conception of a person.  Norms of justice derive from 
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these values.  Rawls’s method boils down to this: “it specifies a particular 
conception of the person as an element in a reasonable procedure of construction, 
the outcome of which determines the content of the first principles of justice.”272 
Thus Rawls abstracts from the individual for non-contextual values – but the 
starting point, the particular conception of the person, is an historically conditioned 
conception drawn from Rawls’s experience.  Understood to apply to a closed society 
to which Rawls belonged, short of world society, Rawls’s Theory of Justice is 
liberated to rely for premises not on universal or universally-acceptable assumptions 
of about human nature, but rather on insights that Rawls observed to be reasonably 
accurate concerning himself and fellow members of his historical community: “The 
search for reasonable grounds for reaching agreement rooted in our conception of 
ourselves and in our relation to society replaces the search for moral truth 
interpreted as fixed by a prior and independent order of objects and relations”.273 
The end of the constructivist method for Rawls is objective authority, but not in 
terms of absolute objectivity.  Rather, he aims at “objectivity in terms of a suitably 
constructed social point of view” that will be authoritative for all historically-joined 
parties to the same body public.274  Thus, “rather than think of the principles of 
justice as true, it is better to say that they are the principles most reasonable for us, 
given our conception of persons as free and equal, and fully cooperating members 
of a democratic society.”275  Objective authority does not flow from universality, but 
from some reasonably abstracted baseline of historical commonality.  Following 
Rawls, there is no more objective or autonomous basis for norms of justice: “Apart 
from the procedure of constructing the principles of justice, there are no moral 
facts. Whether certain facts are to be recognized as reasons of right and justice, or 
how much they are to count, can be ascertained only from within the constructivist 
procedure”.276 
Liberal cosmopolitans, in contrast with Rawls, do not refer to discrete societies or 
historical communities.  Thus, the liberal cosmopolitan does not enjoy the same 
liberty of relying on premises that may be historically contingent, or familiar and 
acceptable to members of one historical community only (or some limited number 
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of historical communities).  Rather, the liberal cosmopolitan aims at principles of 
justice applicable to all regardless of cultural and political distinctions.  Recall the 
legacy of Locke and Kant.  Rawls and the liberal cosmopolitans all accept postulates 
about pre-political conditions of freedom and equality inherited from them.  Rawls, 
however, does not need to argue that these postulates are universally true, and 
instead assumes they represent contextual characteristics which all other reasonable 
members of Rawls’s own, closed society – inheritors of the Lockean and Kantian 
intellectual traditions – will recognize and affirm.  The liberal cosmopolitans, 
interested to apply a theory of justice to world society, take their assumptions of 
pre-political rights to hold universally, or to be universally acceptable.  Buchanan 
holds the principle that “all persons are entitled to equal respect and concern – or, 
as Kant would say, that each is to be treated as an end” is “fundamental to any 
conception of morality worth seriously thinking about.”277  Fernando Tesón, 
perhaps the foremost liberal cosmopolitan focused strictly on international law, 
argues to similar effect: “Because Kantianism relies on rationality as a universal trait 
of persons, it is incompatible with relativism.  It is not possible to defend 
simultaneously Kant’s theory of human nature and morality, and the view that 
liberal democracy and respect for persons is good only for certain societies.”278 
The distance between Rawls and liberal cosmopolitans concerning the viability of 
identifying and applying universal principles underscores the still wider gap between 
liberal and innate cosmopolitans.  Rawls was willing to abstract out certain 
supposedly uncontroversial assumptions about the nature of members of a large 
historical collective to arrive by constructivist method at norms for that community; 
liberal cosmopolitans abstract out from supposedly uncontroversial universal 
assumptions about the nature of being human to arrive deductively at world norms 
that would appear to adhere outside of historical context; innate cosmopolitans 
reject abstraction in theory, and would draw norms in the interest of the world from 
intuition or information about the world as a whole at any given point in time.  
Rawls’s position here is the middle course, insofar as he relies on a more modest set 
of assumptions and is relatively more attuned to historical conditions that the liberal 
cosmopolitans.  But innate cosmopolitanism stands opposed, in effect, to both 
Rawls and the liberal cosmopolitans, insofar as it relies on a largely observational 
method, and works by reference to the whole, rather than by a constructive method 
building up from an abstraction of the individual. 
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Law of Peoples 
Thus Rawls did not adopt universal assumptions productive of world norms.  The 
particular application of constructivist method to his revised social contract 
experiment was conceived to forestall them.  In keeping with the principle behind 
his choice of constructivist method, Rawls never applied his theory of justice 
directly to global public order.  Instead, he developed his Law of Peoples, which is 
still more historically contingent than his Theory of Justice.  Rawls’s Law of Peoples 
incorporates historically conditioned premises typical of international law, and 
likewise operates under constraints imposed by historical circumstance. 
Notably, Rawls’s Law of Peoples is neither a strict theory of justice, nor a theory of 
law per se.  Rawls described it as foreign policy principles for peoples committed to a 
liberal theory of justice, rather than a theory of first principles.279  He relies on social 
contract methodology for both his Theory of Justice and his Law of Peoples, but 
the central thought experiment is differently tailored for the different projects, with 
meaningful normative consequences.  In A Theory of Justice, the original position of 
contracting parties presents a “choice problem”.280  The first principles of justice 
constitute the “object” or “solution” of the choice problem.281  For want of a better 
hypothetical deliberative technique, parties in the original position are presented 
with a list of plausible alternatives for the foundational principles of social justice.  
There exist an indefinite number of candidates for election, and, beyond rough 
plausibility, the list admits only the qualifying criterion that they are not contingent 
on circumstance: “None of the principles is contingent upon certain social or other 
conditions.”282  From the list of alternatives, the selected principles represent “the 
unique solution to the problem set by the original position.”283 
The original position in The Law of Peoples, by contrast, does not present a choice 
problem by which hypothetical parties choose a unique solution from an indefinite 
list of qualifying principles.  Rather, the parties are presented with established 
international norms, and are expected to affirm them:  
These familiar and largely traditional principles I take from the history and 
usages of international law and practice.  The parties are not given a menu of 
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alternative principles and ideals from which to select, as they are in Political 
Liberalism, or in A Theory of Justice.  Rather, the representatives of well-ordered 
peoples simply reflect on the advantages of these principles of equality among 
peoples and see no reason to depart from them or to propose alternatives.284 
Moreover, the second original position is not concerned with the basic principles of 
world relations, but with their interpretation: “It is these interpretations, of which 
there are many, that are to be debated in the second-level original position.”285  The 
change, then, in the use of the original position in Rawls’s Theory of Justice and his 
Law of Peoples is this: the first original position founds an normative baseline 
against which the status quo will be compared; the second original position adopts 
the status quo baseline against which normative arguments will be compared.  The 
end of the second inquiry is an affirmation, for right or just reasons, of progressive 
interpretations for established international norms. 
Liberal cosmopolitans, seeking to extend Rawls’s theory of justice, reject his turn 
towards historical terms more typical of contingent law and politics than of justice.  
Charles Beitz, as noted, objects that Rawls entertains “considerations of political 
realism” that “have to do with constraints imposed by the status quo on prospects 
for change, and thus they pertain to questions about institutional design and reform 
rather than to those about standards of moral appraisal.”286  Similarly, Thomas 
Pogge objects to undue weight for an appraisal of historical circumstances: “Yes, we 
must be realistic, but not to the point of presenting to the parties in the original 
position the essentials of the status quo as unalterable facts.”287  Kok-Chor Tan 
likewise criticizes the elevation of practical constraints above moral judgments in 
Rawls’s consideration of world norms.288  Allen Buchanan equates Rawls’s Law of 
Peoples with rules for a Westphalian world, which is to say that he equates Rawls’s 
law of peoples with traditional international law.  Buchanan demands instead, if 
there should be a second original position to determine a law of peoples, to consider 
“a full range of alternative conceptions of justice” at the second as well as the first 
original position.289 
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Here, the liberal cosmopolitan critique reflects a point of convergence between 
liberal and innate cosmopolitanism.  Rawls’s sensitivity to historical conditions, 
despite his adherence to liberal moral and political theory, causes his law of peoples 
to track closely the status quo of international law.  In large measure, Rawls’s 
timidity flows from a general reluctance to elevate any one universal or objective 
authority at the level of world relations.  Both liberal and innate cosmopolitanism, 
however, aim to do precisely that in response to what is perceived as the 
dysfunctional legacy of a subjective international legal system.  By comparison with 
Rawls’s Law of Peoples, both liberal and innate cosmopolitanism – though by 
different means and with different conclusions – tend to be less sanguine in theory 
with respect to the status quo of the working terms of the international legal system, 
as they are constrained by a tradition of voluntary positivism. 
 
Different structures, different orientations 
I return now to a direct comparison of liberal and innate cosmopolitanism.  The two 
are similar in their efforts to extend a comprehensive objective authority for world 
norms, but proceed from opposite directions.  Because the liberal cosmopolitan 
order recognizes all the world’s individuals as individuals, without regard to any 
intermediary bodies of incorporation, it takes the form of a bottom-up model.  The 
bottom-up structure of the liberal cosmopolitan model is in contrast with the top-
down structure of innate cosmopolitanism, which derives in the first place from the 
world collective.  The normative mandate that would control international law 
according to liberal cosmopolitanism flows from individuals, and never from 
collectives except according to justifications derivative of their value for individuals.  
As Tesón writes simply: “international law must be made congruent with justice, 
and thus be conceived in terms of individuals, not states or governments.”290 
The bottom-up structure, however, is deceptive: the individuals that make up the 
global basis of the liberal cosmopolitan order are treated only according to 
properties that are held to be universal, or universally-acceptable, across all 
individuals.  The liberal cosmopolitan order is wholly consolidated around one 
normative source,  an individual abstracted, such that all of the world’s individuals 
are consolidated by abstraction into one universal individual.  The effect is a narrow 
normative mandate.  That individual serves as the one normative source for world 
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justice, by which, as a matter of international law, all public regimes in the world are 
joined, and to which they all must defer.  The top-down model of innate 
cosmopolitanism, by contrast, purports to recognize normative diversity in the 
world.  The bedrock normative phenomenon is not, or is not supposed to be, an 
abstraction, and the innate cosmopolitan methodology is neither deductive nor 
constructivist.  Rather, the innate cosmopolitan model purports to draw its 
normative underpinnings from the observation of the sum total of acts, experiences 
and expectations expressive of the world phenomenon at any given point in time.  
Where the normative individualism of liberal cosmopolitanism is narrow in its 
reliance on an abstraction, innate cosmopolitanism is broad in its reliance on or 
assumption of sweeping observational data. 
The method on which liberal cosmopolitanism relies effects a bottom-up structure 
of authority, in which all individuals are paramount qua individuals, a clear point of 
contrast with the observational method of innate cosmopolitanism, which 
establishes a top-down model.  But while liberal cosmopolitanism flows from 
individuals everywhere, its content is consolidated around an abstraction that treats 
all individuals equivalently.  Innate cosmopolitanism proceeds from the world 
phenomenon, but would comprehend that phenomenon by reference to the 
diversity of normative acts and expectations in the world.  The normative program 
that flows out of the former takes especially the form of human rights: uniform 
rights vested uniformly in all individuals everywhere, representing the highest 
priority under law.  The normative program that flows out of the latter is more ad 
hoc in character, especially as invoked for the resolution of particular issues as they 
arise before international tribunals, as will be seen in Chapter 4.  Generalizing, 
innate cosmopolitan norms typically are associated with public order, or sustaining 
right conduct among members of the collective whole of the world under 
conditions of diversity and varying levels of interdependence. 
The distinctions between liberal cosmopolitanism and innate cosmopolitanism may 
also be cast in terms of the relationship of each to the existing body of international 
law.  Liberal cosmopolitanism represents a model of political and ethical theory 
against which the justifications for rules and institutions may be tested.  As such, 
and as noted, it operates in principle from outside the institutional constraints of 
international law.  That liberal cosmopolitan scholars have made efforts, under the 
banner of non-ideal theory, to acknowledge and adapt to real-world limitations 
constraining the prospects of a liberal cosmopolitan normative program, does not 
change the basic posture: liberal cosmopolitan norms are drawn according to a 
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constructivist methodology beginning with universally-acceptable abstractions about 
human nature; liberal cosmopolitan institutions, even non-ideal institutions, are 
guided by those norms.  Innate cosmopolitanism, by contrast, is a model designed 
to support doctrinal change from within international law.  While it posits a source 
of norms that is external to the traditionally-recognized  sources of authority in 
international law, such as those enshrined in Art. 38 of the World Court’s Statute, 
that novel source of authority in innate cosmopolitanism nonetheless falls within a 
broader, classically-legal discourse and framework for ascertaining law.291 
In some cases, however, the innate cosmopolitan model has been hedged in ways 
that bring it closer to the liberal cosmopolitan normative program, especially in the 
turn to policy exhibited in conjunction with innate cosmopolitan theory in the latter 
half of the 20th century, as observed in Chapter 2.  A brief reconsideration of select 
uses of the innate cosmopolitan model will illustrate the point, though it will 
ultimately also underscore an enduring gulf between liberal and innate 
cosmopolitanism.  The approach towards ideas of liberal cosmopolitanism, or, more 
appropriately, the incorporation of liberal theory towards ostensibly cosmopolitan 
ends, is especially true of those examples of an innate cosmopolitan model that rely 
on process-oriented theory, in which the model appears to suffer for a certain 
arbitrariness.  If process alone is construed to be definitive of the normative 
program, but without any clear value to guide the process, then the normative 
program, paradoxically, may arrive at practically any ends.  Process alone can result 
in a so-called race to the bottom, or, to use another formula, a positive feedback 
loop tending to produce undesirable results. 
Myres McDougal may be the most representative, and also the most controversial, 
example of the incorporation of liberal ethical principles alongside innate 
cosmopolitan theory.  The New Haven School’s vast appreciation of complexity in 
the world, as noted in Chapter 2, reaches, as noted, a certain ethical stopping point, 
because one may not “take cannibalism from the cannibals and remain ... wholly 
dedicated to the minimal-order principle of no cannibalism.”292  Thus McDougal 
meets a concern for the open-ended possibilities identifiable with his articulation of 
the innate cosmopolitan model, by joining the model to an external source of value 
founded in liberal morality and the value of human dignity, taken by the New Haven 
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School to be the core policy value applicable to the world.293  Thus McDougal 
incorporates moral limits from sources external to the social processes that 
constitute the world collective, such that the innate cosmopolitan model reflects a 
policy of liberal ethical standards.  Superficially at least, the innate cosmopolitan 
program comes to resemble a liberal cosmopolitan program. 
Even in the case of McDougal, however, the likeness between innate 
cosmopolitanism and liberal cosmopolitanism remains limited.  The innate 
cosmopolitan model arrives at and adopts liberal values in terms of a mandate 
founded in the public order of the world as a whole, giving the reliance on liberal 
values a hegemonic character.  McDougal, consequently, has been perceived as 
engaged in social engineering, or a partisan defense of United States foreign 
policy.294  The root source of normative authority remains the collective, such that 
concern for the individual is imposed as a normative constraint justified on the basis 
of collective order, according to the demands of collective order.  Liberal 
cosmopolitanism is more straightforward in its reliance on liberal values for 
traditional liberal ends, following traditional liberal methodology: liberal premises 
are the internal doctrinal foundation, and not imposed from without, such that 
normative authority is justified on the basis of the individual, according to the 
demands of the individual. 
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Constitutional cosmopolitanism and innate cosmopolitanism 
I turn now to a comparison of innate cosmopolitanism with constitutional 
cosmopolitanism.  Where liberal cosmopolitanism operates outside of traditional 
legal discourse, by virtue of a primary appeal to liberal ethical and political theory, 
constitutional cosmopolitanism, like innate cosmopolitanism, operates largely within 
traditionally-recognizable legal discourse.  Innate cosmopolitanism does so by 
primary appeal to a historically-conditioned source of norms.  Constitutional 
cosmopolitanism does so by primary appeal to arguable developments within the 
recognized body of international law.295 
 
Differently constituted normative authorities 
Constitutional cosmopolitanism and innate cosmopolitanism share a basic likeness 
in a common argument that the international community or society is or may be 
constituted.296  Innate cosmopolitanism considers this phenomenon in largely 
sociological terms, as the expression of the reality of a condition in the world; 
constitutional cosmopolitanism in still more formal terms, as an expression of the 
validity of a legal development under international law.  In this context, innate 
cosmopolitanism resembles proto-constitutional theory: the international society or 
community is socially constituted and exhibits its own norms and normative 
authority, but that authority remains to be articulated in a comprehensive way 
adequate to effect a constitution formally controlling a system of law. 
The relationship in terms of proto-constitutional and constitutional theory includes 
the basic grounds of divergence between the two forms of cosmopolitanism.  Innate 
cosmopolitanism posits a constituted and objective world authority to exist 
independent of formal recognition under international law.  Constitutional 
cosmopolitanism proceeds in the first instance according to formal doctrine, on the 
premise that a constitutional settlement will effect a formal and objective world 
authority where none necessarily exists.  Two points of distinction arise.  First, 
innate cosmopolitanism is more definitive about identifying a community 
independent of and prior to positive juridical expression, whereas constitutional 
cosmopolitanism identifies the community precisely with its positive juridical 
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expression.  Concerning this distinction, innate cosmopolitanism is subject to 
Kelsen’s critique, touched on in Chapter 2 and to which I return in the Conclusion, 
of identifying a political community prior to and for the purposes of identifying the 
law appropriate to it.297  Constitutional cosmopolitanism for the most part avoids 
this critique.  The second point of distinction is that innate cosmopolitanism, 
though operating  within the bounds of recognizable legal discourse, looks outside 
of the orthodox limitations of international law for the bedrock source of 
cosmopolitan legal authority, whereas constitutional cosmopolitanism would in the 
first instance develop that authority from within the constraints of the international 
legal system, though the argument might be a creative one. 
There have been a variety of arguments put forward positing a formal international 
constitution.  Some of those arguments have been forward-looking, suggesting a 
possible international constitution.  In these cases, the distinction between 
constitutional cosmopolitanism and innate cosmopolitanism is especially thin.  But 
so long as the emphasis remains on the constitutional moment as a formal 
achievement under international law, constitutional cosmopolitanism retains its 
central distinction from innate cosmopolitanism: one in which the formal legal 
argument and the norms that support the formal argument take precedence over 
any sociological or ontological argument and the norms that flow from it.  In 
making an argument for the formal sufficiency of a cosmopolitan achievement 
under international law, constitutional cosmopolitanism effectively assumes or 
accepts the sufficiency of the system of international law as it has traditionally been 
conceived.  Innate cosmopolitanism, by contrast, appeals to a source of legal norms 
that has not been recognized under orthodox international law – namely the world 
phenomenon, variously expressed in terms of world public opinion, the world 
juridical conscience, etc. – and thereby rejects limitations of the system of 
international law as it has traditionally been conceived. 
To assume or accept the sufficiency of international law as it has traditionally been 
conceived is to accept the subjective voluntarism that underlies modern 
international law.  The international system, by this characterization, resembled an 
anarchy, in which each state was formally its own master.  The system thus 
described approximates a state of nature, absent any superior or objective authority 
capable of defining it otherwise, despite the accretion of innumerable rules agreed to 
as a matter of consent among states.  Constitutional cosmopolitanism largely 
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accepts the historical reality of that condition as a matter of law, but claims to see 
evidence that international actors are progressing or have progressed away from the 
state of nature, in the way that individuals are presumed hypothetically to have left a 
state of nature in forming political union.  International law manifests the formal 
achievement of that progression away from subjective relations, towards an 
objective normative authority not contingent on subjective will.  Following 
constitutional cosmopolitanism, the objective, cosmopolitan achievement is 
juridically accomplished.  By contrast, following innate cosmopolitanism, the 
objective, cosmopolitan phenomenon exists prior to any juridical act, and the 
system of international law conceived as a subjective one reflects the critical failure 
to acknowledge and incorporate the objective normativity of the world unit. 
Because, under constitutional cosmopolitanism, the voluntarist system of 
international law is capable of producing objective authority by means of a formal 
cosmopolitan settlement among subjective actors, the constitutional cosmopolitan 
has no need for the reconstruction of historical doctrine that is a hallmark of 
international legal theory adopting the innate cosmopolitan model.  Whereas innate 
cosmopolitanism has been joined to an argument that the international legal system 
was misconceived as a strictly subjective one, without any unifying cosmopolitan 
normative foundation in the will or interests of the world unit, constitutional 
cosmopolitanism allows for the sufficiency of the orthodox understanding of a 
voluntarist system; it is developments within that system that establish or may 
establish the objective, cosmopolitan achievement of world constitution.  Innate 
cosmopolitanism assumes the doctrinal necessity of recognizing a naturally-
occurring cosmopolitan normativity; constitutional cosmopolitanism posits the 
formal possibility of cosmopolitan normative authority.  In the latter case, states and 
other capable actors under international law represent the primary negotiators for 
the global political settlement, or constitution, and define the global constitutional 
community according to terms and procedures following the practice of modern 
(but progressively evolving) international law. 
As noted, however, there have been a variety of arguments affirming or envisioning 
an international constitution.  For present purposes, I divide them into two streams, 
and refer to the two streams as Charter constitutionalism and value 
constitutionalism.  I turn to them now. 
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Charter constitutionalism and value constitutionalism 
The clearest strand of constitutional theory in international law may be the strand 
associated with Hermann Mossler, Mossler’s student, Christian Tomuschat, and, 
most recently, Bardo Fassbender.  Fassbender offers the following minimal 
definition of a constitution: “A constitution establishes rules regarding the 
formation and exercise of political power.”298  International constitutionalism in this 
usage roughly means a movement initiated by states towards a positive framework 
for a unified international normative authority.  It takes as a centerpiece the UN 
Charter, which is argued to reflect a radical shift in the international system towards 
a constitutional community.  This is what I refer to as Charter constitutionalism. 
Another strand purports to observe a global coalescence around certain basic, 
substantive values.  The work of  Erica de Wet is representative of  this category.  
She observes a world society coming together or constituted according to select 
values represented by a variety of  international legal norms principally developed 
under the Charter regime – but not identical with the UN Charter – including 
norms of  human rights law, international criminal law and other peremptory norms.  
By comparison with Charter constitutionalism, de Wet’s idea of  a constitution is 
relatively complex; she adopts Neil Walker’s recondite definition of  
constitutionalism: “Constitutionalism is a deeply contested but indispensable 
symbolic and normative frame for thinking about the problems of  viable and 
legitimate regulation of  the complexily overlapping political communities of  a post-
Westphalian world.”299  This is what I refer to as value constitutionalism. 
Scholars such as Anne Peters, who may be included within the field of  value 
constitutionalism, aim to reconstruct modern international law.  In purporting to 
reconstruct international law, Peters observes what might be called formal proto-
constitutional developments in international treaties and international organizations, 
among other things.  For Peters, constitutionalism is a forward-looking theory about 
the evolution of  international law towards the value-oriented constitutional 
community that de Wet describes.  The forward-looking perspective of  the 
reconstructive theory brings it especially close in certain respects to the innate 
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cosmopolitan idea.  For one thing, the constitution itself  remains more potentiality 
than fact.  For another, like innate cosmopolitanism, reconstructive value 
constitutionalism addresses doctrinal deficiencies in international law: “the 
constitutionalist reconstruction of  international law draws attention to existing 
legitimacy deficiencies” in international law.300  The source of  Peters’s reconstructive 
theory, however, remains founded in certain positive developments within the 
formal body of  international law, though neither the constituted world phenomenon 
nor the achievement of  a constitution is yet a reality.  For that reason, constitutional 
theory for Peters is also a statement of  advocacy: “Global constitutionalism is an 
academic and political agenda”.301 
The basic distinction between innate cosmopolitanism and both rough categories of  
constitutional cosmopolitanism, Charter and value constitutionalism, remains the 
same.  Constitutional cosmopolitanism differs from innate cosmopolitanism insofar 
as the constitutional argument is vested in the formal sufficiency of  acts recognized 
as a matter of  law and tending to establish a world constitution.  Innate 
cosmopolitanism represents a model by which to encourage the development of  
international law reflecting the world constituted as a single social and political unit, 
but does so independent of  any constitutional achievement.  In practice, 
constitutional cosmopolitanism is typically articulated in systemic fashion, in 
keeping with the nature of  a constitution, whereas innate cosmopolitanism is 
typically articulated for purposes of  ad hoc solutions to select issues as they arise. 
 
The sufficiency of  conventional law 
Charter constitutionalism is the more substantially developed constitutional theory 
as a matter of  law and legal discourse.  It aims to hew closely to the traditional, 
consensual understanding of  international positive law, with particular attention to 
conventional law, though it purports to observe a progressive move by states 
themselves away from the subjective, voluntarist system.  That move is embodied in 
the UN Charter, which represents, following Fassbender, the constitutional 
document underlying world order.  By proceeding from consensual positive law and 
the acts of  states, Charter constitutionalism in its method stands in clear contrast to 
both liberal cosmopolitanism and the top-down cosmopolitan movement of  innate 
                                                                
300 Anne Peters, Global Constitutionalism Revisited, 11 Int’l Legal Theory 39, 46 (2005), pp. 66-67. 
301 Anne Peters, The Merits of  Global Constitutionalism, 16 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 397 (2009). 
109 
 
cosmopolitanism.  The constitution with which it is concerned (the UN Charter) 
represents a definitive choice of  means for effecting legitimate normative authority 
in political community.  The conventional achievement of  the constitutional Charter 
is the cosmopolitan phenomenon, as opposed to any prior social phenomenon, à la 
innate cosmopolitanism, or any convergence around universal ethical standards, à la 
liberal cosmopolitanism. 
Thus, though it is radical in its own way, Charter constitutionalism “stays within the 
limits of  ‘mainstream’ legal thought.”302  As described by publicists such as Mossler, 
Tomuschat and Fassbender, Charter constitutionalism is “rooted in positivism and 
determined not to lose touch with actual state practice, but at the same time [is] 
cautiously idealistic”.303  It preserves the individuation that is characteristic of  
modern international law and similarly entertains a traditional analogy to individual 
persons, whether in a state of  nature or a relation defined by constitutional contract: 
it is a profound misunderstanding to equate the advancement of  the 
constitutional idea in international law with a weakening of  the institution of  
the independent state.  To assume the existence of  a constitution of  the 
international community does not mean to put the state in new, and 
necessarily more restraining, legal chains.  On the contrary, it is that 
constitution which protects the legal authority and autonomy of  every state 
against unlawful interventions by other states and international organizations, 
similar to the protection of  the fundamental rights and freedoms afforded to 
individual citizens by a state constitution.   
Tomuschat puts it squarely: “The international community and its constitution were 
created by States.”304  But while Charter constitutionalism reflects the positivist idea 
of  consensual international law defined by sovereign states, it also suggests 
progressive change in the law.  Tomuschat goes on to describe the process as 
follows: ”Over centuries up to the present time, buttressed in particular by the U.N. 
Charter, the idea of  a legal framework determining certain common values as the 
guiding principles States are bound to observe and respect has gained ground and 
has been progressively strengthened.”305  The consequence is “a legal integration of  
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states which is more intense than the traditional one.”306 
Altogether, Charter constitutionalism accepts the subjective orientation of  modern 
international law as a positive law formed between sovereigns as a matter of  
consent, but observes in that body of  law a comprehensive political settlement that 
gives definition to a global normative authority beyond the will of  states.  
Fassbender makes clear that the global political settlement has occurred in the 
development of  the UN Charter: “the Charter, although it was formally created as a 
treaty, is characterized by a constitutional quality which in the course of  the last 50 
years has been confirmed and strengthened in such a way that today the instrument 
must be referred to as the (substantive and formal) constitution of  the international 
community.”307  The legal constitution reduces to the positive law of  the Charter: 
“the Charter is the supporting frame of  all international law and, at the same time, 
the highest layer in a hierarchy of  norms of  international law.”308  Thus a 
conventional product of  the subjective international legal system has achieved the 
status of  a legal constitution, effecting objective law capable of  defining the 
international community and its interests as constituted. 
The consequence of  the move from a subjective to objective regime as the Charter 
constitutionalist sees it is not the overthrow of  sovereignty, but the limited juridical 
subjugation of  sovereign will to the constitutional order.  On the one hand, “[i]t is 
the constitution of  the international community which safeguards the entitlement 
of  a state”;309 on the other hand, the international legal community “can no longer 
be simply described as a Genossenschaft, or association of  equals not subordinated to 
any higher authority and exclusively associated by agreement.  The community is 
meant to be more than the sum of  its constituent parts; it does not express a mere 
volonté de tous but a volonté générale.”310  But with the acknowledgment of  both orders, 
subjective and objective, charter constitutionalism is not wholly free of  the 
persistent tension between cooperation and consolidation in modern world 
relations.  Observe the conflicted vocabulary in Fassbender’s synopsis: 
“International constitutionalism is a progressive movement which aims at fostering 
international cooperation by consolidating the substantive legal ties between states 
                                                                
306 Fassbender, supra note 298, p. 552. 
307 Fassbender, supra note 302, p. 322. 
308 Fassbender, supra note 298, p. 585. 
309 Fassbender, supra note 302, p. 326. 
310 Fassbender, supra note 298, p. 564. 
111 
 
as well as the organizational structures built in the past.”311  In Fassbender’s own 
terms, the constitutional program is still marked by the incongruous terms of  
cooperation and consolidation, and the law continues to exist between states in the 
first instance, though a meaningful constitutional authority must exist above them. 
 
The appeal to values 
Value constitutionalism, as represented by de Wet, seems also to proceed from 
conventional law, and the Charter in particular, though her language is hedged and 
equivocal: “it would be fair to conclude that the UN Charter’s normative framework 
has been instrumental in bringing about a verticalization in the relations of  Member 
States inter se.”312  The consequence appears as well to be a move from a subjective 
system of  law to an objective one, insofar as the Charter’s normative framework 
“has been the catalyst for the development of  a legal order based on hierarchically 
superior values, as opposed to one exclusively based on the ‘equilibrium or value of  
sovereigns’.”313  De Wet is clear, however, that “it would not be accurate to describe 
the UN Charter as ‘the constitution’ of  the international community.”314  The 
Charter has been instrumental to achieving a constitutional condition, but does not 
represent the constitution itself.  Instead, the substance of  the international 
constitution is principally vested in an “international value system”, made up of  
peremptory human rights norms and obligations erga omnes.315 
Thus value constitutionalism, like Charter constitutionalism, purports to operate 
according to acts of  states, in keeping with the traditionally-conceived international 
legal system, but in a different manner.  De Wet “extends the use of  the term 
constitution” beyond the idea of  a consolidated charter defining and delimiting the 
pathways of  public authority.  Value constitutionalism describes a hierarchical order 
of  substantive norms, predicated on fundamental values and drawn at least as much 
from jus cogens and obligations erga omnes as from conventional law.  International 
constitutionalism, as de Wet describes it, is distributed in terms of  its formal 
components, but consolidated in terms of  its substance; it is: 
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a system in which the different national, regional and functional (sectoral) 
constitutional regimes form the building blocks of  the international 
community (‘international polity’) that is underpinned by a core value system 
common to all communities and embedded in a variety of  legal structures for 
its enforcement.316 
The constitutional product is thus made up of  a variety of  legal structures 
representing a “fragile international community glued together and guided by a core 
of  fundamental values”.317  Moreover, in a number of  respects, the strength or 
effectiveness of  the constitutional framework to which value constitutionalism 
points, or aspects of  it, appears to rely to a meaningful degree on the normative 
force of  the underlying value itself, rather than its strict formal sufficiency as a 
matter of  law.  As such, value constitutionalism approaches both innate and liberal 
cosmopolitan arguments, insofar as the constitutional argument borrows from the 
strength of  extra-juridical conditions to defend an effective hierarchical framework 
of  world norms.  Because Charter constitutionalism, by contrast, reduces the 
international constitution to a discrete document, it is the more distinct from innate 
cosmopolitanism. 
The fundamental values of  value constitutionalism, however, are not precisely the 
moral postulates of  liberal cosmopolitanism, nor are they identical with the interests 
of  the world as that term is employed for purposes of  innate cosmopolitanism.  
The difference derives from the peculiar legal nature of  jus cogens as it is formally 
relied upon by the value cosmopolitan.  Jus cogens in this context represents a 
formal means by which to observe the development of  positive cosmopolitan law in 
a system otherwise defined by subjective interests; it is not a direct appeal to moral 
premises, nor to a vision of  the world as a whole.  As a result, the doctrinal effect is 
not so radical.  As Fassbender puts it, the comparative attractiveness of  jus cogens 
“is explained by the lingering effects of  “a legal training based on the cornerstone 
of  the ‘sovereign state’”.318  This is because jus cogens, “[i]n its quality as customary 
international law, can easily be fitted into the traditional system of  sources of  
international law and, what is more important, the traditional idea of  international 
law as a system of  rules based on the consent of  states.”319  In sum, value 
constitutionalism purports to observe a constitutional by-product of  enlightened 
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international custom, facilitated perhaps by the conventional achievement of  the 
Charter. 
It bears noting, in addition, an argument that assertions of  jus cogens are founded 
less on any quality of  customary law, and more on the preferred or assumed 
normative priorities of  the asserting party.  Likewise, less polemically, Prosper Weil 
links, critically, certain arguments in favor of  jus cogens with “a vague 
personification of  the international community.”320  If  these critical takes on jus 
cogens hold, the constitutional order founded on jus cogens comes closer to the 
innate cosmopolitan model: the assertion of  jus cogens looks like the intuition of  a 
superior normative authority that informs much innate cosmopolitan thought, but 
with the imprimatur of  formal sufficiency under current international law grafted 
onto it.   
Peters, by comparison with de Wet, places special emphasis on global 
constitutionalism’s  “embryonic” nature, a term she shares with de Wet – but 
Peters’s use of  the term stops short of  de Wet’s “fragile” but realized community.  
Owing, perhaps, to the premature constitutional condition she observes, Peters’s 
constitutionalism exhibits some ambiguity: “Global constitutionalization refers to 
the continuing, but not linear, process of  the gradual emergence and deliberate 
creation of  constitutionalist elements in the international legal order”.321  Nonlinear 
constitutionalization produces “constitutionalist elements”, but not necessarily a 
constitution.  The ambiguity also flows from the fact that reconstructive 
constitutionalism, following Peters, is an act of  advocacy, for which a constitution is 
not necessarily the goal, but may also be the medium: Peters’s reconstructive 
constitutionalism “advocates for the application of  constitutional principles in the 
international legal sphere in order to improve the effectiveness and the fairness of  
the international legal order.”322 
Peters, like de Wet, looks principally to a variety of  developments within the body 
of  positive international law to discern the framework of  a cosmopolitan 
constitution, capable of  effecting objective authority for a duly-constituted world 
unit.  In Peters’s analysis, the constitutional framework is largely prospective, and the 
occasion for advocacy to achieve a more effective international law.  As noted, 
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constitutional cosmopolitanism as Peters describes it resembles innate 
cosmopolitanism insofar as it is invoked to correct some defect in the doctrine of  
international law.  But while innate cosmopolitanism makes that argument by appeal 
to a source of  authority outside of  the traditionally-recognized sources of  
international law, Peters refers in the first instance to a variety of  positive 
developments recognized within the body of  international law.   And where the 
innate cosmopolitan model is in tension with deep aspects of  the body of  positive 
international law, Peters’s constitutional model is designed in part to support it.  By 
her own terms, Peters’s “constitutional approach to international law helps to 
prevent uncontrolled ‘deformalization’ of  international law.”323 
At the same time, the reconstructive character of  Peters’s constitutionalism has the 
character of  a liberal cosmopolitan proposal.  In the reconstructed constitutional 
order, “states are not ends in themselves”.324  Rather, “human needs are taken as the 
starting point”, and the end point as well: “the focus shifts from states’ rights to 
states’ obligations vis-à-vis natural persons, and a state that does not discharge these 
duties has its sovereignty suspended.”325  The goal is “transformation of  
international law into a system centered on individuals.”326  To achieve this goal, 
reconstructive constitutionalism turns to human rights and “provokes the pressing 
question of  the legitimacy of  global governance”.327 
Peters, however, is not arguing from first principles any more than she relies on the 
world collective of  innate cosmopolitanism.  Rather, it is developments in the 
positive law itself  that drive her inquiry into legitimacy.  Peters’s reconstruction is 
founded in what she observes to be at least four real constitutional developments in 
international law, or “embryonic hierarchical elements”.328  The four developments 
are: “the erosion of  the consent requirement”;329 “the creation of  World Order 
Treaties”;330 “changes in the concept of  statehood and a legal evolution regarding 
the recognition of  states and governments”;331 and “the growing participation of  
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non-state actors, such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), transnational 
corporations and individuals in international law-making and law-enforcement”.332 
The first development, diminished voluntarism, is identified with a weakening of  
the persistent objector rule, and succeeded in its operation by increasing 
centralization: 
the erosion of  consent requirements manifesting itself  in the weakening of  
the persistent-objector rule, third party effects of  treaties, and majority voting 
within treaty bodies and international organizations.  A most conspicuous 
event in this context is legislation by the Security Council (binding via Article 
25 UN Charter and circumventing eventual ratification requirements of  
parallel treaties).  In this perspective, constitutionalism supplants 
voluntarism.333 
For the third development, taking them out of  order, Peters cites Security Council 
Resolution 1483 for implicitly formulating conditions for the recognition of  a new 
Iraqi government.334  For the fourth development, by way of  example, Peters 
attributes a formative influence to NGO lobbying for the Landmines Convention 
of  1997 and the Rome Statute.335  Concerning the second development, “the 
creation of  World Order Treaties, formerly called traités-lois or ‘objective’ legal 
orders”, Peters indicates the range of  fields to have observed qualifying 
development in the positive law: “Such treaties have been adopted in the subject 
areas of  human rights, law of  the sea, environmental law, world trade law and 
international criminal law.”336  Once again, the constitutional analysis reflects 
progressive development of  international law by means of  traditional, subjective law 
making.  The means that Peters observes are not cosmopolitan, though the ends are. 
Peters’s objective order achieves “collective obligations serving global community 
interests which transcend the individual interests of  the states parties.”337  Peters’s 
language flags a closeness with both the innate and liberal cosmopolitan model.  
Obligations serving global community interests reflect, for Peters, public interest 
norms embodying universal values.338  Examples of  universal values and public 
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interest norms include “the centrality of  the human being, the acceptance of  a 
common heritage of  mankind, and the ideas of  sustainable development or free 
trade.”339  Furthermore, reviewing the sum of  her evidence of  positive 
constitutional development, Peters holds that “the idea of  constitutionalism implies 
that state sovereignty is gradually being complemented (if  not substituted) by other 
guiding principles, notably the ‘global common interest’ and/or ‘rule of  law’ and/or 
‘human security’.”340  In this manner, “the structure of  international law has 
generally evolved from co-existence via cooperation to constitutionalization.”341 
Peters’s emphasis on unfinished progress suggests an inchoate constitutional order – 
which is to say, not a constitutional order at all, but the possibility of  one (an 
unwritten constitution being one thing, an unformed constitution being a 
contradiction in terms).  Herein lies further potential for interplay between 
constitutional and innate cosmopolitanism.  Insofar as Peters purports to observe or 
advocate a constitution developing according to terms in the interest of  the world – 
again, the proto-constitutional condition – she might be observing an innate 
cosmopolitan phenomenon.  But insofar as that observation is wholly contingent on 
the formal achievement of  a constitution, achieved as a sort of  Kantian progression 
out of  a duly constituted – if  anarchic – system of  international law, the 
phenomenon she describes no longer exhibits innate cosmopolitan premises.  
Innate cosmopolitanism posits that the world collective preexists the formal 
achievement, whereas this second understanding of  Peters’s proto-constitutionalism 
suggests the reverse, that the world collective is established by the formal 
achievement. 
In any event, world relations, following Peters, have left or are leaving a phase of  
subjective international relations at law by means of  formal mechanisms, but have 
not arrived squarely at a phase of  objective juridical relations.  In consequence, the 
international system is left in theory with conflicting attributes of  subjective and 
objective authority.  Perhaps for this reason, Peters and other value constitutionalists 
tend to eschew the aspiration to value-neutral theory typically associated with 
constitutionalism, instead discerning or advocating a constitution of  world society 
according to a perceived consensus in the positive law around substantive values and 
norms.  The cosmopolitan constitution comes to resemble liberal cosmopolitanism, 
by appeal to widely-held moral principle to bolster the case for overcoming 
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countervailing subjective authorities.  As noted, value constitutionalism, like liberal 
cosmopolitanism, orients towards human rights and peremptory norms.  But the 
mix of  formal arguments and substantive norms suggests a controversial theoretical 
maneuver not unlike the efforts of  innate cosmopolitans, such as Myres McDougal, 
to marry arguments about process to select values.342  Fassbender, in this context, 
refers to a constitutional regime developed out of  human rights peremptory norms 
as founded on “a sort of  Decalogue of  a secularized world”.343  The formal 
argument to achieve objective authority among subjective actors is strengthened by 
appeal to select values, though the selection process for qualifying values is unclear; 
values become the ordering principle for the cosmopolitan world, but only select 
values that find expression in the positive law of  a non-cosmopolitan, or not yet 
cosmopolitan system. 
 
Different treatments of problems of subjectivity 
Charter constitutionalism also struggles with conflicting attributes of  subjective and 
objective authority in the international system, even under the Charter as 
constitution.  And in examining that struggle in terms of  Charter constitutionalism, 
it may be further observed how constitutional cosmopolitanism arrives at or 
emphasizes different norms from those towards which innate cosmopolitanism is 
oriented.  The basic methodological argument put forward by the Charter 
constitutionalist holds that the Charter transformed from treaty to constitution: that 
transformation, in turn, represents the change of  the entire system from a subjective 
order to an objective one.  As a treaty, the Charter is like any other treaty, subject to 
the law of  treaties and the subjective authority of  states; as a constitution, however, 
the Charter is uniquely vested with superior normative authority, beyond the law of  
treaties and, within its proper domain, the authority of  states. 
Thomas Giegerich objects to the idea of  the UN Charter as world constitution, 
based on a distinction between a constitution in a descriptive and a normative sense.  
A constitution in a descriptive sense is a matter of  formal definition: “a constitution 
is a body of  legal rules regulating the exercise of  political authority”; “[t]he rules of  
a constitution in a descriptive sense circumscribe in more or less detail the 
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authority’s powers and oblige its subjects to obey its orders.”344  The normative 
criteria, by contrast, are essential characteristics derived from the historical purpose 
of  political constitutions.345  A constitution in the normative sense must effectively 
provide for the legitimacy and accountability of  the political authority that it 
establishes, which categories include ensuring respect for human rights and some 
separation of  powers, and for effective supervision enabled by the constitutional 
program over its constituent parts.346 
Giegerich accepts the Charter as a constitution in a descriptive sense, but rejects its 
normative sufficiency.  The Charter fulfills the following descriptive criteria: 
The Charter certainly sets up a public authority with worldwide reach, namely 
the Security Council with the power to make binding political decisions to 
accomplish specified goals, most importantly the maintenance of  
international peace and security.  In the preamble, the Charter derives its 
authority from us, the people of  the United Nations.  Amending the Charter 
is at least as difficult as amending a national constitution….347 
Normatively, however, despite all of  its constitutional terms, Giegerich suggests that 
the Charter remains only a treaty, an act of international law, not an act capable of  
changing international law: “A constitution in the descriptive sense embodied in an 
international treaty remains subject to the interpretative rules of  international law 
and the virtually absolute mastery of  the parties.”348  The objective cosmopolitan 
order remains unfulfilled, because the founding of  that order remains subject to the 
subjective powers of  states in the decentralized order within which the new 
founding was conceived. 
Giegerich’s argument underscores basic difference between innate cosmopolitanism 
and constitutional cosmopolitanism.  The formal achievement, Giegerich suggests, 
is not enough.  The constitutional cosmopolitan is still lacking the real or 
independent source of  authority that the innate cosmopolitan purports to identify 
outside of  the formal constraints of  international law.  In other words, the formal 
argument lacks the objective, validating force that the innate cosmopolitan model 
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identifies with the world collective. 
Fassbender captures the challenge to achieve objective authority over subjective 
powers as follows: 
In the case of  such a treaty-constitution, it is an open question which of  its 
two constituents will be consolidated.  If  the first, i.e. the form of  the 
instrument, prevails, the new corporation will have a separate legal personality 
but “no measure of  independence or power to eradicate its subordination to 
its States’ parents and its subjection to the classical laws governing the States’ 
treaty relations ….  The basic principles of  the law of  treaties would apply to 
privilege the makers of  the treaty at all critical junctures in the life of  a treaty 
– treaty-making, amendment, interpretation and organization.”  It is only if  
the second constituent succeeds, and substance triumphs over form, that the 
instrument will subordinate the constituent units to the new creation and will 
apply to each of  them irrespective of  their continuous individual consent.  In 
spite of  its origins, it becomes non-consensual or “autonomous.”349 
Once transformed, the constitutional order becomes autonomous, or objective, no 
longer subject to the will of  states.  The international system is changed from a 
decentralized one, to a system recognizing an independent and unified source of  
political and juridical authority. 
Fassbender sees the core of  the transformation, where Giegerich does not, in a 
subtle but critical shift in sovereign relations under the Charter.  What was a system 
of  relations predicated on equal sovereignty becomes, under the Charter, a system 
of  sovereign equality.350  In an order founded on relations of  equal sovereignty, 
following Fassbender, the law is concerned to maintain the juridical sovereignty of  
each constituent equally.  In an order founded on sovereign equality, the law is 
concerned to maintain the juridical equality of  each sovereign constituent.  In the 
former, sovereignty is the paramount term, and each state is equally sovereign, or 
equally its own master at law: the law exists between states, according to their 
consent, thereby coordinating among them.  In the latter, under conditions of  
sovereign equality, equality is the paramount term, such that each state is equally its 
own master under the law, preserving individuation but subordinating subjects to 
the demands of  equality under law. 
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Fassbender refers to the move to sovereign equality as the “important innovation” 
of  Article 2(1) of  the Charter, the foundation of  the Charter organization: “The 
Organization is based on the principle of  the sovereign equality of  all its 
Members.”351  Following Fassbender: 
[Article 2(1)] emphasizes the interdependence of  sovereignty and equality 
and, what is more, gives the idea of  equality precedence over that of  
sovereignty by relegating the latter to the position of  an attributive adjective 
which merely modifies the non “equality.”  It is “sovereign equality,” not 
“equal sovereignty” the Charter speaks of. … Sovereignty, as a concept 
excluding legal superiority of  any one state over another, is not at odds with a 
greater role of  the international community vis-à-vis all its members.  All that 
states can ask is to be treated equally in and before the law.352 
Fassbender cites also the General Assembly’s Declaration of  Friendly Relations for 
its affirmation that “States are juridically equal”.353  Still, however radical, the simple 
reversal in terms does not seem to go far enough.  Giegerich is joined by others, 
such as de Wet and Peters, in finding that the reality of  the Charter regime does not 
sustain the document’s formal, cosmopolitan normative and constitutional potential. 
Irrespective of  its reflection in reality, however, Fassbender’s proposed solution 
underscores the different applications of  constitutional and innate cosmopolitan 
ideas.  The distinction begins with something in common: the Charter is a central 
document in innate cosmopolitanism as well as constitutional cosmopolitanism.  
The Charter is central to innate cosmopolitanism for its elevation of  the first rule of  
public order for an interdependent world, namely the prohibition on the use of  
force.  Art. 2(4) is especially important as a matter of  innate cosmopolitan 
jurisprudence, as will be seen in Chapter 4.  The critical Charter provision for 
Fassbender, however, is not Art. 2(4), but Art. 2(1), because it is the formal 
attributes of  the latter that establishes the constitutional community.  The Charter is 
not remarkable to Fassbender for norms that presuppose or convey the interest of  
the world collective; the Charter is remarkable for the norm that creates the world 
collective.  The latter, Art. 2(1), is the formal innovation demonstrating a 
constitutional settlement; only once the formal settlement is achieved does the 
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world collective exist as a subjectivized political body with a juridical will. 
Innate cosmopolitanism, by contrast, endorses the Charter precisely for the 
substance of  Art. 2(4), for establishing in the positive law the first rule of  public 
order in the interest of  the world.  Not any rule would have sufficed; it is the 
affirmation of  the bedrock norm of  public order that distinguishes the Charter, 
rather than any other formal innovation.  While the formal achievement of  a 
constitution may be corollary to the establishment of  objective, public order norms 
in international law, the constituted body already exists and carries its own 
normative authority.  Innate cosmopolitanism is a model employed to achieve 
objective authority for public order norms in the world; a constitution may be one 
such means, but it is not the exclusive means, and indeed little of  the innate 
cosmopolitan work reviewed in Chapter 2 exhibited any interest in a world 
constitution.  In any event, innate cosmopolitanism rejects the need to make the 
recognition of  objective authority in international law contingent on a formal 
validation of  a constitutional settlement among subjective actors. 
 
Within and without formal constraints of international law 
In sum, constitutional cosmopolitanism may be observed to share at least the 
following two characteristics with innate cosmopolitan thought: both are roughly 
focused on remedying what are perceived to be doctrinal defects in the subjective 
system of  law qua a system of  law, rather than as an ethical system, system of  justice 
or anything else; consequently, both constitutional and innate cosmopolitanism 
would arrive at a normative regime in which a cosmopolitan order is established 
with objective juridical authority.  But the constitutional cosmopolitan argument 
operates substantially more from within the positive constraints of  orthodox 
international law, whereas the innate cosmopolitan model is situated largely outside 
of  those constraints, by virtue of  its appeal to a source of  authority not properly 
recognized by orthodox international law.  The world already enjoys normative 
authority under the innate cosmopolitan model, whereas that authority is to be 
conferred on the world by constitutional settlement under constitutional 
cosmopolitanism. 
By definition, constitutional cosmopolitanism is concerned with the systemic 
achievement of  the cosmopolitan settlement.  The formal terms must be capable of  
supporting a comprehensive system of  law.  The Charter constitutionalist sees this 
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in framework effectuated by Art. 2(1).  The value constitutionalist, by contrast, sees 
this in select sets of  values capable of  attracting sufficient consensus to achieve a 
unified and hierarchical system of  norms in the world.  While both operate within 
the formal constraints of  international law, the former looks towards more formal 
innovation to establish the constitutional regime, whereas the latter looks to the 
persuasion of  specific, substantive values as expressed by and in support of  formal 
developments.  Innate cosmopolitanism, by contrast, posits the prior existence of  
world collective, and recognizes normative authority already inhering in that 
collective.  It does not need to be established as a matter of  positive or 
constitutional law, only credited with authoritative power where necessary or 
appropriate.  Consequently, though innate cosmopolitanism may support or endorse 
constitutional development, it also supports – and far more regularly – ad hoc 
solutions to select issues as they arise, particularly in matters of  international 
controversies before tribunals such as the ICJ, to which I turn in the next Chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
I will return to a map of the three cosmopolitan schools in the Conclusion of this 
work.  It bears noting here a summary sketch of conceptual areas of distinction and 
convergence among the three schools of thought, as well as the different form that 
each takes as a matter of expression under international law. 
The three schools of cosmopolitanism, then, all aim to achieve some autonomous 
authority over subjective powers in the world, but each does so differently.  Liberal 
cosmopolitanism, grounded in  normative individualism, does so according to an 
ethical system that operates in the first instance outside of the system of 
international law and without regard to historical constraints typically applicable to 
legal systems generally.  Operating outside of the system of international law and 
without regards to historical constraints founds the liberal cosmopolitan pretension 
to autonomy.  The autonomous cosmopolitan authority inheres in the product of a 
constructive method applied to derive valid norms from universally-acceptable 
moral principles. 
Constitutional cosmopolitanism aims to achieve autonomous authority over 
subjective powers by means of a more or less formal doctrine that operates largely 
from within the confines of positive international law – indeed, as a constitutional 
theory, constitutional cosmopolitanism is synonymous with the legal system it 
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affirms.  The constitutional achievement represents the achievement of autonomy, 
by means of a superior act of positive law, including unwritten positive law such as 
customary law and jus cogens.  An autonomous cosmopolitan authority exists as of 
the moment it is validly constituted and duly recognized as a matter of law.  
Notably, where constitutional arguments begin to reflect an assumption of 
normative authority more than any clear formal validity, such as perhaps with 
speculative arguments in favor of jus cogens, the constitutional argument begins to 
collapse into an innate cosmopolitan argument. 
Innate cosmopolitanism operates, in its key supposition of a source of normative 
authority vested in the pre-juridical phenomenon of the world collective, outside of 
the formal constraints of international law, but nonetheless within the historical 
constraints typically applicable to law.  Innate cosmopolitan aims to sustain the 
historical reality of a world order, though in derogation of a subjective system of 
international law that does not properly recognize normative authority vested in the 
objective order of an independent world collective.  Innate cosmopolitanism 
pretends to autonomy by virtue of the subjectivization of the all-inclusive world 
community, representing its autonomy from its constituent parts.  Innate 
cosmopolitanism reflects legal discourse in a way that liberal cosmopolitanism does 
not, but whereas the constitutional cosmopolitan argument remains grounded in 
positive law, the innate cosmopolitan argument identifies valid bedrock normativity 
outside of the positive law, in the subjectivized world community identified by 
intuition or roughly sociological observation. 
Liberal cosmopolitanism, in application under international law, typically gives rise 
to norms that flow from an interest in human rights which, as formal survivals 
under law of pre-political rights, are capable of trumping any conflicting law or 
political authority.  This body of norms includes legal norms necessary to sustain 
human rights against violation, including distributive norms and norms providing 
for forcible intervention internationally where necessary.  Constitutional 
cosmopolitanism, by contrast, recognizes whatever dynamic or substantive norms 
the duly enacted constitution prescribes, with the proviso that in the case of 
constitutional cosmopolitanism, the constitution as a whole must on balance be 
cosmopolitan, rather than fascist or imperialist or anything else.  That is, there must 
be some meaningful pretension to a harmonious ordering of world relations that is 
all-inclusive.  For Charter constitutionalists, the critical constitutional achievement is 
represented by the terms of Art. 2(1), affirming sovereign equality, and the 
substantive terms of cosmopolitanism are represented by the language of the 
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Preamble.  For value constitutionalists, the critical constitutional achievement is 
distributed across a variety of positive developments recognized as a matter of 
international law and tending to effect a hierarchy of norms capable of ordering a 
world community.  Most value constitutionalism adopts values similar to those 
espoused as a matter of liberal cosmopolitanism, especially human rights. 
In some cases, constitutional cosmopolitanism is more about the possibility of a 
future constitution than the reality of an existing constitution.  Where constitutional 
cosmopolitanism concerns a possible constitution, it resembles innate 
cosmopolitanism, which shares proto-constitutional characteristics.  Even, however, 
where constitutional cosmopolitanism concerns a possible constitution, meaningful 
differences remain.  The constitutional cosmopolitan still identifies the reality of the 
constitutional community with the constitution itself, such that an act of advocacy 
for a potential world constitution is an act of advocacy to bring a world community 
into existence, or to substantiate or make concrete the possibility of a world 
community.  For innate cosmopolitanism, the world collective capable of 
supporting law in the world already and objectively exists, with or without a 
constitutional settlement under law – a possible world constitution may well 
represent the world collective, but does not create it. 
Thus Innate cosmopolitan norms are those norms that flow from the pre-juridical 
phenomenon.  This does not take innate cosmopolitanism, as a discourse, outside 
ofa  framework for ascertaining law that is typical of law generally, but it does take 
innate cosmpolitanism outside of constraints traditionally associated with an 
international legal system long connected with terms of voluntary positivism among 
states.  As seen in Chapter 2, however, efforts at a comprehensive scientific 
rendering of the norms represented by the world collective have been neither 
conclusive nor persuasive.  Consequently, innate cosmopolitanism does not 
demonstrate the same systemic character as liberal and constitutional 
cosmopolitanism in application.  Rather, innate cosmopolitanism tends to find 
expression as an ad hoc solution to various issues as they arise in the course of 
controversies before international tribunals, such as the ICJ, as will be seen in the 
next chapter, Chapter 4.  In these cases, innate cosmopolitanism represents a special 
appeal to authority for the purposes of extending a norm in the interest or 
according to the will of the world as a whole, in the absence of such authority under 
positive international law. 
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Reliance on the innate cosmopolitan model is discernible in the jurisprudence of the 
International Court of Justice, though that reliance follows an irregular juridical path 
through the history of the Court under the Charter.  That path may be described as 
a fruition of alternative precedent: a considerable amount of the reliance on the 
innate cosmopolitan model occurs outside of the judgments of the Court, in 
separate opinions and dissents by various judges over time; at a certain point, 
however, the posture of the Court can be seen to reflect significant aspects of this 
alternative jurisprudence.  What begins in the iconoclastic opinions of Judge Álvarez 
becomes the most plausible way to understand the judgment of the Court in the Oil 
Platforms case. 
To be clear, when I refer to the Court’s jurisprudence, I mean to include minority 
along with majority opinions.  I do so for three reasons.  First, minority opinions 
can serve to explain or shed light on aspects or reasoning that may otherwise remain 
126 
 
opaque in majority opinions.354  Secondly, they are key to allowing the Court to 
satisfy as a forum its mandate to be representative of the main forms of civilization 
and the principal legal systems of the world.355  Thirdly, and in sum, minority 
opinions have a systemic function: they serve a dialectical purpose that enhances the 
Court’s contribution to and development of international law.356  Ijaz Hussain, 
whose study into minority opinions at the World Court remains the most 
comprehensive treatment of their content and function over time, describes the 
dialectic in classically Hegelian terms: constant progression towards a ‘new 
synthesis’, whereby ‘the majority opinions of the Court, drawing inspiration from 
the new synthesis, would become the thesis, while individual opinions, especially 
dissenting opinions representing a more progressive and responsive vision of 
international law, would represent the antithesis’ leading again to ‘a still more perfect 
synthesis’ and the continuation of the process.357  In language more typical of 
classical international law, Shabtai Rosenne describes similar functions for minority 
opinions, including a clear appreciation of their potential explanatory power in any 
given case: 
[T]he [individual] opinion may indicate other general underlying principles 
which its author believed could or should have been more appropriately 
applied in the concrete case.  Such an opinion may have a value of its own as 
a counter-balance to the majority opinion….  When some ideas only appear 
in a separate opinion, that does not mean that the Court as a whole rejected 
them.  It means nothing more than that the Court did not find it necessary to 
adopt them for its decision – something quite different.  In another direction, 
there are concurring opinions which flatly contradict both the underlying 
principles and their application by the majority.  Here, dependent on the 
author’s general reputation and the cogency of his reasoning, the individual 
opinion may in the course of time come to be seen by enlightened and 
informed opinion as expressive of better law.358 
In sum, I will look at minority opinions alongside opinions of the Court for the 
explanatory power a combined reading demonstrates with respect to discernible – if 
                                                                
354 Ijaz Hussain, Dissenting and Separate Opinions at the World Court (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1984), p. 
3. 
355 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 9.  Hussain, supra note 354, at 2-3. 
356 Hussain, supra note 354, at 7, 9, 264-65. 
357 Ibid., at 264-66. 
358 Shabtai Rosenne, The World Court: What it is and how it works, 5th ed. (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1995), 
pp. 138-39 (emphasis in original). 
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incremental – cosmopolitan movement in the position of the Court in its treatment 
of questions of international security and the use of force. 
The innate cosmopolitan jurisprudence that runs through the Court’s work is 
occassionally joined to elements of constitutional cosmopolitanism.  Liberal 
cosmopolitanism is less present in the jurisprudence of the Court and its judges, 
though arguments in favor of value-oriented norms, especially with a liberal 
character, arise.  Altogether, what emerges is a distinct discourse that adumbrates a 
theory of juridical good for the world unit, in the form of a roughly constitutional or 
pre-constitutional arrangement capable giving effect to innate cosmopolitan 
premises. 
Moreover, the ICJ, as an institution, is itself a model for the conflicted historical 
narrative of cosmopolitan norms generally in modern international law.  
Cosmopolitan norms reflect the progressive ambition to ground an otherwise 
subjective order – the anarchic system of relations among equal and independent 
sovereign states – with an autonomous and objective normative foundation.  As 
noted, cosmopolitan norms reflect an appeal to a comprehensive and unified 
arrangement under law, whether it is one founded on certain unassailable values, a 
constitutional settlement, or an innate and ineluctable situation of global unity.  The 
Court similarly represents an institutional pretension to exercise an objective 
normative function, but it is formally empowered only according to the strictures of 
consent among among states in a system of subjective relations.359  Thus the Court 
manifests an aspiration to the normative unity of international law, but also 
manifests the constraints that have caused modern international law to resemble so 
many contracts among states.  To name a few familiar contradictions: it is the single 
institution that comes nearest to the role of a high court in national context, 
approximating the authority to give definitive expression to any legal rule in 
international society, but the Court cannot formally refer to its own rulings as valid 
international law; the Court was established to address pressing international 
controversies, but it enjoys jurisdiction only as a matter of consent; and though 
designed to reflect the juridical will of the whole of the international community in 
every case, the Court’s pronouncements are not binding outside of the arbitrations 
in which they are pronounced. 
                                                                
359 Cf., Hersch Lauterpacht, The Absence of an International Legislature and the Compulsory 
Jurisdiction of International Tribunals, 11 Brit. Y. B. Int’l L. 134 (1930). 
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The conflicted attributes of the Court are most clear in cases concerning the law on 
the use of force.  Cases concerning the use of force tend to implicate questions of 
security and self-interest among states that resist, as a fundamental matter, 
cosmopolitan pressures to abandon the prerogative of subjective judgment.  
Nonetheless, as the Nicaragua case demonstrates, the Court includes among its tasks 
the resolution of questions of law in cases of armed conflict, as against the 
subjective will of states, and independent of the political will of the Security Council.  
The Court, in cases concerning the resort to force between states, is bound to 
contradict a subjective assertion of right put forward by one or another party to the 
conflict, but is constrained in its ability to do so by the limited powers at its disposal. 
Moreover, while the Court is a creature of relatively clear positive law, its own 
jurisprudence represents a nebulous extension of that law in the area of the use 
of force, as follows: The UN Charter, including the Statute of the Court, 
represents the culmination of a progressive movement in conventional 
international law to suppress the recourse to force, but neither the use of force 
as a policy option among states, nor the normative movement to restrict it, 
ended with the conventional achievement of the Charter; rather, the continued 
development of norms restricting the recourse to force has been transferred to, 
among other places, the jurisprudence of the Court, including the separate and 
dissenting opinions of judges to the Court.  Progressive pressure to give more 
comprehensive and cosmopolitan substance to the prohibition on the use of 
force is carried forward in a line of opinions by the Court and judges to the 
Court.  Ultimately, the Court and judges of the Court can be seen to have 
engaged and developed, in modest but meaningful ways, a sustained discourse of 
innate cosmopolitanism applied to issues of international security and 
controversies arising out of the use of force.  What emerges out of the dialectical 
analysis is a discernible movement in the position of the Court, with respect to 
its jurisdiction over matters of international security and the use of force, that 
can be observed over time and understood by reference to the streams of 
cosmopolitan and innate cosmopolitan thought explored for the most part in 
minority opinions. 
Judge Álvarez introduces the first sustained application of cosmopolitan norms 
from the bench of the Court.  Before joining the Court, as seen in Chapter 2, Judge 
Álvarez was one of the foremost exponents of innate cosmopolitan ideas.  He 
continued to develop on his legal theory in a series of separate opinions and 
dissents, proposing sweeping normative changes in international law, and an 
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enlarged role for the World Court, flowing from a new cosmopolitan reality.  Thus I 
will turn first to the nature and scope of his cosmopolitan jurisprudence, with 
particular attention to elements that return in later opinions from the bench of the 
Court. 
Judge Álvarez's alternative jurisprudence, however, made little headway in his time.  
Rather, the Court was constrained by the cooperative (and uncooperative) nature of 
international relations, and Judge Álvarez's tenure was followed by a period in which 
the Court's authority was demonstrably limited vis-à-vis the subjective actors 
appearing before it.  From this period, I will touch briefly on two cases, the Fisheries 
Jurisdiction and Tehran Hostages cases, for the limitations on the powers of the Court 
that they demonstrate, and for contrast with subsequent cases in which the Court 
was less restrained.  On the whole, in reviewing the entire body of work of the ICJ 
in the area of the recourse to force for cosmopolitan elements, there is a clear 
distinction in method between the work of Judge Álvarez, and the work of the rest 
of the Court.  Judge Álvarez used his every opinion to achieve a doctrinal 
affirmation of a new international law conforming to the innate cosmopolitan 
model.  Subsequent judges adopted aspects of the innate cosmopolitan model on a 
piece-meal basis, in a manner tailored to the context of the case before the Court, 
without ever recognizing or acknowledging any doctrinal development.  I will 
examine Judge Álvarez’s work as a foundation for the subsequent, piece-meal 
treatment of the innate cosmopolitan idea by the Court.  In so doing, I will treat the 
work of Judge Álvarez as an integrated doctrinal argument, much as he intended it.  
By contrast, in the succeeding section of this chapter, I will treat the rest of the 
work of the Court on a case-by-case basis, examining each for its discrete 
contribution to the discourse. 
Thus normative ambitions for a more comprehensive and objective juridical scheme 
persisted after Judge Álvarez’s tenure on the bench of the Court, and after a 
relatively fallow period for jurisdiction over the use of force, the Court can be seen 
to have assumed a progressively, if incrementally, expanding authority over the 
actors and disputes before it.  I turn to a line of cases, from Nicaragua to Oil 
Platforms, in which the Court and judges of the Court exhibit increasingly expansive 
views of the Court's jurisdiction, together with a widening presumption of the 
objective character of the law by which the Court is empowered, with reliance on 
the innate cosmopolitan model. 
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Altogether, three levels of innate cosmopolitan jurisprudence can be discerned.  
Judge Álvarez’s work represents the broadest and most radical level, ineffectual in 
its time, but a precedent for later jurisprudence.  In keeping with his scholarship, 
treated in a prior chapter, Judge Álvarez’s opinions broadly sketch an ambitious 
development of the innate cosmopolitan model, affirming a world phenomenon 
capable of sustaining objective normativity in international law.  The second level of 
innate cosmopolitan jurisprudence at the Court includes more limited efforts 
selectively to expand on the list of sources recognized in international law.  As 
opposed to the new and sweeping framework for international law as envisioned by 
Judge Álvarez, this second body of jusridprudence would effectively incorporate the 
innate cosmopolitan model as a possible and perhaps exceptional channel for 
resolving controversies under international law.  The third level is the most modest, 
but has seen the most development in the opinions of the Court.  It involves a 
piecemeal expansion of the Court’s jurisdiction, drawing on the normativity 
associated with the innate cosmpolitan model for the limited purposes of sustaining 
the Court’s power and responsibility to preside over discrete cases or discrete 
questions within cases. 
The increasingly narrow appeal to innate cosmopolitanism – from a new normative 
framework, to a limited allowance for otherwise unrecognized sources of 
international law, to piecemeal expansion of jurisdiction – underscores the reality 
that an aspiration to objective world norms administered by an autonomous world 
court remains controversial, at best.  The cases marshaled here should make clear 
that the appeal at the ICJ to innate cosmopolitan norms is part of a larger narrative 
of progressive world politics with a cosmopolitan telos, but which is in tension with 
other narratives and aspects of the Court's jurisprudence.  The focus on cases 
concerning the use of force, where the conflict between aspirations to juridical 
objectivity and systemic subjectivity is most clear, heps to bring out and explore that 
tension. 
 
The alternative jurisprudence of Judge Álvarez 
In all of his separate and dissenting opinions, Judge Álvarez vests the ICJ with 
responsibility for a new international law.  His treatment of the new international 
law, and the Court’s responsibility under it, is an elaboration of his scholarly work 
articulating a theory of innate cosmopolitanism, treated in Chapter 2.   The body of 
Judge Álvarez’s work from the bench of the Court at once elevates his innate 
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cosmopolitan scholarship, and serves as a foundation for subsequent cosmopolitan 
discourse from the bench of the Court.  I turn here to the aspects of his opinions 
that are most salient with regard to both functions; and I will emphasize certain 
areas in which Judge Álvarez’s jurisprudence offers the fullest or most compelling 
explication of innate cosmopolitan principles that can be found in subsequent 
opinions of other judges.  Thus in Judge Álvarez’s opinions begins a sort of 
shadow-precedent, an interconnected series of separate opinions and dissents over 
time, which take the innate cosmopolitan model to guide the Court in novel 
exercises of its jurisdiction. 
 
Interdependence and a new normative scheme 
Developing on his theory of innate cosmopolitanism, Judge Álvarez describes a 
world condition of social interdependence, which gives rise to a new international 
law, inaugurated with the Charter.  He writes: “De la sorte a commencé à se former 
rapidement un droit international nouveau.  Il a ses racines dans le régime 
d'interdépendance qui s'est frayé une voie depuis le milieu du XIXme siècle.”360  Social 
interdependence, for Judge Álvarez, represents a comprehensive world political 
complex that supersedes the system of equal and independent states: 
La base dont il part est qu'aujourd'hui les États sont de plus en plus 
interdépendants et que, par suite, ils ne forment pas une simple communauté 
comme autrefois, mais une véritable société internationale, laquelle est 
organisée. Cette société ne détruit nullement l'indépendance et la souveraineté 
des Etats, ni leur égalité juridique (art. 2, al. I, de la Charte), mais elle limite 
cette souveraineté, et les droits qui en dérivent, au profit des intérêts généraux 
de ladite société.361 
International society, as Judge Álvarez uses the term, enjoys its own interests, and 
gives rise to world norms above and beyond the rules of conduct agreed to among 
                                                                
360 “In this way a new international law has rapidly begun to come into existence. It has its roots in the 
régime of interdependence which has been emerging since the middle of the XIXth century.”  Competence of 
Assembly Regarding Admission to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 3 March 1950, [1950] ICJ Reports 
4, at 13 (Judge Álvarez, Dissenting Opinion). 
361 “Its point of departure is that, to-day, States are increasingly interdependent: and that consequently 
they do not form a simple community, as formerly, but rather a veritable international and organized 
society. This society in nowise abolishes the independence and the sovereignty of the States, nor their 
legal equality (Article 2 paragraph 1, of the Charter); but it limits this sovereignty, and the rights which 
flow therefrom, in view of the general interests of this society.”  Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
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states.  But because there remains no world legislature to give adequate expression 
to the normative mandate arising out of the world political complex, Judge Álvarez 
establishes a role for the ICJ as chief custodian of world norms, with a responsibility 
for their development.  Thus, “la Cour a pleine liberté pour donner passage à l'esprit 
nouveau qui progresse au contact des conditions nouvelles de la vie internationale : 
au renouvellement de cette vie doit correspondre un renouvellement du droit des 
gens.”362  Following Álvarez, the norms of the international system are dependent 
on the new conditions of international relations; as the primary institution 
responsible for the expression of the norms of the international system at law, the 
Court is entitled and even bound to give voice to the new norms arising out of the 
new conditions.  Thus Álvarez elaborates in parallel both the cosmopolitan 
substance of the new international law, and the cosmopolitan role of the Court as its 
primary exponent. 
In sum, Álvarez employs the innate cosmopolitan model to announce a new 
international normative regime, with the Court as its first body.  Conditions of 
interdependence in the world have established what Álvarez refers to as 
international society, a subjectivized society that enjoys discrete interests of its own, 
founding a primary – though not exclusive – normative grounds to see those 
interests recognized under international law. But because the new international law 
arises out of the reality of a political complex that does not enjoy any 
comprehensive organization (the UN represents an institution within that political 
complex, but not the complex itself), Álvarez's new international law defies 
constraints of positive international law: 
Etant donné que le droit international nouveau se fonde sur 
l'interdépendance sociale …. il n'est pas nécessaire que toutes les obligations 
soient établies expressément dans un texte; par suite de la variabilité et de la 
complexité des rapports internationaux, on ne peut pas tout prévoir ; nombre 
d'obligations ressortent de la nature même des institutions ou des exigences 
de la vie sociale.363 
                                                                
362 “the Court has a free hand to allow scope to the new spirit which is evolving in contact with the 
new conditions of international life : there must be a renewal of international law corresponding to the 
renewal of this life.”  Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, 28 May 
1948, [1948] I.C.J. Reports 57, at 67 [Judge Álvarez]. 
363 “Because the new international law is based on social interdependence …. it is not necessary that all 
obligations be expressly laid down by a text. Because of the diversity and the compiexity of 
international relations it is not possible to provide for every contingency. Many obligations result from 
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The validity of new norms turns on their correspondence with the reality of the 
world political complex, but not necessarily any formal expression of or by the 
same.  The rules of decision available to and binding on the Court , following 
Álvarez, cannot be limited to the positive rules arising out of the traditionally-
recognized sources of international law, because those sources do not sufficiently 
allow for the expression of norms that are manifest in the new interdependent 
world political complex (a rationale drawn from the French sociological school of 
law, and related to that of the American legal realists, who founded the law's 
legitimacy not strictly on its formal validity, but also on a roughly equitable 
correspondence with real conditions in society).  Thus: “La Cour doit appliquer non 
pas le droit international classique, mais le droit tel qu'elle estime qu'il existe au 
moment de rendre sa sentence, en tenant compte des modifications qu'il a pu subir 
par suite des changements survenus dans la vie des peuples ; c'est-à-dire elle doit 
appliquer le droit international nouveau.”364  Here, though Álvarez does not 
propose how the Court is to ascertain the reality of new conditions and the norms 
that flow from them, he incorporates into the nature of the Court’s exercise the 
sociological and observational logic that is central to the innate cosmopolitan idea in 
legal scholarship, as seen in Chapter 2. 
 
The role of the Court 
Judge Álvarez uses his series of separate opinions to demonstrate how the Court 
ought to have decided the cases before it not by reference to the narrow constraints 
of available positive law, but by reference to a broad spectrum of political and other 
norms that characterize conditions of interdependence in the world, or international 
society: “la Cour doit donner une solution non pas conforme au droit international 
traditionnel, ce qui serait une anomalie, mais conforme au droit international qui se 
forme actuellement et qu'elle peut créer.”365  In this reasoning, however, a central 
                                                                                                                                                               
the very nature of institutions or the requirements of social life.”  International Status of South-West Africa, 
Advisory Opinion, 11 July 1950, [1950] I.C.J. Reports 128, at 177 (Judge Álvarez, Dissenting Opinion). 
364 “The Court must not apply classical international law, but rather the law which it considers exists at the 
time the judgment is delivered, having due regard to the modifications it may have undergone 
following the changes in the life of peoples; in other words, the Court must apply the new international 
law.”  Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, Jurisdiction, Judgment of 22 July 1952, [1952] I.C.J. Reports 93, at 125 
(Judge Álvarez, Dissenting Opinion). 
365 “the Court has to give decisions, not in accordance with traditional international law – that would 
be an anomaly – but in accordance with the international law which is now emerging and which the 
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ambivalence is prominent: it is not clear whether legal norms arise naturally out of 
the sum total of acts and expectations expressing interdependence in the world, or 
whether the Court in fact creates the legal norms applicable to those acts and 
expectations.  The ambivalence resembles the ambivalence exhibited by the 
interactional theory of law, as observed in Chapter 2, between emerging and enacted 
law.366  In cosequence, the Court, custodian for world interests, is alternately a pass-
through or a policy chamber.  This ambivalence in the custodial role of the Court, 
however, reflects instability in the actual grounds of authority for the new normative 
regime that is to be announced in accordance with the Court’s custodial 
responsibility.  I return to this matter in a critical light in the Conclusion of this 
book.  In any event, as custodian of the new international law, and one of the few 
international institutions capable of giving positive legal expression to the new 
norms of international society (together with the UN General Assembly), the 
Court's responsibility comprehends the political, cultural and even psychic 
conditions of international life.  Thus: “A l'avenir, ce sont surtout l'Assemblée 
générale des Nations Unies, la Cour internationale de Justice et les juristes qui vont 
créer le droit international nouveau”;367 and “le nouveau droit des gens n'a pas un 
caractère exclusivement juridique ; il a aussi un caractère politique, économique, 
social, psychologique, etc.”.368 
Accordingly, the norms at the Court's disposal, and those binding on the Court, are 
not strictly legal, but also sociological and even ontological in nature.  Three 
important touchstones for the ascertainment of new norms include the exigencies of 
life in the interconnected whole of international society, world public opinion, and 
the conscience of peoples.369  This is the innate cosmopolitan project, as prefigured 
in Álvarez’s prior scholarship: The Court's decisions are valid not by virtue of 
reliance on the mandates of voluntary positive law, but by virtue of reference to the 
progressive reality of a unitary and autonomous international society, and the 
                                                                                                                                                               
Court itself is able to create.”  Competence of Assembly Regarding Admission to the United Nations (Judge 
Álvarez, Dissenting Opinion), supra note 400, at 13. 
366 Chapter 2, supra, pp. 72-79. 
367 “In future, it is to the General Assembly of the United Nations, to the International Court of Justice 
and to the jurists that we shall look, more than to anyone, for the creation of the new international 
law.”  Competence of Assembly Regarding Admission to the United Nations (Judge Álvarez, Dissenting 
Opinion), supra note 400, at 13. 
368 “the new international law is not of an exclusively juridical character. It has also political, economic, 
social, and psychological characteristics.”  International Status of South-West Africa (Judge Álvarez, 
Dissenting Opinion), supra note 363, p. 176. 
369 See Reparations for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 11 April 1949, 
[1949] I.C.J. Reports 174, at 190 [Judge Álvarez]. 
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mandates of its political, economic, social and psychological conditions, among 
other things. 
Within the scheme of Judge Álvarez’s jurisprudence, the sovereign state is reduced 
to an institution that satisfies a social function, and no longer enjoys primary 
responsibility for and authority over the development and application of 
international legal norms: 
Aujourd'hui, en raison de l'interdépendance sociale, ainsi que de la 
prédominance de l'intérêt général, les Etats sont liés par bien des préceptes 
sans que leur volonté intervienne. La souveraineté des Etats est devenue 
actuellement une institution, une fonction sociale internationale de caractère 
psychologique et devant s'exercer conformément au droit international 
nouveau.370 
Rather, the development of international law is disassociated from individual and 
subjective actors, and falls instead to those bodies, such as the General Assembly 
and the ICJ, objectively able to comprehend and articulate the independent norms 
appropriate to the interconnected world collective. 
 
Objectivity and autonomy displace individuality 
The paramount value under this new scheme is the value of solidarity, entirely 
displacing the value of individuality, which, following Álvarez, had theretofore 
dominated modern international law according to the doctrine of equal and 
independent sovereign states: “Le point de départ est qu'au régime traditionnel 
individualiste qui a été jusqu'ici à la base de la vie sociale, se substitue de plus en plus 
le Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of 9 April 1949, [1949] I.C.J. Reports 4, at 41 
[Judge Álvarez].nouveau régime dit d'interdépendance et que, par suite, à l'ancien droit 
individualiste succède le droit d'interdépendance sociale.”371 
                                                                
370 “Today, owing to social interdependence and to the predominance of the general interest, the States 
are bound by many rules which have not been ordered by their will. The sovereignty of States has now 
become an institution, an international social function of a psychological character, which has to be exercised 
in accordance with the new international law.”  Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of 9 April 1949, [1949] 
I.C.J. Reports 4, at 43 [Judge Álvarez]. 
371 “The starting point is the fact that, for the traditional individualistic regime on which social life has 
hitherto been founded, there is being substituted more and more a new régime, a régime of 
interdependence, and that, consequently, the law of social interdependence is taking the place of the old 
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The rejection under Álvarez's scheme of the normative individuality of states, along 
with the rejection of positive law constraints, establishes the crucial pretension to 
objectivity.  The Court is tasked with articulating norms applicable to the global 
reality of an independent international society, representing the world as a whole, 
rather than norms flowing from the subjective expression of so many equal and 
independent agents: 
La communauté des Etats qui était demeurée jusqu'alors anarchique, est 
devenue une véritable société internationale organisée. Cette transformation 
est un fait ; il n'est pas nécessaire qu'un accord international le consacre. Cette 
société est composée non seulement d'États, parfois groupés, voire même 
associés, mais aussi d'autres entités internationales ; elle a une existence, une 
personnalité distinctes de celles des membres qui la composent ; elle a des 
fins qui lui sont propres.372 
In sum, the Court represents a unitary world order, autonomous of the will of 
states.  Moreover, the world unit is a self-conscious one: “tous les peuples 
comprennent actuellement qu'ils ne sont plus isolés ni liés seulement par les actes 
qu'ils ont librement acceptés mais qu'ils font partie d'une véritable société plus 
ample que la société civile à laquelle ils appartiennent”.373  Despite its discrete 
interests and objective normative authority, however, the self-conscious world unit 
lacks classic manifestations of government:  “l'ancienne communauté des nations s'est 
transformée en une véritable société internationale, bien que ne possédant ni pouvoir 
exécutif, ni pouvoir législatif, ni pouvoir judiciaire, lesquels sont des caractéristiques 
de la société civile mais pas de la société internationale.”374  This represents perhaps 
                                                                                                                                                               
individualistic law.”  Fisheries case (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment of 18 December 1951, [1951] 
I.C.J. Reports 116, at 149 [Judge Álvarez]. 
372 “The community of States, which had hitherto remained anarchical, has become in fact an organized 
international society. This transformation is a fact which does not require the consecration of an 
international agreement. This society consists not only of States, groups and even associations of 
States, but also of other international entities. It has an existence and a personality distinct from those 
of its rnembers. It has its own purposes.”  International Status of South-West Africa (Judge Álvarez, 
Dissenting Opinion), supra note 363, at 175. 
373 “all the peoples now understand that they are no longer isolated or bound only by the instruments 
which they have freely accepted, but that they are a part of a real society which is broader than the civil 
community to which they belong”, Dissenting Opinion by Judge Álvarez, Effect of awards of compensation 
made by the U.N. Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion of 13 July 1954, [1954] I.C.J. Reports 47, at 
69 (Judge Álvarez, Dissenting Opinion). 
374 “the old community of nations has been transformed into a veritable international society, though it has 
neither an executive power, nor a legislative power, nor yet a judicial power, which are the 
characteristics of a national society, but not of international society.” Admission of a State to the United 
Nations (Charter, Art. 4) [Judge Álvarez], supra note 362, at 68. 
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the most radical expression of the innate cosmopolitan model: a world collective 
that is self-aware and enjoys subjective interests, and is accordingly capable of 
actuating a primary normative potential under international law, but which does not 
exhibit or, for the time being, require any sophisticated political organization to 
enjoy that authority.  As of the time of Álvarez’s tenure on the bench of the ICJ, the 
Court would suffice to give expression to the new norms flowing from the innate 
cosmopolitan model. 
In representing an autonomous order absent other forms of government, the 
Court's unique competence with respect to international law is identical with a 
unique responsibility for international policy.  International law, following Álvarez, 
is no longer divisible from politics, as it once appeared to be: “La distinction 
traditionnelle entre le juridique et le politique, ainsi que celle entre le domaine du droit 
et celui de la politique, se trouvent aujourd'hui profondément modifiées”.375  Law and 
politics are merged for the purposes of an independent world society: 
Loin donc de s'opposer, comme autrefois, le droit et la politique sont 
aujourd'hui en relations étroites. Celle-ci n'est pas toujours la politique égoïste 
et abusive des Etats ; il y a aussi une politique collective ou individuelle 
inspirée de l'intérêt général. Cette politique exerce actuellement une influence 
profonde sur le droit des gens, soit en le confirmant, soit en le vivifiant, soit 
même en le contrariant quand il apparaît désuet.376 
In this changed normative environment, the Court bears a primary responsibility 
over law and politics together: “Pour que les principes de droit qui naissent de la 
conscience juridique des peuples aient de la valeur, il est nécessaire qu'ils aient une 
manifestation tangible, c'est-à-dire soient exprimés par des organes autorisés”;377 
and “La Cour est l'organe le plus autorisé pour exprimer cette conscience 
                                                                
375 “The traditional distinction between what is legal and what is political, and between law and politics, 
has to-day been profoundly modified”, Ibid., p.69. 
376 “Far therefore from being in opposition to each other, law and policy are to-day closely linked 
together. The latter is not always the selfish and arbitrary policy of States ; there is also a collective or 
individual policy inspired by the general interest. This policy now exercises a profound influence on 
international law ; it either confirms it or endows it with new life, or even opposes it if it appears out of 
date.” Ibid., p.70. 
377 “For the principles of law resulting from the juridical conscience of peoples to have any value, they 
must have a tangible manifestation, that is to say, they must be expressed by authorized bodies”, 
Individual Opinion of Judge Álvarez, Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway) [Judge Álvarez], supra 
note 371, p. 148. 
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juridique”.378  The distinction between politics and law is collapsed, empowering the 
Court to enact the policy of a unitary international society absent traditional 
legislative authorities: “Le droit d'interdépendance sociale n'oppose pas, comme on 
l'a fait jusqu'ici, le droit à la -politique ; au contraire, il admet qu'il existe des rapports 
étroits entre eux.”379  Herein, Álvarez from the bench of the ICJ anticipates the turn 
to policy that was observed in Chapter 2.  As custodian of the interdependent 
normative complex, the Court becomes its primary political agent, prefiguring the 
tendency under the innate cosmopolitan model to merge political and juridical 
authority under international law. 
There are, additionally, hints of a partial and particular constitutional doctrine in 
Judge Álvarez’s jurisprudence.  Certain new norms “ont un caractère universel ; elles 
sont, en quelque sorte, la Constitution de la société internationale, le Droit public 
international nouveau.”380  For the most part, however, what emerges is a vision of 
the ICJ as a broadly-powered, cosmopolitan magistrate.  It is the political 
representative of international society, its legislator and administrator as well as its 
adjudicator.  In the end, the pretension to an objective, autonomous normative 
order renders the Court responsible for the articulation of world politics and the 
administration of world policy. 
 
Cases involving the recourse to force 
Against the broadly visionary jurisprudence of Judge Álvarez, subsequent cases 
involving the use of force first demonstrate political constraints restricting the 
exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction.  Thereafter, a line of cases exhibits a return to 
and embrace of elements of the innate cosmopolitan scheme articulated by Judge 
Álvarez.  I turn to those cases now, looking at underlying facts as well as ultimate 
disposition, doing so one at a time and in chronological order, to capture an 
historical arc in the narrative of the Court’s exercise of its authority. 
                                                                
378 “The Court is the most authoritative organ for the expression of this juridical conscience”, 
Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4) [Judge Álvarez], supra note 362, at 69. 
379 “The law of social interdependence does not place law in opposition to politics, as has been done 
hitherto; on the contrary, it admits that there are close relations between them”.  Corfu Channel Case 
[Judge Álvarez], supra note 370, p. 41. 
380 Certain new norms “have a universal character; they are, in a sense, the Constitution of international 
society, the new international constitutional law”, Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory 
Opinion, 28 May 1951, [1951] I.C.J. Reports 15, at 51 (Judge Álvarez, Dissenting Opinion). 
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The tenor of the analysis of the following cases is substantially different from the 
tenor of the analysis of Judge Álvarez’s jurisprudence.  Judge Álvarez used each 
opinion that he penned towards an integrated treatment of his vision for a new 
international law, and the new role of the Court within it.  His jurisprudence as a 
whole was a radical and wide-ranging argument for a new system of international 
law conforming to the innate cosmopolitan model.  Outside of his opinions, 
however, the Court has not exhibited the same dedicated interest in elevating the 
innate cosmopolitan model.  Rather, the innate cosmopolitan model has been taken 
up by judges of the Court on an occasional basis, and applied to discrete ends in 
conjunction with the given case.  The Court and judges of the Court can be seen 
incrementally over time to reflect aspects of the innate cosmopolitan model in favor 
of ends that are less radical but which still establish some reliance on the innate 
cosmopolitan model as a grounds for normativity in international law. 
I look below at each case in which judges of the Court have had recourse to the 
innate cosmopolitan model, and will offer some description of the particulars of 
each case, to establish the context against which the judges offered their opinions.  
For reasons already noted, I will limit myself to those cases involving the recourse 
to force. 
 
The Corfu Channel case 
The ICJ got off  to a good start, in one sense, with its first case, The Corfu Channel 
Case, involving the recourse to force.  The Corfu Strait had been mined prior to the 
incidents of  the case.  On May 15, 1946, at a time of  tension between Greece and 
Albania, British warships passing through a channel swept of  mines were fired on 
by Albania without warning.  The UK thereafter pressed a right of  innocent 
passage, denied by Albania.  Subsequently, the UK in October of  1946 sent four 
battle-ready navy ships through the same channel, but with their guns at bay on 
orders to return fire only.  The UK ships were mined on Oct. 22, suffering casualties 
and damages.  The UK navy subsequently returned in numbers in November, 1946, 
to sweep the channel and collect evidence linking the fresh mines to Albania, 
following which it referred the matter to the Security Council, which in turn 
recommended the dispute be submitted to the ICJ.  In the proceedings before the 
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ICJ, both parties alleged violation of  international law in the acts of  the other.381 
In its ruling, the Court held that Albania had violated international law in the 
minings of  Oct, 1946; the Court further held that the UK had not violated 
international law in its passage in Oct, but had violated Albania’s sovereignty under 
international law by its minesweeping operation in Nov.  In defense of  its 
minesweeping operation, the UK had asserted a right to intervene in the Strait to 
protect an established right of  passage through Albania’s territory.  The Court 
rejected the argument for menace to the international order. 
The Court rejected the UK’s argument that it was entitled to mine-sweep in 
Albanian waters to protect an established right of  passage on the grounds that it 
constituted an intervention counter to the new international order: 
The Court can only regard the alleged right of  intervention as the 
manifestation of  a policy of  force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most 
serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in 
international organization, find a place in international law. Intervention is 
perhaps still less admissible in the particular form it would take here; for, 
from the nature of  things, it would be reserved for the most powerful States, 
and might easily lead to perverting the administration of  international justice 
itself.382 
The Court’s disapproval affirms the collective security apparatus of  the Charter, but 
does so without any real resort to cosmopolitan terms beyond a rough statement of  
international organization.  By contrast with its treatment of  the UK’s responsibility 
and arguments for defensive intervention, however, the Court’s language concerning 
the grounds of  Albania’s responsibility at law is less restrained.383  The passage is 
worth quoting at length: 
The obligations incumbent upon the Albanian authorities consisted in 
notifying, for the benefit of  shipping in general, the existence of  a minefield 
in Albanian territorial waters and in warning the approaching British warships 
of  the imminent danger to which the minefield exposed them. Such 
obligations are based, not on the Hague Convention of  1907, No. VIII, which 
is applicable in time of  war, but on certain general and well-recognized principles, 
                                                                
381 Sir Humphrey Waldock, The Regulation of  the Use of  Force By Individual States in International 
Law, Recueil des Cours, v. 81 (Paris: Académie de Droit International, 1952), p. 499. 
382 Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of  9 April 1949, [1949] I.C.J. Reports 4, at 35. 
383 The Court's treatment of  Albania's responsibility appears to draw from both the jus ad bellum and 
the jus in bello, though only the former is relevant here. 
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namely: elementary considerations of  humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war; 
the principle of  the freedom of  maritime communication; and every State's 
obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to 
the rights of  other States.384 
The Court’s first source of  law concerning Albania’s responsibility was neither treaty 
nor custom, but general principle.  Though general principles of  law are ostensibly 
available to the Court as a source of  law under Art. 38(1)(c) of  the Court’s Statute, 
which allows for application of  “the general principles of  law recognized by 
civilized nations”, the Court did not identify its use of  term “general principles” 
with that article, nor did the Court conform to the full language of  the clause.  
Though there is overlap, as noted in the Introduction to this book, between innate 
cosmopolitanism and some theories of  general principles as a source of  
international law, it is not clear that the Court is actually establishing any overlap 
here as a matter of  law.  In the context of  this judgment, however, there appears 
cosmopolitan potential to the reliance on general principles representative of  some 
presumptive moral or political unity.  Moreover, the appeal to principle anticipates 
similar – and similarly ambiguous – appeals to principle for innate cosmopolitan 
purposes in later opinions of  the Court.  Despite the pointed reference to 
elementary considerations of  humanity, however, the Corfu Channel Court’s judgment 
on the whole is largely forensic in its analysis, for the most part treating the use of  
force under the Charter rules basically in step with a defense of  sovereignty.  Judge 
Álvarez’s opinion, already treated in the discussion of  his jurisprudence, shows a 
substantially greater appeal to innate cosmopolitanism. 
 
Fisheries Jurisdiction 
Between the Corfu Channel case and the Fisheries Jurisdiction case the ICJ was not again 
confronted with the actual use of force (with the exception of a series of cases 
brought over aerial incidents in the 1950’s and ultimately abandoned for want of 
jurisdiction).  In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, Iceland attempted unilaterally to extend 
its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction to 50 nautical miles; the UK claimed the extension 
to be unlawful and pressed its own fishing rights in the disputed waters.  Both sides 
                                                                
384 Corfu Channel Case, supra note 382, p. 22 (emphasis added).  The italicized language was later cited 
with approval by Judge Jennings to explain his concurrence with one aspect of  the ICJ's judgment in 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of  America), Merits, 
Judgment of  27 June 1986, [1986] I.C.J. Reports 14, at 536 (Judge Jennings, Dissenting Opinion). 
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made a show of force to support their claims, and the situation was cleverly referred 
to as the Cod Wars. 
Iceland argued through public and diplomatic channels to have acted according to 
the Scientific Conservation of the Continental Shelf Fisheries Law of 1948, but 
denied the jurisdiction of the ICJ and made no appearance before the tribunal.  The 
ICJ found that it enjoyed jurisdiction on the basis of a 1961 compromissory 
agreement between the parties, and heard the case in Iceland’s absence.385  In the 
course of the dispute, Iceland’s coast guard several times fired on UK fishing 
trawlers, generally with blank cartridges, to which the UK responded by sending 
naval warships and tugboats into or around the disputed waters.  Iceland’s coast 
guard additionally cut the nets of UK fishing vessels, and there were multiple 
collisions between Icelandic and UK ships.  By the time of final pleadings, however, 
England had dropped all claims arising out of the use of force and violation of Art. 
2(4), and, of course, Iceland had not made any claims at all before the Court.  
Accordingly, the Court never took up the use of force in its judgment.  Additionally, 
none of the separate and dissenting opinions took up the use of force.  Judge 
Waldock made reference to Iceland’s enforcement measures, but only to 
demonstrate Iceland’s disregard for international obligations unrelated to 2(4).386 
Though the ICJ did not address the use of force as a question of law, the Court 
twice ordered the parties to respect one another’s claims peacefully pending the 
results of negotiation: once with an interim protective order in 1972, and once again 
with its final judgment in 1974.387  In both instances the Court was ignored; the 
dispute continued, with intermittent and even escalating violence, until Iceland 
threatened in 1976 to close a NATO base on the island, following which the UK 
dropped its claims to fishing rights in the contested waters. 
The absence of any cosmopolitan appeal should be noted here, at least in light of 
what will follow.  Despite directing the parties to resolve the dispute by peaceful 
negotiations, the Court made no pretence to any higher obligation bearing on the 
parties to do so, nor to any interests beyond the express commitments each party 
                                                                
385 Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment of 2 Feb. 1973, 
[1973] I.C.J. Reports 3. 
386 Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment of 25 July 1974, [1974] I.C.J. Reports 
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had joined in the nature of conventional international agreements.  Moreover, in 
ordering the parties to resolve the underlying dispute via negotiation, the Court 
appears to have ceded its role as a chamber for dispute resolution.  That concession 
reinforces the absence of any cosmopolitan normative responsibility bearing on the 
Court – especially as in keeping with the comparatively vast powers and 
responsibilities for the Court according to Judge Álvarez – and reflects as well the 
absence of any cosmopolitan responsibility applicable to the parties.  The Court 
effectively failed to demonstrate any authority controlling the contentious situation 
underlying the case.  As such, the case is instructive with respect to the 
controversies that arise in adjudicating under international law situations involving 
the use of force, and difficulties that the Court has faced accordingly.  Iceland had 
publicly defended itself according to necessity and sovereign right, and never 
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, instead disregarding the process and the 
Court entirely.  The UK then followed suit by disregarding Court orders as well, 
such as orders to refrain from aggravating the matter by unilateral enforcement of 
its claims.  Both parties resorted to measures of forcible self-help, contrary to orders 
of the Court.  Ultimately, the matter was resolved by political machinations, namely, 
Iceland’s threat to close the NATO base on its island. 
 
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 
The use of force again came before the Court in the Tehran Hostages case, arising out 
of the taking of the US embassy in Tehran in 1979.  In its application to the Court, 
the US alleged, in addition to breaches of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations and related treaties, a breach of Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter.  In its 
subsequent Memorial, however, the US removed reference to 2(4), claiming only 
breaches of the applicable rules governing diplomatic relations.  Iran did not appear 
before the Court, claiming by letter, similar to Iceland in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, 
that the matter was “essentially and directly a matter within the national sovereignty 
of Iran”, and that the case was not justiciable without examining “the whole political 
dossier of the relations between Iran and the United States over the last 25 years.”388  
The Court dismissed Iran’s assertion of exclusive sovereign prerogative in a 
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[1980] I.C.J. Reports 3, at 8-9. 
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preliminary ruling, finding the case manifestly a matter of international 
jurisdiction.389  The ICJ then disposed of the political argument, holding: 
never has the view been put forward before that, because a legal dispute 
submitted to the Court is only one aspect of a political dispute, the Court 
should decline to resolve for the parties the legal questions at issue between 
them. Nor can any basis for such a view of the Court's functions or 
jurisdiction be found in the Charter or the Statute of the Court; ; if the Court 
were, contrary to its settled jurisprudence, to adopt such a view, it would 
impose a far-reaching and unwarranted restriction upon the role of the Court 
in the peaceful solution of international disputes.390 
Without taking up Arts. 2(4) or 51, the Court characterized the taking of the 
embassy as an “armed attack” ultimately attributable to the state.391  Though steeped 
in the language of use of force, the judgment nowhere takes up any substantial issue 
of use of force law.  Rather, the judgment remains largely within the questions 
before the Court concerning diplomatic and consular law, except for an excursion 
into human rights law, holding: 
Wrongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and to subject them to 
physical constraint in conditions of hardship is in itself manifestly 
incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well 
as with the fundamental principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.392 
Questions of human rights law under the Charter and Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights were not before the Court any more than were questions of the 
resort to force.  In fact, the human rights law that the Court addresses was not 
raised in either the Application or Memorial by the US, whereas use of force law 
under the Charter had been raised in the Application of the US, though dropped 
from the Memorial.  Nonetheless, the Court offered no similar digression into the 
law on the resort to force, reinforcing the Court’s reluctance in that area. 
The Court did, however, indicate its disapproval of a rescue operation begun and 
aborted by the US during the same time period in which the Court was deliberating 
on its judgment in the case.  Though the Court recognized that “neither the 
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question of the legality of the operation of 24 April 1980, under the Charter of the 
United Nations and under general international law, nor any possible question of 
responsibility flowing from it, is before the Court”, the Court nonetheless found 
that the rescue operation was “of a kind calculated to undermine respect for the 
judicial process in international relations”.393  Moreover, in a preliminary order, the 
Court had directed both parties to refrain from aggravating conduct; neither party 
held to the order.394  The final order of the Court, directing Iran “immediately” to 
“take all steps to redress the situation”, including the release of the hostages and 
reparations for injuries caused, was also ignored.395 
In its judgment, the Court did make appeal to higher interests of international law, 
but only with respect to the deep-rooted nature of diplomatic and consular law 
internationally, rather than to any broader normative mandate.396  The case, then, 
bears meaningful similarities with the Fisheries Jurisdiction case.  The Court again 
faced an incident involving the use of force, which did not arise as a question of law 
in the Court’s judgment; again the Court failed to see both parties appear before it; 
and again the Court failed to see what orders it issued in the case observed.  Under 
these constraints, the allowance for any viable normative cosmopolitanism seems 
strained at best. 
 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
The next case involving the use of force was Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua.  In that case, Nicaragua put questions of the law of use of force 
squarely before the Court, founding its Application on the illegal use of force by the 
US, and maintaining its complaint over the use of force throughout the case.  Judge 
Schwebel, in his dissent to the preliminary judgment in favour of jurisdiction, 
captured the significance of Nicaragua’s Application: 
The Application in this case is without precedent in the history of the 
International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of International 
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Justice. It is unprecedented in its substance, because never before has a State 
come to the Court requesting it to adjudge and declare that another State has 
the duty to cease and desist immediately from the use of force against it.397 
Nicaragua claimed that the US had, among other things, illegally intervened against 
Nicaragua’s territorial and political independence by instigating and directing the 
armed resistance by the Contra rebels to the then-governing Sandinista government, 
including Contra manoeuvres and preparations in El Salvador and Honduras, and in 
addition claimed more direct acts such as mining and overflights.  The US claimed 
that its support for the Contras, including related activities in El Salvador or 
Honduras, constituted acts of collective self-defense, and counter-claimed that 
Nicaragua had illegally intervened against El Salvador and Honduras by supporting 
armed resistance movements and destabilizing their respective governments. 
The US participated in the proceedings to contest the Court’s jurisdiction.  After the 
Court’s preliminary judgment in favour of jurisdiction, however, the US withdrew 
from the process, refusing to appear before the Court to argue the merits, and 
recalling the failure of Iceland and Iran to appear before the Court in matters 
concerning the international use of force.  Also as with the Fisheries Jurisdiction and 
Tehran Hostages cases, the Court's final order was largely ignored.  Among other 
things, the Court awarded a money judgment against the US, in favor of Nicaragua, 
that was never paid.  The US blocked Nicaragua’s attempts at enforcement of the 
judgment in the Security Council for years, until, in 1991, following regime change, 
Nicaragua withdrew the case and ceased claims for the outstanding award. 
Among other things, the US had put forward arguments that the Court was the 
inappropriate organ under the Charter to treat ongoing issues of the use of force, 
and argued that the matter before the Court basically was not justiciable under 
international law.  Regarding both contentions, the Nicaragua Court referred to the 
Tehran Hostages judgment for its bearing on jurisdiction over the use of force.  Where 
the US had argued that only the Security Council was empowered to rule with 
respect to the use of force and matters of international peace and security generally, 
particularly in cases where the Security Council had pronounced on the issue or was 
deliberating over it, the Nicaragua Court pointed out that the Tehran Hostages Court 
was not impeded by simultaneous deliberation of the underlying situation in that 
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case by the Security Council.398  And where the US argued that a matter of ongoing 
use of force was generally non-justiciable under international law, the Court referred 
to the Tehran Hostages Case alongside the Corfu Channel case to establish its own 
competence to hear the controversy and rule according to applicable law.399 
Unlike the Tehran Hostages and Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, the questions of law before 
the Court in Nicaragua went directly to the resort to force, and were not withdrawn 
in favour of other claims.  The Court confronted the resort to force squarely, and 
even aggressively in sustaining jurisdiction over the matter despite weakness in the 
positive law grounding.  Briefly, the Charter was ultimately found inapplicable by 
virtue of a US reservation to the Court’s jurisdiction insisting, in case of a claim 
founded on a multi-lateral treaty, that all parties potentially affected by judgment on 
the claim be present before the Court: both El Salvador and Honduras, parties to 
the Charter but not the proceedings, would have been affected by resolution of the 
Charter questions concerning Arts. 2(4) and 51; thus the Court found that it had no 
jurisdiction over the US with respect to those articles.400 
The ICJ instead found the prohibition on the use of force to constitute customary 
law.  In brief, the prohibition flows from and expresses a “fundamental principle”, 
reflecting recognition of the prohibition of the use of force in the conduct of 
international relations.  Recognition of the fundamental principle is effectively 
certified by the Charter, and carries with it, a fortiori, the acknowledgment of a 
customary norm as well.  The Court describes fundamental principle as a special 
category of customary law: Art. 2(4) is “not only a principle of customary 
international law but also a fundamental or cardinal principle of such law.”401  The 
Court’s resort to a premise of fundamental principle, insofar as it is not identical 
with an appeal to general principle in accordance with Art. 38(1)(c) under the 
Court’s statute – and the Court gives no indication that it is – suggests an effort to 
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elevate principle where positive law might otherwise be unavailing or unavailable as 
a grounds of decision, as in the present case.  As noted in the discussion of the Corfu 
Channel Case, the interplay of general principles under Art. 38(1)(c) with innate 
cosmopolitanism was considered in Chapter 1 of this work.  In Nicaragua, the 
Court’s affirmation of principle suggests a generally-applicable international norm 
derived from abstractions, rather than more traditional, positive manifestations of 
customary or conventional rules.  Though couched by the Court within the doctrine 
of customary law, fundamental principle looks more like a distinct source of 
international law, neither conventional nor conforming to the rules for identifying 
customary law.  The appeal to fundamental principle in this context suggests a 
distinctly innate cosmopolitan means of satisfying some attribute or interest 
identified with the world as a whole, one not adequately provided for in positive 
international law.  Likewise, the resort to fundamental principle also appears to 
satisfy the custodial role suggested by Judge Álvarez in his series of opinions. 
The Court’s discussion of fundamental principle, however, is limited.  On the 
whole, the Nicaragua judgment does not devote considerable attention or energy to 
innate cosmopolitan terms.  The decision itself affirms norms of non-intervention, 
and by and large supports the independence of sovereign states.  Nonetheless, taken 
in historical context, the Nicaragua Court's invocation of fundamental principle to 
help establish jurisdiction over the international use of force – where previously the 
use of force defied jurisdiction even where it might have been ripe for treatment – 
suggests at least a small but pertinent (and not uncontroversial) expansion of the 
rule of international law. 
Moreover, in finding the prohibition on the use of force to be fundamental 
principle, the Court quotes approvingly from references to jus cogens: 
The international Law Commission, in the course of its work on the 
codification of the law of treaties, expressed the view that “the law of the 
Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a 
conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the character of jus 
cogens”.  Nicaragua in its Memorial on the Merits … states that the principle 
prohibiting the use of force embodied in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the 
Charter … “has come to be recognized as jus cogens”.  The United States, in its 
Counter-Memorial … found it material to quote the view of scholars that this 
principle is a “universal norm”,… and a “principle of jus cogens”.402 
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Though the Court does not expressly find the 2(4) rule to constitute a peremptory 
norm, its approving reference to the possibility invites speculation.  The Court has 
created a special category of customary law, and uses it to establish the possibility of 
a peremptory normative status.  Thus the Court raises the possibility that an abstract 
commitment to communal good is normatively privileged above any contrary 
expression of raison d'état (short of another peremptory norm achieved among states 
according to their will).  Though speculative, the argument demonstrates 
sympathetic treatment of a cosmopolitan potential for international law. 
While the Court's invocation of fundamental principle and peremptory norms 
touches speculatively on a cosmopolitan norm controlling the use of force, the 
separate opinions and dissents more vigorously revive a reconsideration of the role 
of the Court, including its mission or mandate and its powers, squarely raising more 
cosmopolitan issues.  The separate opinion of Judge Singh, for example, 
understands the mandate of the Court in terms of “a major opportunity to state the 
law so as to serve the best interests of the community. The Court as the principal 
judicial organ of the United Nations has to promote peace, and cannot refrain from 
moving in that direction.”403  In keeping with the innate cosmopolitan model, there 
exists an international community with interests of its own, and those interests begin 
with peace and public order.  Moreover, the Court is tasked with promoting the 
values of the community as opportunity allows, which would appear to exceed an 
adjudicatory mandate limited to those rules consented to between the parties before 
the Court. 
Judge Lachs, by contrast, posits a different role for the Court in his separate 
opinion: “The Court's primary task is to ascertain the law, and to leave no doubt as 
to its meaning.”404  The Court’s task arises from the reality that “the world we live in 
is one where certain notions, though part of the vocabulary of law, continue to be 
controlled by subjective evaluations.”405 
The competing visions of Singh and Lachs for the Court are meaningful for the 
different systemic propositions they represent, which difference will come up again 
in later opinions from subsequent cases.  Judge Singh suggests a Court tasked to 
                                                                
403 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, 
Judgment of 27 June 1986, [1986] I.C.J. Reports 14, at 153 [Judge Singh]. 
404 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, 
Judgment of 27 June 1986, [1986] I.C.J. Reports 14, at 168 [Judge Lachs]. 
405 Ibid., p. 168. 
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prosecute a clear mandate founded in a common good, understood according to the 
“best interests of the community”.  Judge Lachs, on the other hand, draws a classic 
picture of the Court in more neutral terms, with a special mandate for dispute 
resolution, according to which the Court overcomes subjective pretensions by 
objectively determining the legal rule to be applied. 
Judge Lachs describes an apparently neutral court, one charged with fealty to the 
law as it exists, whatever it might be.  Judge Singh, by contrast, describes a more 
clearly innate cosmopolitan institution: a court charged in the name of the 
community to promote peace and best interests, which calls for more than 
ascertaining the law: it involves knowing what is in the best interests of the 
community, and using the power of the court  “so as to serve” them.  For both, 
however, the authority of the Court, in its area of competence, is paramount over 
the subjective interests and claims of the parties that may appear before it.  In that 
sense, both suggest a basically cosmopolitan institution, bound to give expression to 
objective normative authority in a consolidated international system, as against the 
subjective parties that will appear before the Court.  
Judge Oda, in his dissent, draws a contrast with the cosmopolitanism represented by 
Judges Singh and Lachs.  Judge Oda suggests, in keeping with the nature of 
voluntarily-accepted jurisdiction, that the dispute before the Court in Nicaragua was 
not necessarily a legal dispute within the meaning of Art. 36(b) of the ICJ Statute.  
Rather, Judge Oda acknowledged the argument by the US that the dispute was “‘not 
susceptible of decision by the application of the principles of law’ – or, in other 
words, that the sense of ‘legal dispute’ had not evolved so far as to embrace the 
subject-matter of the application.”406  International law, Judge Oda suggests, could 
not cure the subjective dispute before the Court; there was no objective ground for 
resolution.  His opinion shows sensitivity to the limitations of a legal system 
founded on consent,407 and suggests that the international law did not – or not yet – 
support a cosmopolitan treatment of the use of force. 
As against the three, the Court's opinion can be seen as a mix of considerations 
raised by Judges Singh and Lachs, and a rejection of Judge Oda's denial of objective 
authority.  The Court, à la Judge Lachs, grounded its decision in terms of the 
                                                                
406 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, 
Judgment of 27 June 1986, [1986] I.C.J. Reports 14, at 236 (Judge Oda, Dissenting Opinion). 
407 Thus, he explains: “It must be added that the Court should not allow any sentiment that States 
ought to accept its jurisdiction to affect its perception of the voluntary nature of such acceptance or its 
caution not to overstep the limits of individual acts of acceptance. ”  Ibid., p. 238. 
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available law, rather than any primary obligation to a communal mandate.  But in 
doing so, the Court’s references to fundamental principles and peremptory norms 
suggest a tacit acknowledgment that it was obliged to step outside of the narrow 
rules at its disposal, appealing instead to the innate cosmopolitan model to 
pronounce on an objective norm not otherwise or expressly agreed to in advance by 
both parties.  In any event, the Court rejected the argument that the intensity of the 
subjective interests implicated in the case rendered it non-justiciable. 
 
Lockerbie 
The Lockerbie case is worth raising here, though the case was withdrawn pursuant to 
negotiations among the parties, and the Court was stopped short of ruling on the  
merits.  The case arose out of the bombing of Pan Am flight 107 over Lockerbie, 
Scotland, and the subsequent demand by the US and UK (as well as France) that 
Libya transfer suspects in the case from Libya to the US or UK.  Libya applied to 
the ICJ on the grounds that the demands constituted a use of force against Libya 
and were illegal under the Montreal Convention of 23 September 1971 for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (the Montreal 
Convention).  Following Libya’s application to the ICJ, the Security Council ordered 
measures against Libya, with resolutions 748 and 883, to effect the transfer of the 
suspects.  In its Memorial before the Court, Libya argued that the pressures applied 
against Libya were “at variance with the principles of the United Nations Charter 
and with the mandatory rules of general international law prohibiting the use of 
force and the violation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, sovereign equality and 
political independence of States."408 
At the preliminary stage, the US argued, among other things, that the Security 
Council resolutions imposing sanctions left Libya without remedy: “Libya's claims 
have become moot because Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) 
have rendered them without object; any judgment which the Court might deliver on 
the said claims would thenceforth be devoid of practical purpose.”409  Thus, even if 
the Court found the original measures illegal under the Montreal Convention, they 
would remain legal under the subsequent Security Council resolutions.  The UK 
                                                                
408 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 27 February 1998, [1998] I.C.J. Reports 115, at 120. 
409 Ibid., p. 131. 
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argued, separately, that, by virtue of the Security Council resolutions, “the relief 
which Libya seeks from the Court under the Montreal Convention is not open to it, 
and that the Court should therefore exercise its power to declare the Libyan 
Application inadmissible”.410  In all of their arguments, the US and UK employed a 
simple logic: if the authority of the Security Council was not at stake, the measures 
ordered could not be overturned, and if the measures pressuring Libya could not be 
overturned, the Court did not need to go to the merits under the Charter or 
Montreal Convention to try the case.411 
The Court rejected the arguments of the US and UK under its rules of procedure as 
not strictly preliminary in character, and as more appropriate to an argument on the 
merits.412  Because proceeding on the merits meant that the Court, as a preliminary 
matter, did not hold itself precluded by Security Council action, scholars and 
observers anticipated a judgment that might assert ICJ review over the legality of 
Security Council actions.  In this vein, Judges Bedjaoui, Ranjeva and Koroma, 
concurring in the Court’s judgment, wrote separately and briefly to emphasize their 
approval of preserving “débat judiciaire au sujet des décisions du Conseil”.413 
Such a judgment (or “débat judiciaire”) would have effectuated a capacity for 
judicial review similar to the capacity famously asserted by the US Supreme Court in 
Marbury v. Madison under the American constitutional system.414  Thus the nature of 
the Court’s preliminary judgment raises the possibility of a new exercise of the 
Court’s authority, one typically associated with judicial powers under a constitutional 
division of government.  Division of government suggests an ordered political 
organization.  A potential assertion by the Court of authority under a constitutional 
or quasi-constitutional system of divided powers corresponds on its face with 
constitutional cosmopolitanism.  But ordered political organization, absent any 
formal or discrete constitutional settlement, also suggests the innate cosmopolitan 
model, insofar as the Court would have been obliged to assume powers over the 
Security Council on the basis of a latent world political organization and the 
                                                                
410 Ibid., p. 124. 
411 Ibid., p. 134. 
412 Ibid., pp. 133-34. 
413 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 27 February 1998, [1998] I.C.J. Reports 115, at 138 
(Judges Bedjaoui, Ranjeva and Koroma, Joint Declaration). 
414 See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The “Powers of Appreciation”: Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of UN 
Legality?, 86 Am. J. Int’l L. 519 (1992). 
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objective normativity it might represent. 415  Once again, the distinction between a 
constitution and proto-constitutional phenomena underscores the distinction.  Had 
the Court ultimately exercised power according to the recognition of a constitutional 
order, the Court would have affirmed the constitutional cosmopolitan argument – 
especially Charter constitutionalism – thereby signaling its approbation of a formal 
constitutional achievement capable of establishing a cosmopolitan community under 
law.  Had the Court, on the other hand, assumed constitutional powers without 
recognizing an express constitutional mandate, the Court would be leveraging the 
presumption of a constituted body politic in whose interest the Court might rule 
even absent formal constitutional legitimation.  The latter reflects the innate 
cosmopolitan pretension to autonomous authority absent positive law grounds. 
 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
In its Advisory Opinion in The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclears Weapons, the 
Court treated the question before it according to two different legal regimes, 
namely, jus ad bellum and humanitarian law.  As a matter of jus ad bellum, the Court 
found the legality of nuclear weapons to depend “upon whether the particular use 
of force envisaged would be directed against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of a State, or against the Purposes of the United Nations or whether, 
                                                                
415 Moreover, the cosmopolitan potential thickens in light of arguments about ICJ authority and 
peremptory norms raised in the context of Lockerbie.  Alexander Orakhelashvili, reflecting on the 
Lockerbie case, and drawing on Nicaragua before it, would hold the Security Council additionally 
accountable before the ICJ to peremptory norms of international law, foremost among them the 
prohibition on the use of force.  (Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the 
Interpretation and Application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 16 European J of Int’l 
Law at 60, 63, 81 (2005).)  The argument suggests that there exists a normative authority governing the 
use of force that supersedes the Chapter VII authority of the Security Council and even the 
conventional (and consensual) law-making powers of the member states of the UN – a fixed norm of 
world public order that adheres beyond all discretionary political authority.  Thus another 
commentator writes: “The SC may derogate from treaty standards and customary international law in 
the exercise of its discretionary power but, as an organ of an international organization, it is bound by 
international law and limited by the absolute norms that are not at the disposition of the UN Member 
States vesting the Council with its powers.”  (Lutz Oette, Peace And Justice, or Neither? The 
Repercussions of the Al-Bashir Case for International Criminal Justice in Africa and Beyond, 8 J. Int'l 
Crim. Just. 345, 352 (2010).)  The argument from jus cogens suggests that the Court is empowered by 
and responsible for world norms that are independent of and superior to all world actors, making the 
Court the preeminent actor in an autonomous and superior world normative order. 
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in the event that it were intended as a means of defence, it would necessarily violate 
the principles of necessity and proportionality.”416 
In the context of humanitarian law, the Court went farther: 
It is undoubtedly because a great many rules of humanitarian law applicable 
in armed conflict are so fundamental to the respect of the human person 
and "elementary considerations of humanity" ... that the Hague and Geneva 
Conventions have enjoyed a broad accession. Further these fundamental 
rules are to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the 
conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible 
principles of international customary law.417 
From that reasoning, the Court found that: “methods and means of warfare, which 
would preclude any distinction between civilian and military targets, or which would 
result in unnecessary suffering to combatants, are prohibited. In view of the unique 
characteristics of nuclear weapons, to which the Court has referred above, the use 
of such weapons in fact seems scarcely reconcilable with respect for such 
requirements.”418 
In its dispositif, however, the Court declined to hold nuclear weapons necessarily 
illegal under otherwise “intransgressible” humanitarian law.  Instead, the Court 
deferred to states' fundamental – and apparently inalienable – subjective interest in 
self-defense, holding that “the Court cannot lose sight of the fundamental right of 
every State to survival, and thus its right to resort to self-defence, in accordance with 
Article 51 of the Charter when its survival is at stake.”419 
The Court's dicta under humanitarian law attains to a liberal cosmopolitan normative 
posture for its statement, derived from the nature of humanity, of equal and 
paramount concern under international law for all human beings.  But the Court 
then meets that norm with a fundamental right to sovereign self-preservation and 
survival of the state.  The Court’s awkward negative resolution – or non-resolution 
– of the conflict between the two underscores a deep normative ambivalence, an 
unstoppable normative force meeting an immovable normative object.  On the one 
hand, there is the acknowledgment of an interest in an objective value beyond the 
                                                                
416 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, [1996] I.C.J. Reports 
226, at 247. 
417 Ibid., p. 257. 
418 Ibid., p. 262. 
419 Ibid., p. 263. 
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will of states; on the other, there is an inherited normative foundation in the state as 
the ultimate unit of value in a subjective international system.  The latter continues 
to check the former in the opinion of the Court, rendering the question of nuclear 
weapons effectively non-justiciable – not unlike the ruling proposed by Judge Oda 
in his dissent in Nicaragua. 
Select separate opinions took pains to elevate the illegality of nuclear weapons above 
the contingencies of self-defense, despite the ambiguity in the Court's judgment.  
Judge Koroma, in his dissenting opinion in favour of holding the use or threat of 
nuclear weapons illegal under all circumstances, touches on a theme that runs 
throughout the attached opinions embracing the Court's jurisdiction, and echoes the 
separate opinions of both Judge Singh and Judge Lachs in Nicaragua: 
the prevention of war, by the use of nuclear weapons, is a matter for 
international law and, if the Court is requested to determine such an issue, it 
falls within its competence to do so. Its decision can contribute to the 
prevention of war by ensuring respect for the law. The Court in the Corfu 
Channel case described as its function the need to "ensure respect for 
international law, of which it is the organ".420 
The institution of international law itself represents interests the defense of which 
ostensibly falls within the ambit of the Court’s juridical responsibility.  Likewise, the 
possibility to contribute to the prevention of war becomes grounds for issuing a 
decision.  Each suggests a sort of custodial responsibility vested in the Court, in line 
with the custodial role adumbrated in Judge Álvarez’s jurisprudence. 
Other opinions recall still more of Judge Álvarez's opinions.  Pres. Bedjaoui, 
confronting the tension in the Court's opinion, initially frames it as a conflict of 
moral and legal norms: “Le drame de conscience auquel les uns et les autres ont été 
confrontés se reflète à bien des égards dans le présent avis. Mais la Cour ne pouvait 
à l'évidence pas aller au-delà de ce que dit le droit. Elle ne pouvait pas dire ce que 
celui-ci ne dit pas.”421  In his declaration, however, Pres. Bedjaoui insists that the 
balance of the Court’s judgment does not tip in favor of a potential use of nuclear 
weapons; he makes this clear in vividly cosmopolitan language, including a 
                                                                
420 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, [1996] I.C.J. Reports 
226, at 557 (Judge Koroma, Dissenting Opinion). 
421 “The moral dilemma which confronted individual consciences finds many a reflection in this 
Opinion. But the Court could obviously not go beyond what the law says. It could not say what the 
law does not say.” Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, [1996] 
I.C.J. Reports 226, at 270 [Judge Bedjaoui]. 
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psychological assessment of the human condition, not unlike Judge Álvarez's 
description of a world psychology with normative repercussions.  Moreover, in his 
treatment of what the law says, Pres. Bedjaoui stresses the changed circumstances of 
international conduct in a globalized world, much as Judge Álvarez emphasized 
changed law for a new regime of interdependence.  Thus, just as Judge Álvarez 
diminished the importance of sovereignty and was dismissive of traditional 
international law insofar as it was constrained by the same, Pres. Bedjaoui seeks to 
minimize the contemporary import of the classic statement of sovereign right in the 
Lotus case: 
La décision en question exprimait sans aucun doute l'air du temps, celui d'une 
société internationale encore très peu institutionnalisée et régie par un droit 
international de stricte coexistence, lui-même reflet de la vigueur du principe 
de la souveraineté de I'Etat….  Il est à peine besoin de souligner que la 
physionomie de la société internationale contemporaine est sensiblement 
différente.422 
From there, Pres. Bedjaoui touches on a number of familiar ideas and principles, 
worth reciting: 
[O]n ne saurait nier les progrès enregistrés au niveau de l'institutionnalisation, 
voire de l'intégration et de la ((mondialisation)), de la société internationale. 
On en verra pour preuve la multiplication des organisations internationales, la 
substitution progressive d'un droit international de coopération au droit 
international classique de la coexistence, l'émergence du concept de 
((communauté internationale)) et les tentatives parfois couronnées de succès 
de subjectivisation de cette dernière. De tout cela, on peut trouver le 
témoignage dans la place que le droit international accorde désormais à des 
concepts tels que celui d'obligations erga omnes, de règles de jus cogens ou de 
patrimoine commun de l'humanité. A l'approche résolument positiviste, 
volontariste du droit international qui prévalait encore au début du siècle - et 
à laquelle la Cour permanente n'a d'ailleurs pas manqué d'apporter son 
soutien dans l'arrêt susmentionné - s'est substituée une conception objective 
du droit international, ce dernier se voulant plus volontiers le reflet d'un état 
                                                                
422 “No doubt [the Lotus] decision expressed the spirit of the times, the spirit of an international society 
which as yet had few institutions and was governed by an international law of strict co- existence, itself 
a reflection of the vigour of the principle of State sovereignty....  It scarcely needs to be said that the 
face of contemporary international society is markedly altered.” Ibid., pp. 270-71. 
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de conscience juridique collective et une réponse aux nécessités sociales des 
Etats organisés en communauté.423 
The passage makes clear appeal to aspects of the innate cosmopolitan model.  The 
international community has successfully been ‘subjectivized’, giving rise to 
objective norms under international law reflecting the juridical conscience of the 
world and responsive to the social necessities of the subjectivized world collective.  
Elsewhere, Pres. Bedjaoui reinforces the cosmopolitan tone of his declaration in 
general by reference to unifying terms and phenomena including “la condition 
humaine”, “la première nature de l'homme”, “la situation de l'homme”, “son destin”, 
“sa conscience” and “ses coordonnées éthiques”.424 
Thus the international community, following Pres. Bedjaoui, has achieved, at least in 
part, the status of its own subjective community, autonomous of the subjective will 
of states, and thereby recalls the innate cosmopolitan method, and develops on its 
recognition of a subjective international community with a collective juridical 
conscience.  The objective conception of international law that Judge Bedjaoui 
proposes includes those norms responsive to social necessities and moral dilemmas 
appropriate for resolution in accordance with the realities of a unitary world 
phenomenon, rather than subjective international custom and convention.  
Throughout, Judge Bedjaoui’s declaration approximates in brief the jurisprudence of 
Judge Álvarez, as well as the scholarship of other figures identified in Chapter 2, 
including Hudson, Lansing and Madariaga. 
Pres. Bedjaoui was not the only Judge to recall innate cosmopolitan theory, and 
particularly the views of Judge Álvarez.  Judge Shahabuddeen, in his dissent, makes 
express reference to Judge Álvarez's opinions in the Corfu Channel and Conditions of 
                                                                
423 “[T]he progress made in terms of the institutionalization, not to say integration and "globalization", 
of international society is undeniable. Witness the proliferation of international organizations, the 
gradual substitution of an international law of co-operation for the traditional international law of co-
existence, the emergence of the concept of "international community" and its sometimes successful 
attempts at subjectivization. A token of all these developments is the place which international law 
now accords to concepts such as obligations erga omnes, rules of jus cogens, or the common heritage of 
mankind. The resolutely positivist, voluntarist approach of international law still current at the 
beginning of the century – and which the Permanent Court did not fail to endorse in the 
aforementioned Judgment – has been replaced by an objective conception of international law, a law 
more readily seeking to reflect a collective juridical conscience and respond to the social necessities of 
States organized as a community.” Ibid., p. 271. 
424 Ibid., pp. 268, 271 (emphasis in original). 
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Admission cases.425  Moreover, Judge Shahabuddeen finds credence for Judge 
Álvarez's new international law, founded in interdependence, in the work of other 
prominent jurists.  His analysis is also worth quoting at length: 
[T]he previous stress on the individual sovereignty of each State considered 
as hortus conclusus has been inclining before a new awareness of the 
responsibility of each State as a member of a more cohesive and 
comprehensive system based on co-operation and interdependence. 
These new developments have in part been consecrated by the Charter, in 
part set in motion by it. Their effect and direction were noticed by Judge 
Álvarez (Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United 
Nations (Article 4 of Charter), 1948, I.C.J. Reports 1947-1948, p. 68, 
separate opinion). Doubts about his plea for a new international law did not 
obscure the fact that he was not alone in his central theme. Other judges 
observed that it was "an undeniable fact that the tendency of all 
international activities in recent times has been towards the promotion of 
the common welfare of the international community with a corresponding 
restriction of the sovereign power of individual States" (Reservations to the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 46, joint dissenting opinion of Judges Guerrero, Sir 
Arnold McNair, Read and Hsu Mo). 
Though elsewhere critical of "the theory which reduces the rights of States 
to competences assigned and portioned by international law”, Judge De 
Visscher, for his part, observed that "[t]he Charter has created an 
international system", and added: "[I]n the interpretation of a great 
international constitutional instrument, like the United Nations Charter, the 
individualistic concepts which are generally adequate in the interpretation of 
ordinary treaties, do not suffice." (International Status of South West 
Africa, I. C.J. Reports 1950, p. 189, dissenting opinion.) The Charter did 
not, of course, establish anything like world government; but it did organize 
international relations on the basis of an "international system" ....426 
Thus Judge Shahabuddeen recognizes a “cohesive and comprehensive system” 
based in part on interdependence.  The passage reflects that area of cosmopolitan 
thought where innate and constitutional cosmopolitanism overlap.  In part, the 
Charter “consecrates” a pre-existing interdependent phenomenon and is a mere 
                                                                
425 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, [1996] I.C.J. Reports 
226, at 394, 407 (Judge Shahabuddeen, Dissenting Opinion). 
426 Ibid., pp. 394-95. 
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vehicle for its normative expression; in part, the Charter is the impetus for its 
development. 
Judge Shahabuddeen further affirms an undifferentiated world “public conscience”, 
borrowed from the Martens Clause in the preamble of Hague II, as a global 
presumption by which to measure the particular will of states: 
T]he Court could reasonably find that the public conscience considers that 
the use of nuclear weapons causes suffering which is unacceptable whatever 
might be the military advantage derivable from such use. On the basis of 
such a finding, the Court would be entitled, in determining what in turn is 
the judgment of States on the point, to proceed on the basis of a 
presumption that the judgment of States would not differ from that made 
by the public conscience.427 
The argument presents a relatively new use of the innate cosmopolitan model.  The 
state, as an actor in international law, apparently remains the law-making entity.  
Now, however, the expression of international law by states will be presumed to 
conform with the interests and will associated with the public conscience of the 
world, barring express conflict.  The innate cosmopolitan phenomenon becomes a 
constraint on the law-making prerogative of states, and a principle of interpretation 
by which the Court is able to give effect to the normativity of the world as a whole. 
It remains to find the means by which to ascertain the public conscience of the 
world.  Echoing Judge Álvarez's partial reliance on the General Assembly for the 
articulation of world norms, Judge Shahabuddeen turns to the same: 
The standard being one which is set by the public conscience, a number of 
pertinent matters in the public domain may be judicially noticed. …  
Among these there is the General Assembly. … Whatever may be the 
position as regards the possible law-making effects or influence of General 
Assembly resolutions, the Court would be correct in giving weight to the 
Assembly's finding on the point of fact as to the state of "human 
conscience and reason" on the subject of the acceptability of the use of 
nuclear weapons ....428 
In sum, state will as the source of international law is formally retained, but 
subjugated to the will of the world public, however it may be represented or 
expressed, such that the public conscience as comprehended by the Court dictates 
                                                                
427 Ibid., p. 403. 
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how to interpret the will of states.  Again, there is at least a germ of constitutional 
theory alongside the innate cosmopolitan argument, though in this case the appeal 
to constitutional principle is an attenuated one, and the innate cosmopolitan model 
takes precedence: the world public conscience exists, and the system of international 
law has been constituted in such a way as to give legal form to the norms for which 
the world public conscience calls. 
Judge Ranjeva, in his separate opinion shares an attention to moral norms with 
Judge Bedjaoui.  In doing so, he also shares aspects of Judge Shahabuddeen's 
method: orthodox, positive law tenets of international law are not overthrown; 
rather, they are harnessed to a different normative mandate.  For Judge 
Shahabuddeen that separate, constraining normative mandate was represented by 
the world public conscience, such that state will would be interpreted in the first 
instance to be in accord with the will of the world.  Judge Ranjeva also preserves 
conventional and consensual sources of international law, but subjects them to 
other moral requirements: the law, following Judge Ranjeva, incorporates ‘un 
minimum d’exigences éthiques’ expressive of the values of ‘les membres de la 
communauté dans leur ensemble’, representative of ‘les grandes causes de 
l’humnaité’, undivided.429  Judge Ranjeva identifies the world collective, coextensive 
with an undivided humanity, and attributes to it moral interests capable of effective 
normative authority under international law. 
Further, Judge Ranjeva asks: ‘La proclamation répétée de principes, considérés 
jusque-là comme seulement moraux mais d'une importance telle que le caractère 
irréversible de leur acceptation apparaît définitif, n'est-elle pas constitutive de 
l'avènement d'une pratique constante et uniforme ?’430  The question suggests that regular 
expression of principle will have the effect of achieving something like the value of 
customary law, even where it that expression does not achieve conventional status 
in any single instance.  Again, the innate cosmopolitan idea is joined to an 
unorthodox affirmation of general principle as a matter of international legal 
discourse.  In part on the basis of the appeal to principle, Judge Ranjeva’s dicta here 
would affirm an authority vested in the Court to announce law conforming to the 
will or interests of the world collective, and the moral constraints recognized by that 
collective, even absent effective positive law or traditional customary law expression 
by states in their individual capacities. 
                                                                
429 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, [1996] I.C.J. Reports 
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430 Ibid., at 297 (emphasis in the original). 
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I pause here for a moment to consider more closely the consistent appeal to 
principle, which will arise again in a moment in consideration of Judge Weeramatry’s 
opinion.  The appeal to general principle, still not identical with the term as it exists 
under Art. 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the Court, appears to reflect a particular 
appreciation by the Court, or judges of the Court, of the sentiment of the world as a 
whole.  As such, the consistent resort to principle joins the innate cosmopolitan 
mandate to a mandate flowing from Art. 9 of the Court’s Statute: the Court is the 
unique institutional site of competence within the system of international law for 
assessing all of the principle legal systems and main forms of civilization in the 
world; as such, it enjoys a unique capacity to pronounce on uniform normative 
principle discernible across or emerging out of the world as a whole.  When the 
world as a whole is understood as a subjectivized collectivity, with a will, interests or 
moral sense of its own, the Court’s unique institutional competence to pronounce 
on general principle reinforces the innate cosmopolitan mandate to exercise 
authority in the service of the perceived world collectivity. 
The final opinion from the Nuclear Weapons case to adopt an innate cosmopolitan 
posture is the dissent of Judge Weeramatry.  He purports to remain within the lex 
lata,431 echoing the efforts of Judges Shahabuddeen and Ranjeva to remain within 
the strictures of international law, as well as Judge Álvarez's insistence that his new 
international law was good law, rather than anything more speculative.  Further 
recalling Judge Álvarez, he expands the body of international law by reference to the 
aims of the Charter captured in its Preamble.  The Charter Preamble, however, 
contains no binding articles or terms.  Thereby, echoing Judge Bedjaoui as well, 
Judge Weeramatry would have the collective will of the peoples of the world, as 
captured in the Preamble, take on a normative authority independent of operative 
terms expressly agreed to among states as a matter of law.  Thus: 
The Charter's very first words are ‘We, the peoples of the United Nations’ - 
thereby showing that all that ensues is the will of the peoples of the world. 
Their collective will and desire is the very source of the United Nations 
Charter and that truth should never be permitted to recede from view. In 
the matter before the Court, the peoples of the world have a vital interest, 
and global public opinion has an important influence on the development 
of the principles of public international law.432 
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The affirmation of the collective will of peoples, in the form of global public 
opinion, is joined once again, as noted, to an elevation of principle: Judge 
Weeramatry holds that power must be restrained by principle as well as statute.433  
In insisting on situating his opinion at once in lex lata and in broader principle, 
Judge Weeramatry also recalls the Nicaragua Court's reliance on fundamental 
principle to achieve its ruling in that case.  Again, innate cosmopolitan principle is 
comprehended to enjoy some purchase under the law available to the Court. 
Arriving at a different conclusion about the contents and means of ascertaining the 
lex lata of international law, Judge Guillaume, in his separate opinion, rejects the 
pretension that arises, in the opinions canvassed here, to innate cosmopolitan law-
making available to the Court beyond a foundation resting ‘sur le principe de la 
souveraineté des Etats’ and their consent.434  The court and judge are empowered 
solely according to the traditional terms of state consent in a subjective international 
system.  Thus: 
le rôle du juge ne consiste pas à se substituer au législateur…. et la Cour doit 
se borner à constater l'état du droit sans pouvoir substituer son appréciation à 
la volonté des Etats souverains. C'est la grandeur du juge que de rester dans 
son rôle en toute humilité, quels que soient par ailleurs les débats intérieurs 
qui peuvent être les siens au plan religieux, philosophique ou moral.435 
Accordingly, Judge Guillaume rejects the turn to policy and law-making authority 
that is bound up with the cosmopolitan, custodial role variously articulated by 
Judges Bedjaoui, Shahabuddeen, Ranjeva and Weeramatry.  Judge Schwebel echoes 
Judge Guillaume’s sentiment, identifying an ‘antinomy between practice and 
principle’, and finding it therefore ‘the more important not to confuse the 
international law we have with the international law we need’.436  His language 
describes a positivist understanding of international law that presents a stark 
counterpoint to the recognition of normative authority vested in the interests of the 
world as a whole. 
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It bears recalling, in light of the opinions of Judges Guillaume and Schwebel, that 
the Court’s decision in Nuclear Weapons appears to have traced the limits of 
cosmopolitan aspirations vis-à-vis still-viable subjective interests, insofar as the 
state’s right to survival as a state may trump even intransgressible principles drawn 
from elementary considerations of humanity in the system of international law.437  
But it also bears noting that while a right of survival vested in states may limit the 
outer bounds of what may be achieved in the name of the world, it does not 
overthrow the whole of the innate cosmopolitan conception.  To a certain extent, it 
complements it in other ways.  Innate cosmopolitanism preserves and, as seen, even 
proceeds from the possibility of discrete social and political collectives within the 
larger unity of the world as a whole.  Moreover, they are conceived to be mutually 
constitutive; as such, neither can serve to deny the existence of the other.  The one 
affirms the other, such that a foundational right to survival vested in the state is 
rightfully preserved, but must be understood to preserve as well a fundamental 
normative value vested equally in the world collective.  Both rest on a common, 
ineradicable core identified with discrete constituent collectives: the baseline 
normativity of the particular collectivity affirms a baseline normativity in the 
universal collectivity. 
Thus, though the Court’s opinion in Nuclear Weapons identifies outer bounds, in 
concerns of international security and the use of force, of what may be achieved as a 
matter universal norms under the in the name of the world as a whole, innate 
cosmopolitan juridical theory remains theoretically viable insofar as, within those 
bounds, the world as a whole also remains a legitimate and equally undeniable 
source of legally-valid norms. 
 
Oil Platforms 
If the Court itself stopped short in Nuclear Weapons from asserting jurisdiction over 
the most basic subjective interests and powers of states, the next case of interest, Oil 
Platforms, suggests a return to the trend of incrementally expanding jurisdiction, 
established by the Court in Nicaragua and Lockerbie.  In certain respects, Oil Platforms 
represents a total institutional reversal from the earlier practice observed in Fisheries 
Jurisdiction and Tehran Hostages, where questions pertaining to the use of force were 
largely abandoned by the parties and the Court.  In Oil Platforms, Iran's complaint 
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against the US sounded in freedom of commerce according to a bilateral Treaty of 
Amity, but was in fact a controversy over the use of force and self-defense, and was 
treated as such by the Court.  Moreover, while the record before the Court was 
limited to specific incidents from the late 1980’s, the various judges appear to have 
drawn substantially, in some cases expressly, on the public record of world affairs at 
the beginning of the 21st century. 
The record before the court pertained to two separate incidents, in Oct. 1987 and 
April 1988, in which the US military struck Iranian oil installations on assertions of 
self-defense, following certain actions attributed to Iran, including the sinking of an 
oil tanker flagged to the US, and the mining of a US warship.438  The incidents took 
place in the wider context of the Iran-Iraq War, and the so-called Tanker War 
escalation, pursuant to which Iran and Iraq had begun targeting neutral shipping in 
the Gulf in an effort to disrupt one another’s trade.  Though the gravamen of Iran's 
complaint to the ICJ in 1992 pertained to the military actions of the US as actor in 
the Iran-Iraq War, Iran brought its suit under the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic 
Relations and Consular Rights between the US and Iran, as the Treaty of Amity 
provided for automatic arbitration before the ICJ.  In 1996, by preliminary 
judgment, the Court allowed the suit to proceed pursuant to a single provision of 
the Treaty of Amity, namely Art. X, paragraph 1, providing for freedom of 
commerce and navigation between the territories of the two contracting parties.  
Provisions suggesting broader terms for complaint were rejected.439 
In its defense, the United States raised, among other arguments, Art. XX(1)(d) of 
the Treaty of Amity, which states that the Treaty would in no event preclude 
measures by either party necessary to protect essential security interests.440  In 
deciding the case, the Court began with the United States' defense, rather than the 
complaint itself: 
In the present case, it appears to the Court that there are particular 
considerations militating in favour of an examination of the application of 
Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), before turning to Article X, paragraph 1. It is 
clear that the original dispute between the Parties related to the legality of 
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the actions of the United States, in the light of international law on the use 
of force.441 
Having signalled its intention to effect judgment on the use of force, the Court  
incorporated the standard for self-defense under Art. 51 and customary law into the 
treaty term “necessary to protect essential security interests”, thereby bringing its 
judgment under Charter law.  Ultimately, the Court found that an armed attack had 
not been proved by the US, including a failure to demonstrate a specific intent on 
the part of Iran to strike the US.  Accordingly, the US acts were not valid acts of 
self-defense.  Having dispensed with the US defense, the Court turned back to the 
complaint – and dismissed it, on the grounds that there was no direct commerce 
between Iran and the US sufficient to trigger responsibility under Art. X of the 
Treaty of Amity for the acts complained of.442 
The Court's procedure was unusual, on the merits rejecting the defense first and the 
complaint second.  A meritless complaint does not ordinarily entail a defense.  In 
passing judgment on an unnecessary defense, the Court exceeds a narrow mandate 
for dispute resolution.  Rather, the Court's unnecessary ruling demonstrates what 
might be called judicial opportunism, recalling Judge Singh's opinion in favor of the 
Court's seizing a “major opportunity to state the law so as to serve the best interests 
of the community.”443  Judge Simma, in his opinion, refers to his own agreement 
with the Court's opportunism as Rechtspolitiek, to which I return in a moment.  The 
Court acknowledged its interest, on behalf of the international community, in 
addressing the questions of the use of force and self-defense: 
as the United States itself recognizes in its Rejoinder, "The self-defense 
issues presented in this case raise matters of the highest importance to all 
members of the international community", and both Parties are agreed as to 
the importance of the implications of the case in the field of the use of 
force, even though they draw opposite conclusions from this observation. 
The Court therefore considers that, to the extent that its jurisdiction under 
Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty authorizes it to examine and 
rule on such issues, it should do so. 
That acknowledgment is the closest the Court came to explaining its unusual 
procedure.  Though the Court portrayed the interest in terms of the arguments of 
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the parties before it, the interest is more coherently understood as an expression of 
innate cosmopolitanism, as the dissenting and separate opinions to the judgment 
make clear. 
Judge Higgins, in her dissent, took issue with the allowing the importance of an 
issue to drive the Court's jurisdiction: “‘importance’ of subject-matter cannot serve 
to transform a contingent defence into a subject-matter that is ‘desirable’ to deal 
with in the text of the Judgment and in the dispositif.”444  Judge Parra-Aranguren 
states the objection plainly: “the Court should have considered Article XX, 
paragraph 1(d), as a defence to be examined only in the event of its having 
previously established that the United States had violated Article X, paragraph 1, of 
the 1955 Treaty”.445  Judge Kooijmans, in a separate opinion, makes clear the 
unorthodox nature of the Court's opinion: 
The operative part does not immediately respond to the claim as 
formulated by the Applicant, but starts with a finding not essential 
to the Court’s decision on that claim….  I have checked the 
operative parts of all judgments of this Court and its predecessor, 
the Permanent Court of International Justice, in contentious cases 
and none of them starts with a finding that is not determinative 
for the Court’s disposition of the claim.446 
The irregularity that Kooijmans emphasizes underscores the progressive expansion 
of the Court's jurisdiction, in keeping with the relative expansion first observed in 
the Nicaragua and Lockerbie cases.  The Court is empowered to try the questions of 
law that the parties have put before the Court by statute or by special agreement; a 
limitation that was accepted in the Fisheries Jurisdiction and Tehran Hostages cases.  And 
if the complaint before the Court in Oil Platforms was not a valid one, the defense 
was never a question for the Court.  Trying questions of law not properly before the 
Court is in tension with the consensual nature of the Court's jurisdiction, and in 
tension with the consensual nature of orthodox international law generally. 
In trying a question not allowed the Court by some express demonstration of 
permission, the Court puts itself in a position to judge a state according to a norm 
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that the state has not affirmatively provided to be justiciable, or not justiciable by 
the ICJ, in the case at hand.  Thus the Court, on behalf of the international 
community, can be seen in its Oil Platforms judgment to include within its authority 
non-consensual law: objective norms that will not be denied according to the 
subjective rights of states.  The Court, and the law according to which it is 
empowered, becomes in this instance autonomous of the will of states. 
Judge Simma writes in support of key aspects of the Court's ruling.  In doing so, he 
presents perhaps the most compelling understanding of the Court 's purpose in 
ruling on a moot point.  Moreover, to the extent his opinion offers a persuasive 
rationale by which to understand the Court's opinion, it also offers perhaps the 
clearest affirmation yet of aspects of Judge Álvarez's alternative jurisdprudence.  
Judge Simma describes his concurrence with the Court's judgment as a matter of 
Rechtspolitiek, which he explains as follows: 
I welcome that the Court has taken the opportunity, offered by 
United States reliance on Article XX of the 1955 Treaty, to state 
its view on the legal limits on the use of force at a moment when 
these limits find themselves under the greatest stress. Although I 
am of the view that the Court has fulfilled what I consider to be its 
duty in this regard with inappropriate restraint, I do not want to 
dissociate myself from what after all does result in a confirmation, 
albeit too hesitant, of the jus cogens of the United Nations 
Charter.447 
By reference to the jus cogens of the UN Charter, Judge Simma treats it as 
a constitutional document, one establishing an autonomous normative 
order, with norms that supersede the subjective rights of states.  Within 
that constitutional scheme, perhaps by virtue of its rudimentary nature, the 
Court enjoys a role that includes advocacy, as well as adjudication.  As 
such, Judge Simma recalls the turn to policy observed as a matter of 
scholarship in Chapter 2, as well as Judge Álvarez's innate cosmopolitan 
embrace of politics and a political role for the Court under a new 
international law.  The Court is responsible for the defense and 
development of an international public order that is independent of the 
will of states.   
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Moreover, in arguing in favor of the Court's role in international politics, 
Judge Simma's language is reminiscent not only of Judge Álvarez's 
opinions, but Judge Singh's opinion in Nicaragua as well.  Judge Simma’s 
language is worth quoting length:  
Everybody will be aware of the current crisis of the United 
Nations system of maintenance of peace and security, of which 
Articles 2 (4) and 51 are cornerstones. We currently find ourselves 
at the outset of an extremely controversial debate on the further 
viability of the limits on unilateral military force established by the 
United Nations Charter. In this debate, "supplied" with a case 
allowing it to do so, the Court ought to take every opportunity to 
secure that the voice of the law of the Charter rise above the 
current cacophony. After all, the International Court of Justice is 
not an isolated arbitral tribunal or some regional institution but 
the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. What we 
cannot but see outside the courtroom is that, more and more, legal 
justification of use of force within the system of the United 
Nations Charter is discarded even as a fig leaf, while an increasing 
number of writers appear to prepare for the outright funeral of 
international legal limitations on the use of force. If such voices 
are an indication of the direction in which legal-political discourse 
on use of force not authorized by the Charter might move, do we 
need more to realize that for the Court to speak up as clearly and 
comprehensively as possible on that issue is never more urgent 
than today? In effect, what the Court has decided to say - or, 
rather, not to say - in the present Judgment is an exercise in 
inappropriate self-restraint.448 
Just as Judge Singh advocated the Court’s seizing an opportunity to 
promote certain interests as a matter of international law, Judge Simma 
would have the Court take advantage of a chance to amplify “the voice of 
the law” against a threat perceived outside of the courtroom.  Thus, 
though Judge Simma begins from a roughly constitutional argument in 
favor of Charter jus cogens, the broad responsibilities that he gives the 
Court suggest an innate cosmopolitan premise, shared by Judge Álvarez: 
the world normative community already is an objective reality, though it 
lacks elements of traditional political organization, such as legislative or 
executive bodies capable of exercising positive authority.  The Court's 
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cosmopolitan responsibility is not only a matter of law, but “a matter of 
principle”.449  In this way, Judge Simma marries constitutional 
cosmopolitanism to innate cosmopolitanism in keeping with the overlap 
between the two as constitutional and proto-constitutional doctrines, 
observed in Chapter 3. 
Perhaps most importantly, if there is no better way to understand why and 
on what authority the Court decided a question that was never properly 
asked as a matter of law, then Judge Simma's separate opinion offers a 
coherent account of an enactment of cosmopolitan normative authority on 
the part of the Court.  The relationship between the Court’s majority 
opinion and Judge Simma’s opinion resembles the relationship between 
the Court majority and Judge Álvarez in the Fisheries case decided in 
1951,450 as described by J.H.W. Verzijl: “The Court has evidently hesitated 
to openly follow the lead given to it by the Chilean Judge, Alejandro 
Alvarez….  But what else, in reality, has the Court done?”451  The Court 
rendered judgment on its own motion, in a sense, to adjudicate a question 
not properly before it, doing so in defense of an objective public order 
associated with the Charter.  As such, the Court approximates legislative as 
well as executive duties within that order, by virtue of responsibility for the 
development and defense of world norms for the world collective.  
Thereby, principles of innate cosmopolitanism discernible in the 
jurisprudence of the Court reach a new height in the Oil Platforms decision. 
 
Legal Consequences of  the Construction of  a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
In the Wall advisory opinion, the question put to the Court for the most part raised 
issues of  humanitarian law, rather than questions directly concerning the resort to 
force.  Accordingly, I will treat it here only briefly for those aspects applicable to the 
jus ad bellum.  The Court began its inquiry into the law with the text of  Art. 2(4), 
then took the occasion to indicate that the Israeli wall, insofar as it was built on land 
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taken in the Six-Day War of  1967, transgressed the principle stated in the 
Declaration on Principles of  International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States: “No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or 
use of  force shall be recognized as legal.”452  Holding the non-acquisition principle 
to represent binding customary law, the Court further noted that “[e]very State has 
the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples . . . of  their right 
to self-determination.”453  The Court’s opinion exhibits a close connection, in its 
brief  treatment of  the resort to force, with concern for territorial and political 
integrity, as well as the right to self-determination.   
Elsewhere, the Court considered the legitimacy of  the wall as an act of  self-defense 
under Art. 51.  The Court rejected the possibility, holding that the wall was 
responsive to activity within territory controlled by Israel, not imputable to a foreign 
state, thus falling outside the ambit of  Art. 51.454  The Court denied self-defense 
under the circumstances on the grounds that Art. 51 “recognizes the existence of  an 
inherent right of  self-defence in the case of  armed attack by one State against 
another State”, thus not in the case of  an armed attack by non-state actors against a 
state.455  Thereby the Court maintained an understanding of  the Charter that limits 
the right of  self-defense under Art. 51 to situations of  armed attacks by other states.  
That holding in and of  itself  might suggest an understanding of  the Charter rules 
concerning resort to force predicated wholly on the acts of  states, basically at odds 
with any more expansive cosmopolitan understanding. 
For the most part, the Court’s opinion does not appear to allow much purchase for 
a cosmopolitan normative scheme in the international law controlling the resort to 
force.  Nonetheless, the Court’s willingness to confront an especially controversial 
issue of  peace and security, namely the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, at least 
demonstrates a continued appreciation of  the broad responsibility Judge Álvarez 
described for the Court, part of  a trend begun with Nicaragua and sustained through 
Oil Platforms, including assumption of  responsibility for matters of  juridical 
conscience in the interests of  the world as a whole. 
In addition, the opinions of  Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal opine in 
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favor of  the capacity of  the Charter to treat states and non-state actors alike, thus 
extending Charter norms outside the context of  purely inter-state relations, and 
recalling the assimilation of  individuals alongside states under the innate 
cosmopolitan model.  Moreover, Judge Koroma, in his separate opinion, opened 
with an affirmation of  “the fundamental international law principle of  the non-
acquisition of  territory by force.”456  Judge Elaraby, too, in a separate opinion noted 
the “fundamental principle” that “[t]he territory cannot be subject to annexation by 
force.”457  Pursuant to that principle, he stated: “The prohibition of  the use of  
force, as enshrined in Article 2, paragraph 4, of  the Charter, is no doubt the most 
important principle that emerged in the twentieth century. It is universally 
recognized as a jus cogens principle, a peremptory norm from which no derogation is 
permitted.”458  Both opinions, then, recall an invocation of  fundamental principle 
that once again is not exactly identical with general principle under Art. 38(1)(c) of  
the Court’s Statute, but may be observed throughout the jurisprudence of  the 
Court.  Fundamental principle is not dispositive of  reliance on the innate 
cosmopolitan model, but the more regularly the Court turns to statements of  
general principle, the more it appears to be relying on norms manifest broadly in 
patterns of  behavior observed in the world as a whole, rather than anything more 
clearly or rigourously in keeping with a subjective system of  law or positivist legal 
analysis. 
 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
The Congo case concerned, among other things, the right of self-defense in 
situations where the alleged underlying use of force was not necessarily 
attributable to another state.  The Democratic Republic of the Congo had 
alleged illegal use of force on the part of Uganda, and Uganda in turn 
defended itself on grounds of self-defense, among other things.   
Notably, before proceeding to the questions of law before it, the Court 
expressly raised its own role in resolving the case.  Acknowledging in this 
case a “complicated and tragic situation”, the Court nonetheless made clear 
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a narrow role: “the task of the Court must be to respond, on the basis of 
international law, to the particular legal dispute brought before it.  As it 
interprets and applies the law, it will be mindful of context, but its task 
cannot go beyond that.”459  The  Court’s language here appears at odds 
with arguments for progressively expansive authority and responsibility 
that have been traced up to the Oil Platforms and Wall judgments.  Having 
limited itself to a narrow answer for the question before it, the Court 
produced a ruling on the resort to force and self-defense that was closely 
tailored to the complex facts of the case, if somewhat ambivalent as a 
matter of law.  The Court held that Uganda did not enjoy a right of  self-
defense against the DRC, putting to one side questions raised concerning 
the right to self-defense against other parties and non-state actors. 460  
Moving on from the arguments of  self-defense, the Court elsewhere 
affirmed, with respect to the resort to force generally, “that acts which 
breach the principle of  non-intervention 'will also, if  they directly or 
indirectly involve the use of  force, constitute a breach of  the principle of  
non-use of  force in international relations'”.461  In that light, the Court 
followed its ruling on the facts with a straightforward endorsement of the 
collective security system under the express terms of the Charter: 
Article 51 of the Charter may justify a use of force in self-defence 
only within the strict confines there laid down. It does not allow the 
use of force by a State to protect perceived security interests beyond 
these parameters. Other means are available to a concerned State, 
including, in particular, recourse to the Security Council.462 
Two principal aspects of the Court's judgment came under criticism in the 
separate opinions of the judges to the Congo case.  First, Judge Kooijmans 
lamented the lack of clarity regarding the Court's treatment of self-defense 
in response to non-state actors, reiterating an argument he made in a 
separate opinion to the Wall advisory opinion, in which he held that the 
                                                                
459 Armed Activities on the Territory of  the Congo (Democratic Republic of  the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of  19 
December 2005, [2005] I.C.J. Reports 168, at 190. 
460 Ibid., p. 22. 
461 Ibid., p. 227. 
462 Ibid., pp. 223-24. 
173 
 
right to self-defense under Art. 51 is not limited to situations of armed 
attack by states only.463 
Second, Judge Elaraby, while concurring with the Court's finding that 
Uganda violated the prohibition on the use of force, forcefully criticized 
the Court on the grounds that it “should have explicitly upheld the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo’s claim that such unlawful use of force 
amounted to aggression”.464  Despite the absence at the time of a 
definition of aggression under conventional and customary international 
law, Judge Elaraby found the Court obliged and able, largely by reference 
to its own dicta in prior cases, to “establish a normative test [for 
aggression] which should be operational across the board”.465 
Aggression represents for Judge Elaraby a heightened violation of Art. 
2(4), rising to the level of an international crime.  Thus he would have used 
the Court to establish norms conducive to the development of 
international criminal law.  He acknowledges that the Court enjoys no 
criminal jurisdiction, but favors the expansion of the Court’s authority on 
the basis of potential benefits for the international community: “The 
International Court of Justice has not been conceived as a penal court, yet 
its dicta have wide-ranging effects in the international community’s quest 
to deter potential aggressors and to overcome the culture of impunity.”466 
In arguing to act on behalf of the interests of the international community 
– a community sufficiently cohesive to support the development of 
criminal law sanctions for violations of public order principles – Judge 
Elaraby, in his dissent, takes farther the innate cosmopolitan discourse 
from the bench of the Court, despite the countervailing posture of the 
majority in its decision.  Moreover, Judge Elaraby claims to find 
contemporary consensus where once Judge Álvarez was in the minority, 
purporting to identify a progressively disappearing distinction between law 
                                                                
463 Armed Activities on the Territory of  the Congo (Democratic Republic of  the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of  19 
December 2005, [2005] I.C.J. Reports 168, at 310-316 [Judge Kooijmans]; Legal Consequences of  the 
Construction of  a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, [2004] I.C.J. 
Reports 136, at 229-30 [Judge Kooijmans]. 
464 Armed Activities on the Territory of  the Congo (Democratic Republic of  the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of  19 
December 2005, [2005] I.C.J. Reports 168, at 327 [Judge Elaraby]. 
465 Ibid., at 331. 
466 Ibid., at 332-33. 
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and politics in the jurisprudence of international security: “There is now 
general recognition that … “the dividing line between political and legal 
disputes is blurred, as law becomes ever more frequently an integral part of 
international controversies’”.467 
The argument, mixing appeals to law and politics, in favor of an ability 
effectively to legislate and try cases for their capacity to effect the 
development of international criminal law, represents a radical appeal to 
expand the Court’s role and authority.  Moreover, expanding the Court’s 
role and authority as a platform for international criminal legal 
development presupposes, absent any clearer positive law grounding, the 
sort of social organization that is inherent in the nature of criminal 
sanction.  As such, Judge Elaraby’s proposal appears to be one of the more 
radical appeals since Judge Álvarez to the world unit as a social and 
political collective capable of sustaining discrete normative authority, 
broadly administered by the Court. 
Judge Simma joined the critiques of both Judges Kooijmans and Elaraby.  
Further, in his own opinion, Judge Simma laments the Court’s failure to 
confront an issue of importance, as it had done in its Oil Platforms case, 
irrespective of formal limitations: 
the Court could well have afforded to approach the question of the 
use of armed force on a large scale by non-State actors in a realistic 
vein, instead of avoiding it altogether by a sleight of hand, and still 
arrive at the same convincing result. By the unnecessarily cautious 
way in which it handles this matter, as well as by dodging the issue 
of “aggression”, the Court creates the impression that it somehow 
feels uncomfortable being confronted with certain questions of 
utmost importance in contemporary international relations.468 
In this respect, if Judge Simma’s separate opinion in Oil Platforms made clear a high-
water mark of progressive authority assumed by the Court, in the manner of Judge 
Álvarez’s cosmopolitan jurisprudence, Judge Simma’s separate opinion in the Congo 
case makes clear a retreat. 
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Conclusion 
Looking back across the jurisprudence of the Court and its judges, cosmopolitan 
norms, and especially norms flowing from the innate cosmopolitan model, can be 
seen to have entered the discourse in  three related forms.  First, and most broadly, 
norms predicated on innate cosmopolitanism have been cited as foundational to 
new international law announced with the Charter, effectively displacing the sources 
of international law with a primary focus on law arising from norms of 
interdependence.  This is most clear in the alternative jurisprudence of Judge 
Álvarez.  Second, somewhat less broadly, norms have been adduced in favor of 
expanding the traditional sources of international law, to include norms identifiable 
with the interests or will of the world.  Examples of this can be seen in the separate 
opinions that would base their ruling on terms of innate cosmopolitan phenomena, 
such as the demands of world public opinion, or an international juridical 
conscience.469  Third, and most narrowly by comparison with the other two 
categories, norms drawn from innate cosmopolitanism are discernible in opinions 
favoring an expansive jurisdiction for the Court.  An expansive jurisdiction may be 
observed in a line of the Court’s own judgments, amounting to a sustained 
jurisprudence, from Nicaragua through Oil Platforms. 
The first category is revolutionary in nature.  Judge Álvarez posits an objective, 
cosmopolitan law to have succeeded in place of pre-Charter international law.  The 
Charter is a touchstone, and the organization of the UN represents an aspect of the 
new international order, but neither is definitive of it.470  Rather, the new 
international order is bound up with the reality of an interdependent world 
collective, and the Court is its primary exponent.  The second, though still radical, 
does not displace the tradition of modern international law, so much as it adds to 
that tradition with new sources of valid legal norms drawn from the innate 
cosmopolitan model.  Opinions in this category carry forward the progressive 
project by supplementing the subjective sources of international law (positive 
expressions of state will) with objective ones (positive expressions of world 
community).  The third category operates, by contrast, entirely within the system of 
                                                                
469 See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Judge Weeramatry, Dissenting Opinion), supra 
note 431, and Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Judge Shahabuddeen, Dissenting Opinion), 
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(Charter, Art. 4) [Judge Álvarez], supra note 362, p. 68. 
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international law, but would give that system a more cosmopolitan character by 
expanding the jurisdiction of the Court, and, by extension, the objective authority of 
international law.  The Court, independent of the will of states, is responsible for the 
continued development of progressive norms sanctioned by them.  This represents 
the thinnest appeal to the innate cosmopolitan model, but also underscores overlap 
between the innate cosmopolitan model and theories of constitutional 
cosmopolitanism, as treated in Chapter 3, positing a constituted international 
society, however rudimentary, on the basis of various normative developments 
within the modern, subjective system of international law. 
Altogether, the three categories of cosmopolitan jurisprudence represent a sort of 
joined normative leitmotif recurring throughout the Court’s varied body of work.  
Despite differences in their scope and substance, all three categories represent 
continuations of efforts to assert the unity of international law above and beyond 
the constraints imposed by a subjective system of law.  Moreover, the three 
categories can be seen to build on one another in a sort of pyramid structure, 
proceeding over time from the first, broadest category, to the third, narrowest 
category.  As such, Judge Álvarez’s alternative jurisprudence represents both a 
beginning, in terms of precedent, and a telos, in terms of substance.  In sum, the 
cosmopolitan jurisprudence running through the history of the Court reveals a 
normative purpose founded on the innate cosmopolitan model – one that is not 
necessarily an exclusive or even a paramount purpose assumed by the Court, but 
which purpose, dedicated to the objective expression of the will and interests of the 
world as against competing assertions of subjective right, reflects an historical 
objective bound up with the innate cosmopolitan idea, and the tradition of its appeal 
from Vitoria forward, as observed in Chapter 2  
The Court’s exercise of its own authority suggests a principled and professional 
belief that the world as a whole enjoys interests and a general will capable of giving 
rise to objective norms, and the Court is responsible for the expression, defense and 
further development of those norms and, with them, the world phenomenon by and 
for which they exist.  The cosmopolitan purpose of the Court, then, understood 
according to the dialectic of the Court over time, is to provide for those norms in 
the interest of the world as a whole, while operating within the technical limitations 
imposed by a system still defined by subjective powers.  Thus the discourse of the 
Court can be seen to favor the introduction of objective norms and objective 
normative authority into the traditionally subjective system of international law.  In 
that context, however, the innate cosmopolitan model also suggests a superior 
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responsibility and competence, vested in the Court, over the politics of a world 
phenomenon in conformance with the innate cosmopolitan model. 
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What is cosmopolitanism in international law?  It is not identical to liberal 
cosmopolitanism, nor is it identical to constitutional arguments of international law, 
though both of these represent important streams of cosmopolitan thought in 
international legal discourse.  Cosmopolitanism in international law, at its broadest, 
means an inclusive and harmonious legal system predicated on universal norms 
applicable uniformly across the world.  But arguments at international law 
concerning cosmopolitanism – including arguments for cosmopolitanism and 
arguments critical of cosmopolitanism – have been insufficiently precise and 
insufficiently thorough in their adoption and treatment of cosmopolitan terms and 
principles.  Moreover, in addition to liberal and constitutional cosmopolitanism, 
there exists the third stream of cosmopolitan thought, namely innate 
cosmopolitanism, which has never achieved the level of a discrete doctrine, but 
which has been central to the historical narrative and development of modern 
international law.  In this work, I have explored the discrete domains of the three 
streams of cosmopolitan thought – their distinct terms and principles, as well as 
their areas of convergence – and have looked in particular at the set of ideas 
represented by the various expressions of innate cosmopolitanism over time.  
Because innate cosmopolitanism has not been comprehended as a discrete doctrine, 
study or stream of thought, it in particular – more so than liberal or constitutional 
cosmopolitanism – has not been confronted, supported or treated with adequate 
specificity in international legal discourse. 
Liberal cosmopolitanism is an ethical theory predicated on normative individualism, 
applying regardless of political boundaries, and associated with core moral rights 
vested in all individuals equally.  Constitutional cosmopolitanism is for the most part 
a positive legal theory predicated on the valid achievement of universal norms 
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supporting a cosmopolitan arrangement in world affairs, associated with a hierarchy 
of norms recognized under international law.  Innate cosmopolitanism is a theory 
that posits the world as a whole to represent a discrete social and political complex 
with a will and interests of its own, irrespective of any such expression in positive 
international law, but capable of sustaining a unique normative mandate in the 
international legal system.  Innate cosmopolitanism represents the elevation of 
certain ideas of political theory to provide for normative authority outside of the 
traditional, consent-based  strictures of the international legal system.  Thus an idea 
of social connectedness and interdependence in the world is taken to establish a 
valid source of world norms and, with them, international legal norms, even absent 
any allowance for the same under the traditionally-recognized sources of positive 
international law.  Innate cosmopolitan ideas may be seen, in Chapter 4, to lend 
themselves to the practice of international tribunals such as the World Court, where 
the appeal to an innate cosmopolitan mandate allows the Court an ad hoc authority 
to rule in the perceived interest of the world, where narrow terms of positive 
international law might not allow a comparable exercise. 
The relative lack of sophistication and differentiation in the treatment and 
appreciation of cosmopolitanism in international law to date has impeded both the 
adequacy of the arguments for cosmopolitan ends, as well as the criticism of them.  
Liberal cosmopolitanism, for instance, has suffered for a failure to acknowledge 
alternative cosmopolitan visions as a matter of contemporary political and legal 
theory.  Constitutional cosmopolitanism too often conflates the cosmopolitan 
ambition with positive terms of international law.  Innate cosmopolitanism, for want 
of any discrete treatment heretofore, has approximated liberal and constitutional 
cosmopolitan arguments in ways that have not always been perfectly coherent.  
More than that, however, the relative lack of awareness of a discrete body of innate 
cosmopolitan ideas has allowed those ideas to escape sustained and specific critical 
attention, just as it has impeded the thoroughness of their development in any self-
aware doctrinal sense. 
Focused critical attention on innate cosmopolitanism reveals an ostensibly 
progressive doctrine that may nonetheless serve as cover for the maintenance of 
status quo interests, to which critique I will turn in greater depth, below.  But 
focused critical attention also suggests that the deconstructive technique (from 
which derives much of the recent criticism of cosmopolitanism in general, as well as 
the critique that I apply to innate cosmopolitanism in particular) may itself be 
compromised by certain shared attributes with innate cosmopolitanism; I turn to 
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this matter following my critique of innate cosmopolitanism, below.  That 
compromise leads to a final consideration of the enduring appeal of innate 
cosmopolitan arguments as a matter of legal theory, and their possible redemption, 
which I consider in conclusion of this work.  First, immediately below, I will review 
and map the respective domains of the three schools of cosmopolitan thought, 
drawing on Chapter 3, followed by a closer look at arguments central to innate 
cosmopolitanism in particular, drawing largely on Chapters 2 and 4. 
 
Mapping the cosmopolitan schools 
As Chapter 3 makes clear, liberal cosmopolitanism generally effects a critique of the 
institutions and norms of international law, doing so for the most part from an 
ethical orientation situated outside of typical international legal doctrine and 
discourse.  Constitutional cosmopolitanism, by contrast, operates for the most part 
within the discourse of international law, however creatively.  Constitutional 
cosmopolitanism observes the achievement of a hierarchical, constitutional 
arrangement of norms and institutions under international law, and joins the 
recognition of a world body politic to its positive expression as a matter of law.  In 
this context, innate cosmopolitanism is situated between the two.  By comparison 
with liberal cosmopolitanism, innate cosmopolitanism operates within a typically 
legal discourse, but by comparison with constitutional cosmopolitanism, innate 
cosmopolitanism operates outside of orthodox constraints of international law, 
conceived according to a tradition of voluntary positivism.  Innate cosmopolitanism 
identifies in the international system a normativity that is vested in a world body 
politic, or world collectivity that exists independent of any formal constitutional 
achievement or other positive expression under international law. 
Each of the three cosmopolitan theories of international law shares a common 
aim to transcend or circumvent a system of rules subjectively defined by discrete 
actors, and each does so by appeal to an objective grounds for announcing and 
applying universal norms.  Powers and authority vested with subjective interests 
continue to challenge the integrity of public international law, and cosmopolitan 
theories in general address that challenge by meeting subjective authorities with 
an objective one.  Accordingly, each school of cosmopolitan thought posits 
some harmonious set of universal norms, capable of sustaining a unified system 
of law that is global in scope.  As noted, however, the effort to achieve objective 
normativity under international law in theory and practice remains a 
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controversial one.  But while critical legal theorists such as Martti Koskenniemi, 
among others, raise important discontents associated with cosmopolitanism in 
international law, the critique suffers for a lack of precision. 
Chapter 3 makes clear the different domains of the three schools of 
cosmopolitan thought.  What differs among them is roughly threefold: first, the 
normative foundations; second, the nature of the norms that arise out of those 
foundations and the method for determining them; and, finally, the nature of the 
legal rules and legal system that follows on the normative grounds.  Liberal 
cosmopolitanism is founded in a limited set of moral premises, specifically liberal 
moral axioms, which are posited to be universally acceptable, and are expressive 
of normative individualism.  The norms that follow are constructively developed 
out of those premises.  Observing some model of the social contract thought 
experiment, the relevant law and legal rules that follow are structured around the 
individual rights not ceded to the power and authority of the political 
community; as such, they are not subject to political control.  They are 
indissolubly attached to each individual qua individual. 
Constitutional cosmopolitanism, by contrast, is founded in positive settlement or 
convergence around constitutional norms among parties, which establishes an 
authority beyond each individual party to the settlement or convergence, together 
with a presumption of legitimacy.  The settlement or convergence may be in the 
form of a discrete document, such as the UN Charter, or some other 
acknowledgment of hierarchically arranged norms recognized as a matter of 
international law.  The rules that follow reflect a recognition of common legal 
authority, and are determined by means associated with the acknowledged terms of 
the world constitution as a formally valid legal construct.  Thus a constitution 
identified with the UN Charter will produce norms in keeping with the organization 
as established by that document; a constitution identified with a hierarchy of norms 
including jus cogens lately inclines towards the superiority of human rights norms.  
Following constitutional cosmopolitanism, the constitution is achieved by 
presumptively legitimate authorities –in the first instance, states – capable of 
affirming a valid constitutional framework, which constitution in turn establishes 
and defines as a matter of law the world body to which it applies. 
The source of normative objectivity for innate cosmopolitanism is the presumption 
of an ineluctable world collective, an interdependent social or political complex 
encompassing the world as a whole.  As discussed in Chapter 2, the world collective 
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is larger by definition than all other worldly collectives, and inclusive of all of them, 
which contributes to the objective authority the world collective enjoys vis-à-vis all 
other collectives.  The premise of the world collective is founded in the perceived 
reality of an autonomous phenomenon, an interdependent social or political unit, 
capable of manifesting interests and a will of its own, which may be perceived either 
by means of intuition or by scientific observation.  The norms that follow are 
derived from the nature of that reality, insofar as it may be comprehended by the 
lawmaker or magistrate empowered to pronounce on the interests and will of the 
world as a whole.   The rules to which the innate cosmopolitan model gives rise are 
universal, but historically contingent; they are supposed to reflect the lived reality of 
the world social complex as it exists in time. 
The phenomenon of world collectivity exists prior to or irrespective of any positive 
acknowledgment of the same under international law; its normative potential is not 
contingent on its recognition as a matter of constitutional, conventional or even 
customary law.  If anything, as noted in Chapters 1 and 4, the innate cosmopolitan 
phenomenon is acknowledged as a matter of international law according to terms of 
general principle, but in a loosely defined way that is not identical with the adoption 
of general principle as a source of law under Art. 38 of the Statute of the World 
Court.  Consequently, association with terms of general principle has not brought 
the innate cosmopolitan model within the orthodox constraints of positive 
international law.  Likewise, the recourse to terms of general principle has not given 
rise to any more systematic development of innate cosmopolitan argumentation at 
law, which association with Art. 38 might otherwise have promoted.  Rather, innate 
cosmopolitanism continues to find expression in a largely ad hoc manner, as a tool 
used by a tribunal such as the ICJ to extend normative authority over a particular 
issue, as it arises, which issue might otherwise not be subject to the will of the Court 
according to terms of positive international law. 
While innate cosmopolitanism typically arrives at ad hoc announcement of legal 
rules in application, however, it nonetheless begins from a more consolidated 
understanding of the unit that it observes to establish the cosmopolitan order 
than either or the other two streams of cosmopolitan thought.  Constitutional 
cosmopolitanism involves a process that begins with states and peoples, whereby 
the traditional subjects of international law (who are not, or not necessarily, 
cosmopolitan) establish new cosmopolitan authority by means of constitutional 
settlement among themselves.  Liberal cosmopolitanism, proceeding from an 
ideal of justice founded in normative individualism, observes a bottom-up 
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process driven by all the individuals in the world, from and for whom 
cosmopolitan norms flow.  Innate cosmopolitanism, proceeding from a 
perception of interconnected social phenomena, observes a top-down process, 
by which cosmopolitan norms follow on the particular nature of the global social 
or political complex as a whole. 
The difference between liberal and innate cosmopolitanism is stark: individuals 
qua individuals drive liberal cosmopolitan normativity, whereas the world as a 
whole, representing an interdependent and ‘subjectivized’ collective – as that 
term is used in Chapter 2 – drives normativity according to the innate 
cosmopolitan model.  The seemingly inverse relationship of liberal and innate 
cosmopolitanism, however, goes farther, with a twist.  Liberal cosmopolitanism, 
in beginning with the individual, begins with the individual abstracted, according 
to generalizable attributes of every individual that may be universally recognized.  
What looks like a bottom-up process produces a consolidated substance in 
keeping with the moral unity of normative individualism.  Innate 
cosmopolitanism, in beginning from a unified world complex, attempts to 
assimilate the whole of the world’s diversity, taking theoretical account of the 
variety of acts and expectations relevant to world interconnectedness for their 
normative value.  Instead of a constructive process developing on universally-
recognized attributes shared by individuals, innate cosmopolitanism searches for 
patterns in the sum of engagements that make up the historical expression of 
interdependence.  As a result, in theory, the potential normative content is more 
varied, and universal norms are typically tied to the changing demands of public 
order or public interest. 
In establishing the cosmopolitan order differently – by the appeal to normative 
individualism or by the study of the world collective – liberal and innate 
cosmopolitanism emphasize different aspects of cosmopolitan thought.  Liberal 
cosmopolitanism emphasizes universal rights; innate cosmopolitanism 
emphasizes the unity of world community.  The former comprehends 
cosmopolitanism in terms of a world of individuals; the latter comprehends 
cosmopolitanism in terms of an individual world.  Ultimately, the distinction in 
the different aspects of cosmopolitan thought underscores that there are at least 
two different ways by which to understand the nature of a cosmopolitan 
normative order, at least as a matter of international law: namely, in accordance 
with substance or source.  Liberal cosmopolitanism is developed constructively 
out of select moral premises; the source of world norms is identified by means 
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of universal substance.  Innate cosmopolitanism is developed inductively or 
intuitively out of observations (or assumptions) of world behavior; the universal 
substance of world norms is identified by means of historical source.  The 
distinction underscores the point explored in Chapter 3, that liberal 
cosmopolitanism situates itself outside of international law, as a matter of ethical 
theory.  Innate cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, situates itself within the 
legal discourse, and remains vested in a discrete theory of sources for purposes 
of law-ascertainment.471 
As a matter of discourse, constitutional cosmopolitanism hews still more closely 
to the traditional terms of international law, at least insofar as it purports to 
observe a movement towards a constitutional arrangement as a matter of valid 
positive law.  As between the normative individualism of liberal 
cosmopolitanism, and the communal orientation of innate cosmopolitanism, 
however, constitutional cosmopolitanism is agnostic.  It is the demonstrable 
process of normative settlement or arrangement under the terms of international 
law that counts, whether those terms adopt substantive ethical criteria, a 
naturalist appreciation of public order, or anything else.  But because innate 
cosmopolitanism posits a world social phenomenon capable of supporting 
normative authority, it may be understood to prefigure the constitutional project 
in a particular way.  The norms observed and affirmed as a matter of innate 
cosmopolitan doctrine may be construed not only to be part of, but also to be 
constitutive of the world social or political phenomenon.  As such, innate 
cosmopolitanism may be taken to prepare the grounds for identifying a uniquely 
global political community capable of adopting or recognizing a formal 
constitutional arrangement. 
While innate cosmopolitanism may prefigure a constitutional project, however, it 
maintains a crucial distinction, as noted in Chapters 2 and 3: according to the 
innate cosmopolitan model, world collectivity precedes any expression or 
recognition of the world body politic as a matter of law.  The reality of the world 
body, together with the normative potential it enjoys, is a matter of observational 
proof or appreciation, but is not contingent on affirmation under law.  By 
contrast, following constitutional cosmopolitanism, the affirmation of the world 
body is contingent on its recognition as a matter of international law.  The 
distinction is especially important in terms of the critique raised in Chapter 2, in 
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the context of the work of Hans Kelsen, according to which the recognition of a 
body politic may not precede its recognition under law, to which critique I return 
below. 
 
Innate cosmopolitanism and some criticism 
Within its particular domain of legal theory, the innate cosmopolitan argument that 
runs through the theory and practice of international law is, in its simplest terms, as 
follows: the ultimate source of authority in world affairs is the world itself, but that 
authority cannot be meaningfully effectuated in a system defined by the subjective 
interests and will of constituent actors.  The argument responds to the perceived 
dilemma that, without recourse to a consolidated authority, such as the will of the 
world, international law resembles a contractual or cooperative venture, only as 
broad and as binding as each subjective inclination to cooperation, with no clear 
unifying mandate or purpose.  Such a system, defined by the subjective interests of 
its constituent members, is not really normative in any meaningful sense of the term.  
Rather, reliance on subjective consent suggests that there is nothing normative 
outside of each individual, subjective entity or regime that the so-called international 
system comprises. 
In response, as Chapter 2 makes clear, the innate cosmopolitan model posits a 
world collective that is an interdependent unit exhibiting its own subjectivity – i.e., 
its own interests and will.  Failure to recognize the subjectivity of the world as a 
whole, following the innate cosmopolitan argument, reflects a failure to recognize 
the autonomous reality of an interdependent world, and results in a mistaken 
concept of international law.  International law must be conceived, so the argument 
goes, in terms of the mandate and ends of the interdependent world complex, which 
is independent of, and cannot be unilaterally defined by any one or several of its 
constituent parts.  Following the innate cosmopolitan model, the failure of positive 
international law to reflect the foundational mandate represented by the world as a 
whole, independent of constituent parts, is synonymous with a failure of 
normativity.  Innate cosmopolitanism holds that, to escape nationalistic solipsism, it 
is only on account of the normative potential of the world as a whole that 
international law may truly be argued to exist in the first place.  In that vein, the 
work of Scott, Hudson, Álvarez and Lauterpacht, from the first half of the 20th 
century, all variously hold that institutions of international law must be understood 
to operate in the service of the interests of the world collective, not strictly in the 
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interests of any one or several constituents.  Carried into the jurisprudence of the 
ICJ, the reality of an objective world phenomenon also sustains the Court’s capacity 
to pronounce on norms in the world’s interest, over and against the limitations of 
consensual prerogative preserved by the sovereign states that appear at its bar. 
Martti Koskenniemi, however, has argued that the 20th century turn (or return) 
to cosmopolitanism did not overcome problems for international law associated 
with subjective constituent powers in the international system.  If anything, he 
observes, the turn to cosmopolitanism exacerbated the perceived diminution of 
international law’s normative force.472  The failure of normativity was 
exacerbated by a tendency, associated with cosmopolitan arguments generally, to 
suppress any appreciation of political contestation as a matter of law, thereby 
facilitating the exploitation of international legal norms and institutions as tools 
at the disposal of client constituencies, vested powers and subjective interest 
groups.473  As noted, however, Koskenniemi’s critique is typical of a general 
deficiency in international legal argumentation concerning cosmopolitanism, 
insofar as it is insufficiently precise with respect to different cosmopolitan ideas, 
summoned to do different tasks, in the practice and discourse of international 
law.  Thus Koskenniemi, like others, treats particular cosmopolitan strategies 
largely as part of an undifferentiated whole. 
Following the analysis in the foregoing chapters, the critique can now be framed 
in more precise language with respect to innate cosmopolitanism: innate 
cosmopolitanism suppresses political contestation in favor of assertions of 
observational science or intuition; it vests elite actors with an authority for norms 
even as it situates responsibility for the expression of those norms elsewhere, in 
the world as a whole as it may be properly observed or intuited; and it affirms 
status quo historical conditions by virtue of founding novel normative authority 
on the nature of the world as it exists at any point in time.  Going further, the 
three grounds taken together suggest that innate cosmopolitan arguments may 
ultimately stand, intentionally or not, for policy interests that support the status 
quo.  I turn to each of these critical arguments now. 
First, whether the innate cosmopolitan model is adopted according to intuitive 
assumptions or sociological assertions, it consistently resolves into an argument that 
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universal norms will flow from the proper appreciation of acts, experiences and 
expectations bearing on interrelationship in the world.  The nature of the argument 
is designed to accommodate variation in particular political arrangements.  Because 
local political differentiation is an inescapable fact observed in the world as it is, the 
goal, as articulated by Jens Bartelson, must be “to reconcile some set of universal 
values with the actual plurality of values currently embodied in international society” 
such that “there is no need to transcend the existing order of states in order to bring 
a world community into being.”474  Particular political communities exist, but they 
are reconciled with universal norms, rather than responsible for them.  Thus, under 
the innate cosmopolitan model, the reconciliation will not be achieved by political 
contestation engaged in according to subjective argumentation by interested parties 
to a conflict.  Rather, that reconciliation will be achieved by the body best situated 
to appreciate the full scope of diverse phenomena contributing to the 
comprehensive global phenomenon, from which universal norms may be derived 
and applied juridically. 
The ICJ is the prototype institution for the purpose, by virtue of several 
characteristics, including a bench representative of diverse legal systems and political 
cultures around the world, its professional sensitivity to questions of normativity, 
and its mandate in the service of the organization of united nations, rather than a 
mandate devolved directly from any one or several constituent states.475  All of the 
qualifying characteristics of the ICJ, however, are characteristics that may be 
understood to insulate it from subjective political contestation.  As Chapter 4 makes 
clear, the ICJ comes to resemble, in the absence of any other vigorous and central 
lawmaking authority that is also representative of the world, a sort of custodian for 
the world as a whole.  The Court stands as the protector and mouthpiece of the 
cosmopolitan world phenomenon.  But the norms that the ICJ pronounces on are 
comprehended by recourse to arguments of historical and sociological fact, or other 
purportedly cognitive phenomena such as world public opinion.  Neither the judge, 
nor any party with an interest in a given controversy, nor any single lawmaker or 
lawmaking body, typically bears responsibility for the legal norm as it may be 
articulated in terms of innate cosmopolitanism.  Restriction of the unilateral 
recourse to force, for example, is simply and naturally in the interest of an 
interdependent world as a matter of public order, rather than anything more limited 
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as an article of positive law negotiated among states according to their consent.  The 
opinion of the Court in the Oil Platforms case, in its extension of use of force law, 
reflects the interests of the world, in defiance of constraints of voluntary positive 
law, as though the interest of the world represents a naturally occurring norm. 
Notably, however, there remains some ambiguity, among those adopting innate 
cosmopolitan arguments, in the means by which the interest or will of the world as a 
whole may legitimately be discerned, when intuition will not suffice.  Judges of the 
ICJ, following the lead of figures such as Judge Álvarez, vary between recourse to 
roughly sociological assertions and assertions of world public opinion.476  Recourse 
to sociological assertions approximates a legitimacy conferred by science: the will 
and interests of the world collective must be comprehended according to proper 
observation.  Recourse to assertions of world public opinion approximates a 
legitimacy conferred by democratic principle: the will and interests of the world 
must be comprehended according to some affirmation roughly identified with the 
world as whole.  Both, however, assume that the world as a whole, so defined, is 
capable of giving rise to norms that will support the rule of law, and, likewise, rules 
of law.  Likewise, in either case, the norm itself is derived from a source 
independent of the lawmaker and from outside the predominant sources of 
international law, treaty and custom.  Thereby political contestation remains 
suppressed in the interpretation and development of international law, both among 
parties interested in an issue or controversy, as well as in an act of decision itself.  In 
this context, the ICJ may be seen to act in its custodial role, according to innate 
cosmopolitanism, free of traditional constraints of political process or contestation.  
Recall, for example, the language of then-President Bedjaoui, from his separate 
opinion in the Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons case: 
The resolutely positivist, voluntarist approach of international law still current 
at the beginning of the century … has been replaced by an objective 
conception of international law, a law more readily seeking to reflect a 
collective juridical conscience and respond to the social necessities of States 
organized as a community.477 
Judge Bedjaoui filled out the underpinning of objective international law by 
reference to “man's first nature”, “his ethical coordinates” and “[h]is life on earth”, 
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as well as “the common heritage of mankind”.478  The attributes of “man” and 
“mankind” are not raised for their individual expression; rather, they contribute to 
the “subjectivization” of international community.479  The international community, 
in becoming a subjective phenomenon, acquired interests and a collective will of its 
own, distinct as a subjective collective from the individualized subjective entities it 
comprises, and demonstrating objective normative authority in its relation to them.  
International law, by Judge Bedjaoui’ s formula, will reflect measurable attributes of 
the subjective collective, which is indivisible from “life on earth”. 
But the methodologies of innate cosmopolitanism remain problematic.  In light 
of the vast field contemplated to determine world norms, whether sociologically 
or otherwise, the method itself becomes the contested field of politics.  There is 
too much data and too many ways to interpret it: any given set of 
methodological choices by which to arrive at norms that arise out of the world as 
it is comes to look like a particular policy and discrete political agenda.  Thus the 
international scholarship of Alejandro Álvarez has been seen as a policy 
promoting Latin American interests.480  Likewise, Quincy Wright was clear about 
the perceived necessity of a turn from sociology to policy.481  Myres McDougal 
and the New Haven School, which attempted perhaps the most comprehensive 
effort as a matter of legal scholarship to comprehend the sum total of acts and 
expectations bearing on interdependence in the world – and largely introduced 
the vocabulary of acts and expectations into international law – ultimately 
defined itself as a policy science.  McDougal’s policy science has since been 
denigrated as little more in application than propaganda for the United States.482 
Even where not reflective of indeterminacy, however, the limitations of method still 
underscore a consistent limitation evident in the various examples of recourse made 
to innate cosmopolitan ideas since Vitoria: the vision remains just that; it is still in 
the first place a matter of intuition, rather than anything more substantial or precise.  
Neither sociological method nor arguments from world public opinion have 
satisfied assumptions that the world as a whole exists as a social or political unity 
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capable of sustaining its presumptive normative potential.  Consequently, the most 
compelling invocations of the innate cosmopolitan model, from Vitoria through the 
political theory of Bartelson, remain fixed to a vocabulary of potentiality.  As 
observed throughout Chapter 2, the world as a whole represents an immanent 
political or social community, the reality of which is identical with the possibility of 
its actuality.  But there is something that can only be described as mystical in the 
turn to immanence.  As Harry Jones wrote, addressing the Committee for the Study 
of Mankind, “any statement of social potentiality is less a matter of factual 
description than a declaration of faith.”483  The critique is particularly troubling for 
the innate cosmopolitan model, as the model represents an aspiration to depict the 
world as it exists more accurately than modern international law and politics 
typically allow.  But instead of a offering a more comprehensive rendering of the 
world as it exists, the theory and practice of international law founded on the innate 
cosmopolitan model comes to resemble a professional religion.  I will return to this 
critique in another context in a moment. 
First, there remains the third grounds for critique, perhaps counterintuitive, arising 
out of the premises and method of innate cosmopolitanism, namely that innate 
cosmopolitanism is too much invested in the status quo.  The critique may be 
counterintuitive because the innate cosmopolitan idea is most apparent in 
conjunction with the progressive ambitions of the lawyers throughout 20th century 
who reinvigorated the innate cosmopolitan model, such as Scott, Álvarez and 
Lauterpacht, along with their contemporary legacy.  They posited an objective, 
cosmopolitan authority capable of overcoming the limitations of a subjective system 
of so-called law, which appeared compromised and consigned to a rough state of 
anarchy by accommodation of the powers of independent, subjective regimes.  But 
even as it defies traditional international law, innate cosmopolitanism appears 
uniquely contingent on – and thereby ultimately supportive of – historical 
conditions.  It is the historical manifestation of phenomena such as public opinion 
or the patterns of behavior under conditions or interdependence that define the 
norms appropriate to the world as a whole under innate cosmopolitanism.  The goal 
of international lawyers and legal scholars relying on the innate cosmopolitan model, 
from Vitoria forward, has been to create a more perfect formal system of law by 
reference to a historical reality – short of world government – capable of sustaining 
normativity beyond the prerogatives of subjective constituents.  The ambition is 
similar to what Nicholas Onuf observes, in the idea of the international legal order, 
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concerning an intended reconciliation of the sociological jurisprudence of Myres 
McDougal with the pure theory of Hans Kelsen: “the order is treated by its makers 
and benefactors as historical reality and formal entity at one and the same time.”484  
In identifying the world as a whole as the proper basis of universal norms, the 
innate cosmopolitan model aspires to a more adequate grounding for international 
law as a matter of theory and historical reality.  In achieving more adequate 
grounding, the innate cosmopolitan model defies the constraints of international 
law, traditionally conceived, even as it would perfect it. 
But while the progressive ambition to which the innate cosmopolitan model has 
been harnessed is transgressive of the subjective terms of traditional international 
law, the innate cosmopolitan model can be seen to be nonetheless supportive of 
status quo conditions in fundamental ways.  As Chapter 3 makes clear, where liberal 
cosmopolitanism expressly situates its normative authority outside of the status quo, 
to enable an external critique on the institutions of international law and the 
international system, innate cosmopolitanism expressly associates its normative 
authority with the perceived historical reality of the world.485  Because the proper 
observation of acts, experiences and expectations in the world is theoretically 
supposed to yield the interests and will of the world, the normative authority of the 
world is discerned in terms of historical fact.  Likewise, since the norms that flow 
from innate cosmopolitanism are effectively discovered by observation of historical 
acts and conditions of the world, innate cosmopolitan norms are supposed to 
represent the world as it is.  To represent the world as it is, is to represent the status 
quo.  Thereby the innate cosmopolitan model adopts a posture deeply tied to 
historical circumstance, likewise binding the norms to which the model would give 
rise to status quo historical conditions.  That reliance on status quo conditions 
suggests, at least in theory, a model that ultimately serves to affirm – even in its 
application for reform – a historical distribution of powers and resources, favoring 
an established class of elites. 
Recall in this light Kelsen’s primary criticism of appeal to community in the manner 
of the innate cosmopolitan model, for its tendency in common with natural law to 
allow law-makers and magistrates to observe or discover law, rather than to make or 
administer law by means of a more legitimate, volitional process: “the doctrine 
which denies that the positive law-makers really are what they pretend to be-the 
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creators of the law-has the effect, if not the purpose, of strengthening their 
authority.”486  His reasoning is worth quoting at length: 
The acts of human beings by which, from the point of view of legal 
positivism, the law is created, such as custom, legislation, judicial decision, 
consequently have a constitutive character, and which must be interpreted by 
natural-law doctrine as merely declaratory. From the point of view of that 
doctrine the organs of the community do not produce the law, they only re-
produce a pre-existing law created by God, nature, human reason, or in some 
other mysterious way. The organs of the community may, it is true, fail to 
fulfill their task of finding the law and formulating it in an adequate way, but 
it must be assumed that, on the whole, they succeed; otherwise there would 
be no law realized in the world. Besides, who could be more competent to 
decide what natural law prescribes and whether the positive law conforms to 
the natural law, the true law, than the organs of the community whose task it 
is to find this law? To confer this competence not on the organs of the 
community but exclusively on the subjects supposed to obey the law, would 
amount to establishing anarchy.487 
The mystical elements of the innate cosmopolitan model – variously and 
optimistically referred to as immanence, a matter of potentiality, or even 
interdependence absent any more concrete understanding of what that term entails 
– serve to amplify or entrench the powers of individuals and institutions already in 
positions of authority.  Thus the innate cosmopolitan model, however progressive 
its use as a matter of intent, appears nonetheless prone to reinforce the status quo in 
theory and effect. 
 
Criticism reflected 
Having refined the contemporary critique, I wish now to point out that elements 
of it may be so far reaching as to implicate the critic.  Take, for example, the 
work of Koskenniemi, which has served as a template here.  Koskenniemi’s 
critical theory regularly resolves into an affirmation of international law as a 
carrier of redeeming intuitions capable of addressing conflict in the world.488   In 
this way, it resembles the history of recourse to the innate cosmopolitan model, 
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by which an intuition or sense of world unity represents a lodestar for the 
international system.  The innate cosmopolitan model stands throughout history 
for the intuition or proposition that some unified world conscience or 
consciousness, capable of giving rise to legally normative expression, represents 
a telos of objectivity for a system largely and conflictually defined by the 
subjective powers of constituent units; the failure of normativity observed in a 
conflict of subjective interests may be checked by the normativity assumed to 
exist in an immanent harmony attributed to the world as whole. 
But, as was seen in Chapter 2, the underlying intuition, once employed to 
normative effect, comes to look like a manipulable device in the service of 
particular policy interests.  Because critical legal theory also tends to resolve into 
an intuition capable of checking or at least exposing the failure of normativity in 
international law, the critique of innate cosmopolitanism may extend to the 
critic.  The critical intuition that would provide a normative compass, as it were, 
appears to be of a kind with the innate cosmopolitan intuition.  Ultimately, it is 
no longer just the norms and rules of international law that are indeterminate: 
the critical intuition that would redeem their normative validity and legitimacy 
appears indeterminate as well. 
To summarize briefly, indeterminacy of substance and method vitiates the 
normative potential of the innate cosmopolitan model, such that its application 
in international law ultimately appears only to reaffirm, both in theory and as a 
matter of policy, a historical distribution of powers and resources.  Moreover, 
that affirmation of the status quo appears to hold even when the model is joined 
to otherwise progressive ambitions for reform.  As noted, however, the 
problems of indeterminacy reflect a problem with the underlying vision: the 
intuition of an objective normative authority identified with the world as a 
whole, if it is not a straightforward cover for a policy agenda, becomes instead an 
article of faith.  In the latter case, it is an article of faith that is assumed to be 
necessary to overcome the contradictions and dysfunctions associated with a 
subjective system of law, and guide that system towards a more satisfactory 
normative disposition.  In these terms, however, the innate cosmopolitan idea 
may be discerned in the critical legal school of thought.  Koskenniemi’s critical 
work first explicates the dilemma of indeterminacy, then identifies a corrective, 
for purposes of international law, in the form of a sort of presumptive normative 
compass – which normative compass resembles the intuitive faith exhibited by 
innate cosmopolitanism. 
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In his earlier work, Koskenniemi identifies a normative compass with the 
imagination; in his later work, it takes on a still more spiritual dimension.  He begins 
from a critique of international law and international lawyers for failing to recognize 
or acknowledge the inevitability of political contestation, such that the practice and 
discourse even of progressive and cosmopolitan international law becomes 
selectively associated with and co-opted by policy agendas: 
our inherited ideal of a World Order based on the Rule of Law thinly hides 
from sight the fact that social conflict must still be solved by political means 
and that even though there may exist a common legal rhetoric among 
international lawyers, that rhetoric must, for reasons internal to the ideal itself, rely 
on essentially contested – political – principles to justify outcomes to 
international disputes.489 
In From Apology to Utopia, in its first edition, the imagination is the corrective to the 
critical dilemma: “As international lawyers, we have failed to use the imaginative 
possibilities open to us”, and “[n]ormative imagination – reasoned folly – must take 
over where the technique of legal interpretation left off.”490  Imagination already 
suggests the visionary character that marks the long tradition and appeal of innate 
cosmopolitanism, and continues to represent perhaps its most persuasive attribute.  
As of The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, just over ten years later, Koskenniemi’s language 
is changed.  The universal is no longer exactly or simply redeemed by imagination; 
in its place, in language that Bartelson would also approximate shortly thereafter, 
Koskenniemi explains that the universal “is neither a fixed principle nor a process 
but a horizon of possibility that opens up the particular identities in the very process 
where they make their claims of identity.”491 
Finally, by the time of Koskenniemi’s 2007 address before the London School of 
Economics, which address represents one of the two fullest statements of revision 
to his earlier work and response to criticism it received,492 the nature of the 
normative compass that informs his critical project is further developed and 
changed.  To begin with, the critical project is clearly presented as a project of 
critical universalism: “The task for international lawyers is not to learn new 
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managerial vocabularies but to use the language of international law to articulate the 
politics of critical universalism.”493  Furthermore, the politics of critical universalism 
take on an apparently spiritual character.  The horizon of possibility is changed to a 
horizon of transcendence, and what was once a matter of imagination has become a 
matter of faith.  A passage from Koskenniemi’s conclusion from the article that was 
developed out of his address is worth quoting at length: 
International law increasingly appears as that which resists being reduced to a 
technique of governance. When international lawyers are interviewed on the 
Iraqi war, or on torture, or on trade and environment, on poverty and disease 
in Africa – as they increasingly are – they are not expected to engage in hair-
splitting technical analyses. Instead, they are called upon to soothe anxious 
souls, to give voice to frustration and outrage. Moral pathos and religion 
frequently fail as vocabularies of engagement, providers of ‘empty signifiers’ 
for expressing commitment and solidarity. Foreign policy may connote party 
rule. This is why international law may often appear as the only available 
surface over which managerial governance may be challenged, the sole 
vocabulary with a horizon of transcendence – even if, or perhaps precisely 
because, that horizon is not easily translated into another institutional project. 
I often think of international law as a kind of secular faith. When powerful 
states engage in imperial wars, globalisation dislocates communities or 
transnational companies wreck havoc on the environment, and where 
national governments show themselves corrupt or ineffective, one often hears 
an appeal to international law. International law appears here less as this rule 
or that institution than as a placeholder for the vocabularies of justice and 
goodness, solidarity, responsibility and – faith. 
I do not think international law is often invoked because of the sophistication 
of its rules or institutions. Those rules or institutions are as vulnerable to 
criticism as any other rules of institutions. The fact that they are ‘international’ 
is no proof of their moral value. But the tradition of international law has 
often acted as a carrier of what is perhaps best described as the regulative idea 
of universal community, independent of particular interests or desires. This is 
Kant’s cosmopolitan project rightly understood: not an end-state or party 
programme but a project of critical reason that measures today’s state of 
affairs from the perspective of an ideal of universality that cannot be 
reformulated into an institution, a technique of rule, without destroying it. 
The fate of international law is not a matter of re-employing a limited number 
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of professionals for more cost-effective tasks but of re-establishing hope for 
the human species.494 
Like other innate cosmopolitans, Koskenniemi has reconstructed Kantian 
cosmopolitanism.  Applied to international law, Koskenniemi would redeem 
cosmopolitanism by seeing international law reconceived such that it would finally 
fulfill a traditional role as a carrier of the regulative idea of universal community.  
Moreover, that role corresponds with the actual appeal to international law in the 
world and by the world.  International lawyers are appealed to for the purpose of 
“soothing anxious souls” and “to give voice to frustration and outrage”.  
International law is a secular faith for the world at large, such that international 
lawyers resemble its priests, capable of “re-establishing hope for the human 
species”. 
Taken together, the foregoing terms and propositions appear of a kind with the 
ideas and language that have marked innate cosmopolitanism in international law 
from Vitoria forward as part of a project intended to be progressive, as well as 
transgressive of subjective orthodoxy in the international system.  Likewise, 
Koskenniemi’s language conforms to the criticism, noted above, that Harry Jones 
leveled at innate cosmopolitan ideas, namely that they represent articles of faith.  
The innate cosmopolitan model, like the critical universalism described by 
Koskenniemi, would be progressive and transgressive by virtue of providing a 
normative telos or orientation capable of moving a system of law otherwise subject 
to the historical vicissitudes of atomized powers and interests.  Koskenniemi’s 
reliance on faith and hope, and his eschewal of more traditional terms of legal 
discourse and practice, represents a similar resolution into normative intuition, a 
sense of a normative endpoint, reference point or “horizon”, one that moves with 
history but cannot be made perfectly clear by technical means, and instead must rely 
as well on a “gut feeling”.495 
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Working with the intuition 
That even critical legal theory resolves into an intuitive assumption similar to that of 
innate cosmopolitanism attests to the enduring appeal of the innate cosmopolitan 
idea, despite its discontents.  This project is not, however, directed at how the innate 
cosmopolitan model reflects on critical legal theory.  Rather, the possibility that 
critical legal theory exhibits an innate cosmopolitan character even as it deconstructs 
the innate cosmopolitan model is meaningful here with respect to what it reveals 
about the seemingly inescapable recourse to innate cosmopolitan ideas or sentiment.  
The widespread persistence of the appeal of innate cosmopolitanism suggests that it 
will not simply be dismissed.  Likewise, if the central dilemma facing the innate 
cosmopolitan model is that, in the end, it boils down to policy and politics, even 
Koskenniemi has recognized that “a demonstration that ‘it all depends on politics’ 
does not move one inch towards a better politics.”496  If, where other means are 
lacking, the resort to intuition represents a viable – or even merely irresistible – 
means of retaining some sense of normative orientation in the resolution of 
controversies under international law, then its role in the law must be 
acknowledged. 
Consider, in this light, the comments of Judge Simma before the European Society 
of International Law in 2008, delivered in the context of the fragmentation debate.  
His comments are the more relevant by virtue of his position at the time on the 
bench of the ICJ, especially as appreciated through the prism of his opinion in the 
Oil Platforms case.  Moreover, his remarks draw expressly on his experience as a 
practitioner who is obliged to render judgments in cases of controversy as a matter 
of international law.  He begins with a relatively clear affirmation, taken in context, 
of the innate cosmopolitan model: 
international law has undoubtedly entered a stage at which it does not exhaust 
itself in correlative rights and obligations running between states, but also 
incorporates common interests of the international community as a whole, 
including not only states but all human beings.  In so doing, it begins to 
display more and more features which do not fit into the ‘civilist’, bilateralist 
structure of the traditional law. In other words, it is on its way to being a true 
public international law.497 
                                                                
496 Ibid., p. 8. 
497 Bruno Simma, Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner, 20 Eur. J. 
Int’l L. 265 (2009), p. 268. 
198 
 
Within the system of true public international law, incorporating the common 
interests of the international community as a whole, the ICJ represents a pillar “of 
unity and coherence of universal international law.”498  Moreover, the Court enjoys 
a complementary relationship with the International Law Commission with respect 
to that body’ s mission to foster universality under international law.499  Part of that 
complementary relationship is founded on “strong personal ties”.500  The same is 
true of the Court’s relationship with other international tribunals – the Court’s 
capacity to exercise “true public international law” is complementarily enhanced by 
virtue of personal association among members of various international tribunals: 
“quite a few international judges have moved from one court to another, thus also, 
more or less consciously, adding to the consistency of international 
jurisprudence.”501  Moreover, “such courts have explored other, less formal, 
cooperative mechanisms on their own initiative. For instance, more recently, 
meetings of judges of international courts also at the universal level have been 
organized upon the initiative of the ICJ, and are on their way to being 
institutionalized.”502  In saying this, however, Simma recognizes that such 
mechanisms “lack transparency”, among other things.503 
In critical terms, Simma’s frank comments may be taken to describe a cadre of elites 
developing international law according to their own policy, albeit in the name of the 
world.  I do not intend, however, to use selective treatment of Judge Simma’s 
straightforward commentary as a straw man.  Rather, in conclusion of this project, I 
raise his comments to recognize that one of the foremost jurists in international law 
offers clear-sighted recognition of an adjudicative function that resembles the 
custodial function, formerly sketched in the work of Judge Álvarez, in its wide 
allowance for the juridical development and maintenance of a “true public 
international law” serving the interests of the international community as a whole.   
In pragmatic terms, rather than critical, this may be understood in terms of 
especially qualified individuals resolving complex controversies as best they can, 
with the tools at their disposal and in accordance with some baseline sense of 
normative ends – however intuitive, or however hard to establish as a matter of 
positive law or empirical proof. 
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But if the innate cosmopolitan intuition has a proper – or simply unavoidable – role 
in international law, its ad hoc character will not enhance either its legitimacy or its 
utility.  The various appeals to the innate cosmopolitan model must begin to 
coalesce around a common vocabulary.504  Likewise, recourse to innate 
cosmopolitan ideas must be seen by author and audience alike as part of a wider 
discourse making use of similar ideas.  Thereby the different ends to which the 
innate cosmopolitan idea is put, and the different means by which the idea is 
articulated and substantiated, must be appreciated as a distinct doctrine serving a 
distinct purpose – and serving distinct masters – in international law and legal 
discourse.  Doing so will, on the one hand, enhance coherence and the possibility 
for coordinated development, where recourse to innate cosmopolitan ideas is 
deemed necessary or desirable.  On the other hand, doing so will more thoroughly 
and effectively expose the recourse to innate cosmopolitanism to clear criticism, 
which, if the practice will not be denied, is in the end the best check on the 
discontents of innate cosmopolitanism that international law and legal discourse is 
capable of administering. 
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Summary 
This book is an inquiry into cosmopolitanism in the discourse of international law, 
with particular attention to a specific stream of cosmopolitan thinking, which I call 
innate cosmopolitanism.  Innate cosmopolitanism stands for the proposition that 
the world as a whole represents a phenomenon with interests and even a will of its 
own, and is capable of establishing a foundation for universal norms under 
international law.  Innate cosmopolitanism has never been expressly developed as a 
doctrine in its own right, and thus lacks the consolidated vocabulary and critical 
engagement enjoyed by other schools of cosmopolitan thought, such as liberal 
cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan constitutional theory.  But despite the relative 
neglect of innate cosmopolitan ideas as part of a distinct theoretical construct, the 
innate cosmopolitan conception, in a variety of terms and contexts, has been central 
to the narrative and development of modern international law.  In observing innate 
cosmopolitanism to be a distinct theoretical construct, this work establishes the 
tradition of innate cosmopolitan thought in the discourse of international law, 
including its central concepts, terms and principles; maps out the distinct domain of 
different streams of cosmopolitan thought in international law; and engages in a 
close and critical evaluation of the role of innate cosmopolitan ideas, once 
recognized, in the discourse and development of international law. 
It bears noting that international law and international lawyers have regularly been 
described as cosmopolitan, but the term in this context has remained elusive, or has 
been taken as self-evident, and is rarely explained with any thoroughness.  What 
does cosmopolitanism generally mean in international law?  It does not properly 
refer to any narrowly orthodox theory or practice of international law, which 
presumes a consensual system of relations among equal and independent sovereign 
states.  Rather, at its most broad, the cosmopolitan obtains to the cosmopolis: a 
harmonious and inclusive, universal order.  That order stands in opposition to the 
consensual system, which allows for a cooperative (or uncooperative) anarchy of 
normative relations. 
When international lawyers are described as cosmopolitan, the association invokes 
aspirations to a system of law capable of purposefully sustaining order in the world 
on unified terms.  Their cosmopolitan order is an objective one, pretending to a 
normative authority that is superior to its subjects in principle and defined 
independently of them.  In contrast with the subjective system of international law 
as it is classically described, cosmopolitanism represents a normative condition that 
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is neither definable nor revocable by state subjects individually, nor by any other 
subjective actors in their individual capacities.  Cosmopolitanism replaces the 
political authority of sovereign states (and their analogs) with the authority of 
universal norms. 
Cosmopolitan aspirations at law to world order, independent of the political will 
of states and other subjective interests, have lately received critical attention.  
Scholarship has shed critical light on progressive aspirations to the would-be 
greater good of a unified cosmopolis of world relations, not mediated by 
subjective attachments.  This critical scholarship makes clear that cosmopolitan 
doctrine, despite its apparent antinomy with orthodox ideas of a consensual 
system of law among states, is neither wholly oppositional nor exactly subversive 
in its relationship to international law and international legal discourse.  Rather, 
the cosmopolitan ethos runs like a leitmotif throughout the work of diverse 
scholars and practitioners in modern international law.  Appreciating the 
cosmopolitan undercurrent of international law – and especially, as I argue here, 
appreciating the innate cosmopolitan undercurrent of international law – can be 
crucial to appreciating the historical project of international law, a project that is 
bound up with the tension between aspirations to objective international norms, 
and a subjective international system.  The critical attention to cosmopolitanism 
generally, however, has not adequately distinguished among distinct 
cosmopolitan doctrines, methods and norms. 
Liberal cosmopolitanism is a well-developed ethical doctrine in political theory.  
By means of a specific constructivist process – a particular deductive method – 
liberal cosmopolitanism comprehends norms developed out of what are taken to 
be universally-acceptable moral premises.  Liberal cosmopolitanism is expressive 
of normative individualism, and bound up with the core norms and values of 
human rights doctrine.  Constitutional cosmopolitans, on the other hand, 
identify world norms with the formal establishment of a global political 
settlement among actors in the international system, creating a new world order 
independent of its constitutive parts.  Constitutional cosmopolitanism is 
particularly bound up with the method of international law, as it turns on 
questions of formal sufficiency derived from positive terms of international law.  
Innate cosmopolitanism broadly shares the legal method of constitutional 
cosmopolitanism, insofar as it seeks to ascertain law from a historical source, 
rather than moral premises in the first instance, but distinguishes itself by 
reference to a historical source, the phenomenon that is the world as a whole, 
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which precedes – and, for its normativity, is not dependent upon – its 
acknowledgment as a matter of positive international law. 
Despite differences among liberal, constitutional and innate cosmopolitanism, 
each seeks to establish some autonomous normative power, an objective 
normativity for the world as a whole, as against the system of subjective 
authority identified with the relations of equal and independent states.  In 
aspiring to objective world norms exhibiting autonomous bases of legitimacy, 
each of the three aspires to world norms superior to international politics.  
Liberal and innate cosmopolitanism, however, emphasize different aspects of 
cosmopolitan thought: liberal cosmopolitanism emphasizes individuals in the 
world; innate cosmopolitanism emphasizes the individuality of the world.  
Constitutional cosmopolitanism, by contrast, is relatively agnostic as between the 
two: the potential constitutional settlement is open in its terms, and – so long as 
the constitution is a cosmopolitan one – either cosmopolitan vision, liberal or 
innate, might yield a constitutional arrangement provided it is satisfies a certain 
formal baseline of constitutional legitimacy. 
In terms of discourse, each of the three cosmopolitan streams is differently situated.  
The differences may be conceived as points along a line: at one end, liberal 
cosmopolitanism represents an ethical discourse applied to law; at the other end, 
constitutional cosmopolitanism represents a legal discourse largely congruent with 
traditional terms of international law, however radical its use of those terms.  
Between the two, innate cosmopolitanism represents a legal discourse that eschews 
some of the traditional terms of international law.  The differences are discernible 
by reference to the different allowance for ascertaining law and the different 
appreciation of sources exhibited by each cosmopolitan school of thought. 
Notably, though innate cosmopolitanism has not been recognized as a discrete 
school of thought even by its adherents, scholars and practitioners referring to 
innate cosmopolitan ideas tend regularly to invoke a long history of innate 
cosmopolitan ideas, in each case largely as though for the first time.  The vocabulary 
has never been sufficiently conformed or consolidated, such that the same historical 
lessons are repeated in various contexts, and scholars and practitioners regularly 
refer for a variety of purposes and in a variety of ways to a common history.  That 
history is a history of ideas in support of a normative potential vested in the world 
as a whole, capable of serving as a source of law under international law.  Because 
the innate cosmopolitan premise of a world social or political collective capable of 
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establishing norms and normative authority is so difficult to establish empirically, 
the history of innate cosmopolitan ideas plays an unusually significant role in the 
argument for innate cosmopolitan normativity.  The history of the idea, captured 
and recaptured in repetitious exercises, serves as a pedigree and bona fides where 
other support is lacking.  Furthermore, the regular recourse to an intellectual history 
of innate cosmopolitanism has bound application of the innate cosmopolitan model 
to the historical narrative of cosmopolitanism in international law more closely than 
other, better recognized forms of cosmopolitanism. 
Several characteristics define the consistent substance of the innate cosmopolitan 
idea.  For one, innate cosmopolitanism founds a bedrock normativity in 
international law on the will and interests of the world as a collective whole.  To 
found normativity on the will and interests of the world as a whole means to assume 
as a central premise that the world of people and peoples represents a collectivity 
capable of exhibiting a unified will or unified interests.  By conceiving of the world 
in terms of a discrete collective capable of exhibiting and sustaining an exercise of 
normative authority in its own interests or according to its own will, the world is 
made an autonomous phenomenon.  It is conceived to be independent of the 
smaller collectives and entities, including states, which it comprises.  Moreover, the 
autonomous world phenomenon is typically attributed something like personality – 
it is ‘subjectivized’, and thereby enjoys a special sort of political agency, expressed 
according to terms such as world public opinion.  The subjective and independent 
world phenomenon, then, becomes a crucial foundation for normativity in the 
international system: the world as a whole is taken to represent the only objective 
foundation of international norms, capable of escaping the contradictions of a 
system of law established according to consent. 
Another characteristic of innate cosmopolitanism is an appreciation of the world 
phenomenon as a fact.  The world as a social or political whole is perceived to exist 
as a function of comprehensive interdependence in the world.  Moreover, because 
the subjective personality of the world as a whole is understood as a fact or 
phenomenon, the world phenomenon precedes and is independent of any positive 
expression – or lack thereof – as a matter of international law.  Its recognition is 
joined to an emphasis on observational method, as opposed to formal legal method.  
Likewise, its normative potential flows from the fact of its existence, rather than any 
positive law affirmation.  The nature of the subjective personality manifested by the 
world unit will be discernible as a matter of proper observation.  Accordingly, innate 
cosmopolitanism has typically relied on assertions of roughly sociological 
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observation – if not simple intuition – to describe characteristics of the 
interdependent world as a whole at any given point in time.  From observed 
attributes in wide-ranging fields that encompass economic, political, cultural and 
psychological study, the norms adhered to by the world as a whole at any given 
point in time may be discerned, and from those norms law and policy may be 
determined. 
The premise that the world as a whole represents a viable – even fundamental – 
normative potential in international law, independent of any positive law 
affirmation, represents a challenge to the limitations of voluntary positivism, and 
particularly a challenge to the limited list of traditionally-recognized sources of 
international law, such as are recognized by Art. 38 of the World Court’s statute.  
This is one of the crucial and most controversial aspects of innate cosmopolitanism 
as it is employed in international legal discourse.  Also controversial, there exists 
under the innate cosmopolitan model a close link between law and policy: the 
normative potential attributed to the autonomous world as a whole becomes, in the 
work of theorists and practitioners, synonymous with policy tailored to guide that 
potential towards certain ends, or at least to constrain it from arriving at others.  
The incorporation of a policy mandate, which may be observed as well in a stream 
of innate cosmopolitan discourse in the jurisprudence of the ICJ, reflects the 
expansive scope of legal argumentation and legal authority under innate 
cosmopolitanism.  That scope is constrained neither by traditional terms of positive 
law, nor traditional channels of political contestation. 
In sum, a normative potential flows from the particular nature of the world as a 
whole, such that proper observation of social and political interrelationships that 
make up the phenomenon of the social or political world as a whole will yield 
universal norms, which norms will guide law and policy alike.  In application, the 
innate cosmopolitan model has been invoked before a tribunal such as the ICJ to 
extend normative authority over a given matter, on the basis of what is held to be in 
the interest of the world as a whole, where positive law may not produce a 
comparable result.  Furthermore, the extension of authority attributed to the ICJ 
typically takes an ad hoc character across cases, often invoked in a sui generis 
manner, in application to select issues as they arise.  In part, that ad hoc character 
may be attributable to the lack of any developed vocabulary or established 
framework for a doctrine of innate cosmopolitanism, in part it may be attributable 
to the specific appeal of innate cosmopolitanism to a grounds for normativity that 
exists independent of positive international law. 
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Having traced the contours of innate cosmopolitanism, including the appeal of and 
to innate cosmopolitanism in scholarly and jurisprudential discourses of 
international law, I turn to critique.  Innate cosmopolitanism suppresses political 
contestation in favor of assertions of observational science or intuition; it vests elite 
actors with an authority for norms even as it situates responsibility for the 
expression of those norms elsewhere, in the world as a whole as it may be properly 
observed or intuited; and it affirms status quo historical conditions by virtue of 
founding novel normative authority on the nature of the world as it exists at any 
point in time.  Going further, the three grounds taken together suggest that innate 
cosmopolitan arguments may ultimately stand, intentionally or not, for policy 
interests that support the status quo. 
In founding a world legal order on the aggregation of observed normative acts 
and expectations applicable to the world at any given point in time, the rule-
making process prefigured by innate cosmopolitanism is emptied of 
responsibility: the rules appear to create and recreate themselves; they are merely 
discovered by constant scientific investigation, and announced by the 
presumptively proper person, body or instrument.  The norm is observed, rather 
than deliberated or decided upon, or it is derived from world public opinion, 
rather than the reasoned determination of any legislator or judge.  In light of the 
vast field contemplated to determine world norms sociologically at any point in 
time, however, the observational method itself reestablishes the contested field 
of politics in other terms.  Any given set of methodological choices by which to 
comprehend world norms potentially represents a particular policy and discrete 
set of interests.  The complexity of the research apparently necessary to make 
good on the innate cosmopolitan intuition suggests that it in fact cannot be 
substantiated or even meaningfully defined.  Thus innate cosmopolitanism 
would suppress subjective international politics by an appeal to science, or 
sociological observation, but the science or method of observation becomes a 
new field of contestation, apparently incapable of resolution. 
The variability of the innate cosmopolitan phenomenon undermines the guiding 
purpose to achieving an objective authority for international legal norms, namely, 
the ability to overcome the paradox and self-contradiction of a subjective system 
of international law.  With variability comes manipulability, and the association 
of law and policy that also characterizes innate cosmopolitanism takes on a 
particularly controversial character.  Furthermore, the limitations of sociological 
method also expose to critique the underlying premises of an interdependent 
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world collective, revealing a consistent limitation of innate cosmopolitan 
doctrine since Vitoria: the vision of a world social or political complex remains 
just that; it is still in the first place a vision or matter of intuition, rather than 
anything more substantial or precise.  In consequence, the appeal to world 
normativity under innate cosmopolitanism can appear quixotic, or worse: 
political contestation is suppressed, but responsibility is diminished in an 
affirmation of unsubstantiated ends. 
Moreover, innate cosmopolitanism expressly associates normativity with the 
perceived historical reality of the world.  Because the proper observation of acts, 
experiences and expectations in the world is theoretically supposed to yield the 
interests and will of the world, the normativity of the world is discerned in terms of 
historical fact.  Likewise, since the norms that flow from innate cosmopolitanism 
are effectively discovered by observation of historical acts and conditions of the 
world, innate cosmopolitan norms are supposed to represent the world as it is.  To 
represent the world as it is, is to represent the status quo.  Thereby the innate 
cosmopolitan model adopts a posture deeply tied to historical circumstance, likewise 
binding the norms to which the model would give rise to status quo historical 
conditions.  As a consequence, the historical contingency of innate cosmopolitan 
norms suggests, at least in theory, a model that ultimately serves to affirm – even in 
its application for reform – status quo conditions, despite a traditional association of 
innate cosmopolitan ideas with progressive legal scholarship. 
The story, however, does not end with the critique.  Innate cosmopolitanism 
purports to offer a compelling account of a world phenomenon, which indeed 
appears to resonate with an internationally-conscious audience, be it diplomats, 
scholars, or a world public, loosely defined.  The innate cosmopolitan account 
substantiates the international normative regime in a coherent way: there is a 
foundational normative potential that lends an authority to international law beyond 
the subjective authority of its subjects.  Likewise, innate cosmopolitanism has 
indeed enjoyed a long history of appeal, which continues to represent arguably its 
greatest strength.  It has been suggested, in other places and other words, that the 
persistent historical intuition of innate cosmopolitanism may be its best proof.  In 
that light, innate cosmopolitanism functions like a heuristic model, or, to use 
another analogy, a sort of lodestar: a guide by which to orient the ends of 
international law, and thereby a means of affirming the normativity of the 
international legal system.  In this context, even the most trenchant critic will often 
appear to share the fundamental intuition that drives the innate cosmopolitan 
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model, exhibiting a faith in the ends of international law even absent any more 
definitive or scientific exposition of the same. 
If, ultimately, the innate cosmopolitan intuition will not be denied in 
international law, it must be better understood.  The terms of its articulation and 
the ends to which those terms are applied in the discourse of international law 
call for more consistency, and more consistent recognition.  Doing so will allow 
for a clearer and more comprehensive critical treatment of innate 
cosmopolitanism as a school of thought – including the method of innate 
cosmopolitan argumentation, its premises and the ends to which they are put – 
as well as its particular instantiations.  This book represents a first step in that 
project. 
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Samenvatting 
Aangeboren kosmopolitanism: in kart brengen van een latente theorie van wereld normen. 
Deze dissertatie is een onderzoek naar kosmopolitisme binnen het discours van het 
internationaal recht, voornamelijk met betrekking tot een specifieke stroom van 
kosmopolitisch denken die ik aangeboren kosmopolitisme noem.  Aangeboren 
kosmopolitisme stelt dat de wereld als geheel een fenomeen met een eigen belang en 
zelfs met een eigen wil is, en dat die wereld bovendien een basis voor universele 
normen kan vormen.  Aangeboren kosmopolitisme is nooit uitdrukkelijk als eigen 
doctrine ontwikkeld, en dus ontbreekt het aan een geconsolideerde vocabulaire en 
kritische aandacht die andere scholen van denken wel bezitten, zoals het liberale 
kosmopolitisme en theorieën over een kosmopolitisch constitutionalisme.  Maar 
ondanks de relatieve verwaarlozing van het aangeboren kosmopolitisch denken 
neemt zij, in een verscheidenheid van termen en contexten, een centrale rol in het 
verhaal en de ontwikkeling van het moderne internationaal recht.  Dit onderzoek 
brengt het aangeboren kosmopolitisme binnen het discours van het internationale 
recht in kaart, met inbegrip van zijn centrale concepten, termen en principes, als 
apart domein van verschillende stromen van het kosmopolitische denken.  
Daarnaast volgt in dit onderzoek een nadere kritische evaluatie van de rol van 
aangeboren kosmopolitische ideeën in het discours en de ontwikkeling van het 
internationaal recht. 
Het internationaal recht en volkenrechtjuristen zijn regelmatig beschreven als 
kosmopolitisch, maar de term blijft vaag of wordt als vanzelfsprekend ervaren.  
Kosmopolitisme wordt zelden grondig uitgelegd.  Wat betekent kosmopolitisme in 
het algemeen in het internationaal recht?  Kosmopolitisme verwijst niet naar een 
orthodoxe theorie van het internationale recht, die een consensueel rechtsstelsel 
onder gelijke en onafhankelijke soevereine staten veronderstelt.  In plaats daarvan 
draait het kosmopolitisme om het nastreven van de kosmo-polis: een harmonieuze 
en inclusieve universele orde. Die orde contrasteert met het consensuele systeem: 
het kosmopolitische systeem vraagt om een universele orde, terwijl het consensuele 
systeem een coöperatieve (of niet-coöperatieve) anarchie van normatieve relaties 
voorstelt.   
Wanneer internationale juristen als kosmopolitisch worden beschreven, wordt hun 
denken en handelen geassocieerd met aspiraties naar een rechtssysteem dat in staat 
is om onder universele voorwaarden doelbewust orde in de wereld te bewaren.  Hun 
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kosmopolitische orde is een objectieve orde, een orde die in beginsel naar een 
normatieve autoriteit streeft die superieur is aan haar onderdanen en onafhankelijk 
van hen gedefinieerd wordt.  In tegenstelling tot het subjectieve systeem van het 
internationaal recht zoals het traditioneel beschreven wordt, het kosmopolitisme een 
normatieve voorwaarde die noch definieerbaar, noch herroepelijk is door 
individuele onderdanen, noch door enige andere subjectieve actoren in hun 
individuele capaciteiten.  Kosmopolitisme vervangt de politieke autoriteit van 
soevereine staten (en hun analogen) door de autoriteit van universele normen. 
Recentelijk zijn kosmopolitische aspiraties naar een wereldorde die onafhankelijk 
van de politieke wil van staten en andere subjectieve belangen opereert, 
bekritiseerd.  In de literatuur is een kritisch licht geworpen op de progressieve 
ambities van het zogenaamde grotere goed van een universele kosmopolis van 
wereldrelaties, die niet gemiddeld wordt door subjectieve belangen.  Dit kritisch 
denken maakt duidelijk dat de kosmopolitische doctrine – ondanks de schijnbare 
antinomie met orthodoxe ideeën van een dergelijk  consensueel rechtssysteem 
tussen staten – in zijn verhouding tot het internationaal recht en doctrine geheel 
oppositioneel noch subversief is.  Integendeel, de kosmopolitische ethos loopt 
als een leidmotief door het werk van diverse volkenrechtjuristen in het moderne 
internationaal recht.  Het waarderen van de kosmopolitische onderstroom van 
het internationaal recht – en voornamelijk, zoals ik hier beweer, het waarderen 
van de aangeboren kosmopolitische onderstroom van het internationaal recht – 
kan cruciaal zijn voor het waarderen van het historische project van het 
internationaal recht, een project dat verbonden is met de spanning tussen 
aspiraties naar objectieve internationale normen en een subjectief internationaal 
systeem.  De kritische aandacht voor kosmopolitisme in het algemeen heeft 
echter onvoldoende onderscheid  gemaakt tussen aparte kosmopolitische 
doctrines, methoden en normen. 
Liberaal kosmopolitisme is een goed ontwikkelde doctrine in de politieke theorie.  
Door middel van een apart constructivistisch proces – een bepaalde deductieve 
methode – ontwikkelt liberaal kosmopolitisme normen op basis van wat men 
ziet als universeel aanvaardbare morele uitgangspunten.  Liberaal 
kosmopolitisme geeft uitdrukking aan normatief individualisme en is verbonden 
met de kernnormen en waarden van mensenrechten.  Anderzijds identificeren 
constitutionele kosmopolieten , wereldnormen met de formele oprichting van 
een wereldwijd politiek akkoord tussen actoren in het internationale systeem, 
zodanig dat een nieuwe wereldorde geschapen wordt die onafhankelijk is van 
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zijn samenstellende delen.  Constitutioneel kosmopolitisme is in het bijzonder 
verbonden met de methode van het internationaal recht, aangezien het zich richt 
op vragen van formele toereikendheid die voortkomen uit positieve vaktermen 
van het internationaal recht.  Aangeboren kosmopolitisme deelt in grote lijnen de 
juridische methode van constitutioneel kosmopolitisme, in die zin dat 
aangeboren kosmopolitisme de wet in eerste instantie wenst vast te stellen door 
middel van een historische bron in plaats van door morele uitgangspunten.  Maar 
aangeboren kosmopolitisme onderscheidt zich van constitutioneel 
kosmopolitisme door de verwijzing naar een historische bron – het fenomeen 
dat de wereld als geheel is – die voorafgaat aan de bevestiging door het positieve 
internationaal recht en voor zijn normativiteit niet afhankelijk is van positieve 
bevestiging door de wet. 
Ondanks verschillen tussen het liberale, constitutionele en aangeboren 
kosmopolitisme proberen ze allen om een autonome normatieve kracht te 
vestigen, een objectieve normativiteit voor de gehele wereld als tegen het 
systeem van subjectieve autoriteit dat geïdentificeerd wordt met de relaties tussen 
gelijke en onafhankelijke staten.  In het streven naar objectieve wereldnormen 
die autonome bases van legitimiteit zijn, streven ze alle drie naar wereldnormen 
die superieur zijn aan de internationale politiek.  Maar liberaal en aangeboren 
kosmopolitisme benadrukken verschillende aspecten van het kosmopolitische 
denken: liberaal kosmopolitisme benadrukt individuen in de wereld; aangeboren 
kosmopolitisme benadrukt de individualiteit van de wereld.  Daarentegen is 
constitutioneel kosmopolitisme relatief agnostisch: het potentiële constitutionele 
akkoord is relatief open in zijn voorwaarden, en – zolang de grondwet 
kosmopolitisch blijft –beide kosmopolitische visies, liberaal of aangeboren, 
kunnen in een grondwettelijke regeling opgenomen worden, mits deze voldoet 
aan een formele eisen van de constitutionele legitimiteit. 
In termen van discours kunnen elk van de drie kosmopolitische stromen anders 
worden geplaatst.  De verschillen kunnen worden opgevat als punten langs een lijn: 
aan de ene kant representeert het liberaal kosmopolitisme een op de wet toegepast 
ethisch discours ; aan de andere kant representeert het constitutioneel 
kosmopolitisme een juridische discours dat grotendeels congruent is met traditionele 
termen in het internationaal recht.  Tussen deze twee in vormt het aangeboren 
kosmopolitisme een juridisch discours dat een deel van de traditionele termen van 
het internationaal recht vermijdt.  De verschillen kunnen worden onderscheiden aan 
de hand van de manier waarop elke stroming het recht vaststelt, alsmede door de 
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verschillen in de waardering van bronnen die door elke kosmopolitische school van 
denken ten toon wordt gespreid. 
Meer in het bijzonder, hoewel aangeboren kosmopolitisme zelfs door zijn 
aanhangers niet als een aparte school van denken erkend is, hebben 
volkenrechtjuristen met betrekking tot aangeboren kosmopolitische ideeën de 
neiging om regelmatig een beroep te doen op een lange geschiedenis van 
aangeboren kosmopolitische ideeën, in iedere zaak alsof het voor de eerste keer is.  
De vocabulaire is als zodanig nooit voldoende geconformeerd of geconsolideerd.  
Dezelfde lessen worden in verschillende contexten herhaald, en volkenrechtjuristen 
verwijzen regelmatig naar een gemeenschappelijke geschiedenis voor een 
verscheidenheid aan doeleinden en op verschillende manieren.  Die geschiedenis is 
een geschiedenis van ideeën ter ondersteuning van een normatieve potentieel in 
handen van de wereld als geheel dat in staat is om te dienen als een bron van 
internationaal recht.  Omdat de aangeboren kosmopolitische premisse van een 
sociaal of politiek wereldcollectief dat in staat is tot vaststelling van normen en 
normatief gezag, zo moeilijk empirisch is vast te stellen, speelt de geschiedenis van 
aangeboren kosmopolitische ideeën een buitengewoon belangrijke rol in het 
pleidooi voor aangeboren kosmopolitische normativiteit.  De geschiedenis van het 
idee, gevangen en opnieuw gevangen in repetitieve oefeningen, dient als een 
stamboek en bona fides waar andere ondersteuning ontbreekt.  Bovendien heeft het 
regelmatige beroep op een intellectuele geschiedenis van aangeboren 
kosmopolitisme het aangeboren kosmopolitische model sterker gebonden aan het 
historische verhaal van kosmopolitisme in het internationaal recht dan andere, beter 
erkende vormen van kosmopolitisme. 
Verschillende kenmerken definiëren de consistente inhoud van het aangeboren 
kosmopolitische idee.  Om te beginnen fundeert aangeboren kosmopolitisme een 
fundamentele normativiteit in het internationaal recht op de wil en de belangen van 
de wereld als een collectief geheel.  Wat volgt uit deze fundering is het als centraal 
uitgangspunt aannemen dat de wereld van mensen en volkeren een collectief  is, dat 
in staat is een verenigde wil of verenigde belangen te vertonen.  Door de wereld 
voor te stellen in termen van een ingetogen collectief dat in staat is om de 
uitoefening van normatief gezag te vertonen en te behouden volgens eigen wil  
wordt de wereld tot een autonoom fenomeen gemaakt.  Het wordt opgevat als 
onafhankelijk van de kleinere collectieven en entiteiten die ze  omvat.  Bovendien 
wordt het fenomeen van de autonome wereld meestal beschreven met iets als 
persoonlijkheid – het wordt tot een subjectieve actor gemaakt, en geniet daardoor 
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een speciaal soort van politieke werking, uitgedrukt in termen als ‘wereld publieke 
opinie’.  Dit fenomeen van een subjectieve en onafhankelijke wereld wordt 
vervolgens een cruciale basis voor normativiteit in het internationale systeem: de 
wereld als geheel is de enige objectieve basis van internationale normen, en is in 
staat te ontsnappen aan de tegenstellingen van een rechtssysteem dat is vastgesteld 
op basis van consensus. 
Een ander kenmerk van aangeboren kosmopolitisme is een waardering van het 
fenomeen wereld als een feit.  De wereld als sociaal of politiek geheel wordt gezien 
als een functie van de uitgebreide onderlinge samenhang in de wereld.  Bovendien 
gaat het fenomeen wereld vooraf aan enige positieve uitdrukking – of het ontbreken 
daarvan – in het internationaal recht, omdat de subjectieve persoonlijkheid van de 
wereld als geheel wordt opgevat als een feit of verschijnsel.  Deze erkenning is 
verbonden met een nadruk op een observerende methode, in tegenstelling tot een 
meer formeel-juridische  methode.  Ook haar normatief potentieel vloeit voort uit 
het feit van haar bestaan, in plaats van uit een bevestiging door het positieve recht.  
De aard van de persoonlijkheid die de wereld laat zien, wordt duidelijk door goede 
observatie.  Dienovereenkomstig is aangeboren kosmopolitisme vaak gebaseerd op 
beweringen naar aanleiding van ‘sociologische’ observatie – zo niet simpelweg  
intuïtie – om de kenmerken van de onderling afhankelijke wereld als een geheel op 
een bepaald punt in de tijd te beschrijven.  Van de waargenomen kenmerken op 
uiteenlopende terreinen als de economie, de politiek, cultuur en de psychologie, 
kunnen normen worden afgeleid waaraan de wereld als geheel op een bepaald punt 
in de tijd hecht, en op basis van die normen kan recht en beleid worden bepaald. 
Het uitgangspunt dat de wereld als geheel staat voor een levensvatbaar – zelfs 
fundamenteel – normatief potentieel in het internationaal recht, onafhankelijk van 
enige bevestiging door het positieve recht, vormt een uitdaging voor de grenzen van 
het voluntaristisch positivisme, en in het bijzonder een uitdaging voor de beperkte 
lijst traditioneel erkende bronnen van internationaal recht, zoals die is opgenomen in 
art. 38 van het Statuut van het Internationaal Gerechtshof.  Dit is een van de meest 
cruciale en meest controversiële aspecten van aangeboren kosmopolitisme zoals het 
in het internationaal recht wordt gebruikt.  Eveneens controversieel is dat er binnen 
aangeboren kosmopolitisme een nauwe band bestaat tussen recht en beleid: het 
normatief potentieel dat wordt toegeschreven aan de autonome wereld als geheel 
wordt, in het werk van theoretici en juristen, synoniem met beleid op maat dat naar 
bepaalde doelen leidt, of op zijn minst ervoor zorgt dat andere doelen niet worden 
bereikt. De integratie van een beleidsmandaat, dat ook binnen een aangeboren 
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kosmopolitische stroming in de jurisprudentie van het Internationaal Gerechtshof 
opgemerkt kan worden, weerspiegelt de uitgestrekte omvang van juridische 
argumentatie en juridische autoriteit onder aangeboren kosmopolitisme.  Die 
reikwijdte wordt niet ingeperkt door de traditionele beperkingen van het positieve 
recht, noch door de traditionele kanalen van politieke twist. 
Samenvattend, een normatief potentieel vloeit voort uit de bijzondere aard van de 
wereld als geheel, in de zin dat een goede observatie van sociale en politieke 
verbanden die deel uitmaken van het fenomeen van de sociale of politieke wereld als 
geheel, universele normen kan opleveren, die leidend zijn voor zowel recht als 
beleid. Bij de toepassing is het model van aangeboren kosmopolitisme gebruikt voor 
tribunalen, zoals het Internationaal Gerechtshof, om hun bevoegdheid over een 
bepaald onderwerp uit te breiden op basis van wat in het belang van de wereld als 
geheel is. In deze gevallen kon het positief recht geen vergelijkbaar resultaat 
produceren.  Bovendien heeft de uitbreiding van het gezag van het Internationaal 
Gerechtshof meestal een ad hoc karakter, en is die uitbreiding slechts van toepassing 
op afzonderlijke kwesties, zoals die zich voordoen.  Voor een deel kan dat ad hoc 
karakter toegeschreven worden aan het ontbreken van een ontwikkeld vocabulaire 
of een gevestigd kader voor de doctrine van aangeboren kosmopolitisme, voor een 
ander deel kan het toegeschreven worden aan de specifieke aantrekkingskracht van 
aangeboren kosmopolitisme om normativiteit te vinden los van de beperkte 
gronden onder het positieve internationaal recht.   
Na de contouren van aangeboren kosmopolitisme te hebben geschetst, met inbegrip 
van de aantrekkingskracht van aangeboren kosmopolitisme in het wetenschappelijke 
en jurisprudentiële discours van het internationaal recht, wend ik mij tot de kritiek 
op deze stroming.  Aangeboren kosmopolitisme onderdrukt politieke conflicten ten 
gunste van beweringen van observerende aard; het verleent elite actoren de 
bevoegdheid om normen vast te stellen, ook al situeert het de verantwoordelijkheid 
voor de expressie van die normen elders (namelijk in de wereld als geheel, zoals die 
waargenomen dan wel aangevoeld kan worden); en het bevestigt de status quo van 
historische omstandigheden door gezag te funderen op de aard van de wereld zoals 
die bestaat op enig punt in de tijd. Om nog een stap verder te gaan: de drie gronden 
tezamen wijzen er uiteindelijk op dat de argumenten van aangeboren 
kosmopolitisme, opzettelijk of niet, voor een beleid kunnen staan dat de status quo 
ondersteunt. 
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Door de oprichting van een wereldrechtsorde op de aggregatie van 
geobserveerde normatieve handelingen en verwachtingen die van toepassing zijn 
op de wereld als een geheel op een bepaald punt in de tijd, is het 
rechtscheppende proces van aangeboren kosmopolitisme geledigd van elke vorm 
van verantwoordelijkheid. De regels lijken zichzelf te scheppen en te 
herscheppen en ze worden slechts door constant wetenschappelijk onderzoek 
ontdekt, en door de vermoedelijk juiste persoon of  instantie verkondigd.  De 
norm wordt waargenomen in plaats van te worden vastgesteld middels 
beraadslaging of een beslissing, of hij is afgeleid van de internationale publieke 
opinie, in plaats van met redenen omkleed te zijn vastgesteld door een wetgever 
of rechter.  In het licht van het brede terrein waarin wereldnormen op een 
sociologische manier op enig punt in de tijd worden bepaald, herstelt de 
observerende methode echter zelf het bestreden gebied van de politiek in andere 
termen.  Elke set van methodologische keuzes, waardoor de wereldnormen 
worden begrepen, kan een bepaald beleid en een bepaalde set van belangen 
weerspiegelen.  De complexiteit van het onderzoek dat nodig is om de intuïtie 
van aangeboren kosmopolitische te ondersteunen suggereert dat het in feite niet 
kan worden onderbouwd of zelfs zinvol gedefinieerd.  Aangeboren 
kosmopolitisme zou zo subjectieve internationale politiek onderdrukken met een 
beroep op de wetenschap of sociologische observatie, maar de wetenschap of de 
methode van observatie wordt zelf een nieuw terrein van de betwisting zonder 
dat dit tot een oplossing leidt.  
De verscheidenheid van het fenomeen van aangeboren kosmopolitisme 
ondermijnt het leidende doel om te streven naar een objectieve autoriteit voor 
internationale juridische normen, namelijk de mogelijkheid om de paradox en 
innerlijke tegenstrijdigheid van een subjectief systeem van internationaal recht te 
overwinnen.  Met verscheidenheid komt maakbaarheid, en de associatie van 
wetgeving en beleid die ook kenmerkend is voor aangeboren kosmopolitisme 
krijgt dan een bijzonder controversieel karakter. Bovendien stellen de 
beperkingen van de sociologische methode ook de onderliggende 
uitgangspunten van een onderling afhankelijk wereldcollectief bloot aan kritiek, 
die een voortdurende beperking van de leer van aangeboren kosmopolitisme 
sinds Vitoria onthult: de visie van een wereldcomplex blijft niet meer dan dat 
(het is nog steeds in de eerste plaats een visie of intuïtie, in plaats van iets meer 
substantieels of nauwkeurigs).  Als gevolg hiervan kan het beroep op een 
normativiteit van de wereld door aangeboren kosmopolitisme onuitvoerbaar 
klinken, of, nog erger, terwijl politieke betwisting wordt onderdrukt wordt 
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verantwoordelijkheid verminderd bij een bevestiging van ongefundeerde 
uiteinden.  
Bovendien verbindt aangeboren kosmopolitisme normativiteit met de 
gepercipieerde historische realiteit van de wereld. Aangezien theoretisch 
verondersteld wordt dat de juiste waarneming van historische handelingen, 
ervaringen en verwachtingen van de wereld, de belangen en wil van de wereld baat 
op zullen brengen, wordt de normativiteit van de wereld opgevat in termen van 
historische feiten.  Omdat de normen die uit aangeboren kosmopolitisme 
voortvloeien door observatie van historische handelingen en omstandigheden van 
de wereld ontdekt moeten worden, wordt ook verondersteld dat aangeboren 
kosmopolitische normen de wereld zoals die is vertegenwoordigen.  De wereld zoals 
die bestaat vertegenwoordigen, betekent de belangen van de status quo behartigen. 
Hierdoor neemt het model van aangeboren kosmopolitisme een houding aan die ten 
diepste gebonden is aan historische omstandigheden, met als gevolg dat de normen 
die hieruit voortvloeien eveneens aan de status quo van bepaalde historische 
omstandigheden gebonden zijn.  Als gevolg hiervan doet de historische contingentie 
van aangeboren kosmopolitische normen, althans in theorie, reeds het vermoeden 
rijzen van een model dat uiteindelijk - zelfs in haar poging tot hervorming - dient 
om de status quo voorwaarden te bevestigen, ondanks de traditionele verbinding 
tussen aangeboren kosmopolitische ideeën en een progressieve rechtstheorie. 
Maar het verhaal eindigt niet met de kritiek. Aangeboren kosmopolitisme beweert 
een overtuigende visie van de wereld als fenomeen te bieden, die inderdaad lijkt te 
resoneren met een internationaal georiënteerd publiek, zoals diplomaten, 
wetenschappers, of een (los gedefinieerd) wereldpubliek. Het betoog van 
aangeboren kosmopolitisme onderbouwt het internationale normatieve regime op 
coherente wijze: er is een fundamenteel normatief potentieel dat het internationaal 
recht gezag geeft onafhankelijk van dat van haar onderdanen. Ook heeft aangeboren 
kosmopolitisme inderdaad een lange geschiedenis van aantrekkingskracht, die 
misschien nog steeds wel haar grootste kracht vertegenwoordigt. Er is gesuggereerd, 
op andere plaatsen en in andere woorden, dat de aanhoudende historische intuïtie 
van aangeboren kosmopolitisme zijn beste bewijs is. In dat licht functioneert 
aangeboren kosmopolitisme als een heuristisch model, of, om een andere metafoor 
te gebruiken, als een soort Poolster: een gids waarmee men zich kan oriënteren in de 
uiterste contreien van het internationaal recht, en daarmee wordt het een middel om 
de normativiteit van de internationale rechtsorde te bevestigen.  In dit verband zal 
blijken dat zelfs de scherpste criticus de fundamentele intuïtie die het aangeboren 
224 
 
kosmopolitische model aandrijft vaak deelt, door het tonen van een geloof in de 
uiteindelijke doelen van het internationaal recht, niettegenstaande het feit dat een 
definitief of wetenschappelijk betoog hieromtrent ontbreekt.  
Als uiteindelijk de aangeboren kosmopolitische intuïtie in het internationaal recht 
niet zal worden ontkend, dan moet ze beter begrepen worden.  De termen 
waarin die intuïtie wordt uitgedrukt en de doelen waarvoor deze begrippen 
worden ingezet in het discours van het internationaal recht vereisen meer 
consistentie en een consistentere erkenning.  Hierdoor zal een duidelijkere en 
uitgebreidere kritische behandeling van aangeboren kosmopolitisme als een 
school van denken - met inbegrip van zijn specifieke wijze van argumentatie, zijn 
uitgangspunten en de doelen waarvoor die worden ingezet, evenals zijn 
bijzondere concretiseringen - mogelijk worden. Dit boek is een eerste stap in dat 
project. 
